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The
Journal
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Homepage - www.members.tripod.com/usiofindia/htmlpages/Main.htm

Vol CXXIX

July-September 1999

No. 537

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 250.00. Subscription should be sent to the Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution.

Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be addressed to the Director.

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EDITORIAL

As a nuclear India grapples with the fallout stemming from Pokhran II, international pressure is being exerted on her to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India has made public the draft Indian nuclear doctrine. It is bound to generate a lot of debate. The lead article titled, "The Proposed Indian Nuclear Doctrine" by Professor Matin Zuberi deals with the essential ingredients of the nuclear doctrine - no first use, credible minimum nuclear deterrence and not resorting to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

There is a need to maintain a highly effective conventional military capability to raise the threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict, as well as that of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. There is a need for radical restructuring and integration of the Defence Forces including the Ministry of Defence. An article by Admiral VS Shekhawat on the subject contains valuable suggestions and makes interesting reading.

The Armed Forces deserve praise for an outstanding performance in the Kargil operations. The burden of physical assault and capture of heights at 15,000 feet and more, was borne by the infantry soldiers and young officers. They fought gallantly and made every Indian proud of them. The Armed Forces fought against several odds. Lack of suitable equipment was too glaring to be ignored. The fact that our Armed Forces still delivered the goods, does speak volumes for the grit and determination of our troops. The article titled, "Beyond Kargil" has been compiled by Dr S Kalyanaraman. It is based on the proceedings of a Panel Discussion conducted at the USI during July 1999. The major issues covered pertain to Pakistan's future options and India's military and diplomatic options. In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict, there is an inescapable need for modernisation of the Armed Forces to deal with future threat perceptions with confidence.

The Proposed Indian Nuclear Doctrine

MATIN ZUBERI

Military doctrines can be strategic, tactical, and operational; the last two are found in field manuals. Nuclear doctrines, generally kept secret, lay down procedures and targets for the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. Occasionally, such doctrines are summarised as "massive retaliation", "flexible response" or "assured destruction". The first nuclear weapon powers accumulated nuclear stockpiles before they could enunciate nuclear doctrines. Reversing this process, the National Security Advisory Board has produced a consensus document even before the development of an operational Indian nuclear force.

There was no American policy guidance regarding the employment of nuclear weapons until 1948, i.e., three years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Emergency war plans codenamed, 'Pincher', 'Broiler' and 'Frolic' prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed atomic offensives against the former Soviet Union from bases in Britain Egypt, India and Japan. War Plan 'Halfmoon', calling for 50 atomic bombs to be dropped on 20 Russian cities, however, precipitated a debate leading to secret directive NSC-30 of 16 September 1948. This simply stated that "in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to use promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly" and that the decision to use atomic weapons "must be made by the Chief Executive." This perfunctory guidance, even without its endorsement by President Truman, remained the only specific statement on American nuclear policy approved by the National Security Council until 1960. Presidential Directive NSC 162/1, approved on 30

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

October 1953, had a single ominous sentence; "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions."

Nuclear deterrence rests on the paradox that while the utility of nuclear weapons lies in their *non-use* in combat, the deterrence effect is reinforced by the ability and willingness to use them in case deterrence fails. The terrible apparatus of deterrence is set up precisely to deter the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. Although often presented as complementary, there is a fundamental difference between the strategies of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting. The capacity to deter cannot be confused with the capacity to win. The threat entailed in deterrence strategy is the threat of *punishment*, while a war-fighting strategy threatens *defeat*.

This basic difference is reflected in force requirements and deployment patterns. 'Intra-war deterrence', 'intra-war bargaining', and 'escalation dominance' are some of the requirements of a war-fighting strategy, which also demands a wide range of weapons systems and increasingly accurate delivery vehicles. All this leads to the search for nuclear superiority. The open-ended nuclear arms race of the Cold War was driven by the incessant search for nuclear advantage, necessitated not only by the dilemmas of extended deterrence but the war-fighting strategies of the major contenders. As former US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger once put it: " You show me a Secretary of Defence who's planning not to prevail and I'll show you a Secretary of Defence who ought to be impeached."

The consensus document of the NSAB outlines only the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces. Many details of policy and strategy concerning force structures and nuclear targeting schemes, which could not be discussed in a document designed for public debate, will flow from these broad principles and will have to be laid down separately.

The unique feature of the doctrine is that it is anchored in India's continued commitment to nuclear disarmament, which it

describes as the country's national security objective. As the first nuclear weapon powers have discarded nuclear disarmament even as a distantly envisioned possibility, it is incumbent on India to maintain its links with the large global community which continues to struggle for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The categorical commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons determines the contours of India's nuclear posture. This commitment is not just a verbal pledge; it will be reflected in the structure, deployment and state of readiness of Indian nuclear forces. Some nuclear weapon powers have been reluctant to give a similar pledge precisely because of its derivative policy choices. India will campaign for an international treaty banning first use of nuclear weapons. If all nuclear weapon powers subscribed to a treaty banning first use, it would be tantamount to a complete ban on any use of these weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime, India will also work for an internationally binding and unqualified commitment by all nuclear weapon powers not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries.

The consensus document proposes a credible, minimum nuclear retaliatory capability consisting of sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces with the necessary support of an effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and the will to employ nuclear forces for purposes of deterrence. Credible minimum deterrence, however, is not a static concept and will have to take into account the evolving capabilities of possible adversaries. For purposes of deterrence, however, it is not necessary that warheads should match with warheads and missiles with missiles. Nuclear deterrence does not depend *per se* on superiority, because an increase in the deterrent effect is not necessarily proportional to an increase in the magnitude of potential destruction. A secure retaliatory force is sufficient, especially when the goals of deterrence are modest.

The NSAB's doctrine proposes that nuclear forces be based on a triad - bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based assets. Development of ballistic missiles launched from submarines will reinforce the no first use commitment. The present Indian capabilities are limited and the triad will take many years to materialise. Commitment to no first use necessitates a robust command and

control system; but it will be markedly different in structure, force requirements, and state of readiness from that of a deterrent posture geared to first use. Its basic characteristic will be an ability to survive a nuclear first strike coupled with a manifest capability to inflict unacceptable punishment. This manifest capability should not be confused with the bizarre calculations of assured destruction, dubbed by critics with the attractive acronym MAD, which demanded a capability to destroy approximately half of the former Soviet Union's industrial capacity and one-fifth to one-fourth of its population. As a cynical American official explained: first the Minutemen ICBMs would destroy the Russian cities, the Polaris SLBMs would then tear up the foundations to a depth of ten feet, and "when all Russia is silent" waves of aircraft would "drop enough bombs to tear the whole place down to a depth of forty feet to prevent the Martians from colonising the country. And to hell with the fallout!"

No calculus of unacceptable punishment is provided in the document simply because it can only be determined by the stakes involved in a nuclear crisis. Incorporating the cardinal principle of civilian control, the doctrine proposes that the final authority for the release of nuclear weapons should rest with the Prime Minister or his designated successor(s). In order, however, to raise the threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict as well as threat or use of nuclear weapons, highly effective conventional military capabilities will have to be maintained. Nuclear arms control as well as confidence-building measures will have to be negotiated, especially with our nuclear neighbours, in order to increase transparency and reduce possibilities of a nuclear arms spiral.

While other countries secretly decided to produce nuclear weapons - Roosevelt and Stalin alone took the fateful decisions on behalf of their countries - the Indian nuclear weapon 'option' was discussed in a protracted public debate from 1964 to 1998. Now the proposed nuclear doctrine, a first step in the evolution of a fully operational nuclear force, is open for public scrutiny. Unlike other nuclear weapon powers, India welcomes a public discourse on even those nuclear issues that are generally kept secret.

The text of the proposed draft doctrine is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

TEXT OF THE DRAFT INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

1. Preamble

1.1 The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context. These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.

1.2 India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires an environment of durable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It will be India's endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a constructive role in advancing the international system toward a just, peaceful and equitable order.

1.3 Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people. Indian will strenuously guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and frequency in the use of force for political purposes.

1.4 India's security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at promoting an ever expanding

area of peace and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.

1.5 However, the very existence of offensive doctrines pertaining to the first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of States.

1.6 This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.

2. Objectives

2.1 In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.

2.2 The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security.

2.3 India shall pursue a doctrine of 'credible minimum nuclear deterrence.' In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India's peace-time posture is aimed at convincing any potential aggressor that:

- (a) Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat, and
- (b) Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.

2.4 The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

2.5 India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

2.6 Deterrence requires that India maintain:

- (a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
- (b) A robust command and control system,
- (c) Effective intelligence and early warning capabilities,
- (d) Comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and
- (e) The will to employ nuclear forces and weapons.

2.7 Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

3. Nuclear forces

3.1 India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.

3.2 The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable force in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.

4. Credibility and Survivability

The following principles are central to India's nuclear deterrent:

4.1 Credibility : Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.

4.2 Effectiveness : The efficacy of India's nuclear deterrent be maximised through synergy among all elements involving reliability, timeliness, accuracy and weight of the attack.

4.3 Survivability :

(i) India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organised for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike, which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.

(ii) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons.

5. Command and Control

5.1 Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).

5.2 An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of the system.

5.3 For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.

5.4 The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control, communications, computing, intelligence and information [C⁴ I²] systems shall be assured.

5.5 The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to execute operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation.

5.6 Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.

6. Security and Safety

6.1 **Security** : Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or use.

6.2 **Safety** is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and systems shall be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place and risks of accidents are avoided.

6.3 **Disaster Control** : India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system capable of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and material.

7. Research & Development

7.1 India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field.

7.2 While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.

8. Disarmament and Arms Control

8.1 Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security object. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.

8.2 Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every effort shall be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning first use.

8.3 Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.

8.4 Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and effectiveness.

8.5 In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.

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Restructuring of Defence Forces Including the Ministry of Defence

ADMIRAL V S SHEKHAWAT, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)

Restructuring of the Defence Forces and their integration with the Ministry of Defence have been discussed over the years, but defied solution. It is somehow felt that the restructuring logic is self-evident. We need to understand the compulsions behind the integration which has come about in the defence establishments of the leading military powers in order to understand our own situation after half a century of Independence.

What is self-evident is that all major changes have to be politically driven. The major powers entered the Second World War with traditional organisations. It was the global nature of the conflict and scale of operations, which required designation of Supreme Commanders and Joint Headquarters. Politicians were forcefully educated in the fundamentals of military power. This was given impetus by the Cold War and nuclear weapons, making rapid political or military response imperative.

The Indian experience has been different. The defence of India was conducted from London and India was led into wars without its consent, while its political leaders struggled for independence. Our national leadership, except for Subhas Chandra Bose, had no practical experience of military matters. Such was their lofty image for the India of their dreams that the military was even considered unnecessary by some.

Such views betrayed a disregard for military history, geo-strategic power realities, the lessons of the European and colonial wars and two world wars. In mitigation, it can be said that the problems of partition, rehabilitation, economic development and political consolidation were so acute and pressing that military affairs

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

could receive only limited attention from the political leadership, whose expertise and interest in any case lay elsewhere.

Events since Independence have accentuated the gulf in political understanding of military matters. The governments of the day are so besieged by problems of the moment that they are unable to devote the time and thought necessary for anything of as far-reaching consequence as major restructuring of the defence organisation. There have been attempts, most notably the Arun Singh Committee. But no government has had its heart in it and has merely gone through the motions in the face of sustained pressure of frustration in the Armed Forces, criticism in the media and dysfunctionality of the Ministry of Defence.

Even the outgoing government, whose Defence minister has shown greater concern in solving the problems of the Armed Forces than most of his predecessors and who has been conspicuously active in this regard, did not display a complete grasp of the complexity of the issues, the entrenched interests involved, the need for consensus and a plan for execution spread over four or five years. Instead, following media criticism of the dismissal of the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Bhagwat on 30 December 1998, an announcement was made that the integration of the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters would be completed in a month's time!

In fairness, it must be said that the government did take some bold initiatives in the short time that it lasted. Pokhran II was a landmark event, which has altered India's defence posture and future force structure irrevocably. It will have its inevitable consequences on the decision making processes of the government as a whole. A national security structure, howsoever imperfect, has come into being and produced a draft nuclear doctrine, which is now in the public domain. A hand of friendship was extended to Pakistan at Lahore and its perfidy exposed at Kargil in the most measured way, eliciting praise even from India's traditional critics. It seemed that the time had come when the government was willing to give to security issues the attention they deserved. The next government, whatever its shape and agenda, will find itself forced to expand these initiatives or risk compromising national security.

Why do we need reorganisation and integration? Some argue that things have gone along reasonably well for over fifty years. We have won wars and kept terrorism at bay. The Armed Forces are aloof from politics, rise to national emergencies, go back to barracks, remain beloved of our people, fade quietly into oblivion after their colour service and all is well with the world. Indeed, the majority of Armed Forces activities literally "run themselves" and would be scarcely affected by integration and reorganisation.

It is at the higher levels of political, civil and military interaction that deficiencies are excruciatingly evident. Not during crises so much, because compulsions and urgency of the situation focus the responses of the state, but in routine planning, budgeting, procurement and administration. The single biggest failing of the existing system is costly delay, accompanied by faulty information exchange in decision making, avoidable duplication, wasteful expense and sub-optimal administrative and operational efficiency.

The deficiencies of the existing organisation of the MoD have been extensively written about. Most valid perhaps are insider accounts of former defence civilians as they cannot be accused of military bias. The perceptive ones acknowledge that absence of military expertise, generalist approach and short tenures are at the root of the problem. This can only be rectified by bringing in uniformed personnel, but has always been resisted by the bureaucracy on specious grounds of civilian control etc., conveniently forgetting that civilian control lies in the hands of the political authority and not the bureaucracy. As in the case of major defence reforms in the USA, the UK and elsewhere, a strong, clear, political imperative and impetus is necessary. This has now been provided by India becoming a nascent nuclear power and the command, control and organisation requirements that follow from it.

Assuming that political will may be forthcoming and an integrated ministry comes about, perhaps on the lines proposed by the Arun Singh Committee, what are the changes to be contemplated on the military side? The first is single point co-ordinated military advice, specifically the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff. Wherever existing, the system is not without reservations, frictions

and varying degrees of resentment in the individual Services, specifically their Chiefs. Nevertheless, hands-on, firm and informed political control does ensure effective functioning.

The creation of a CDS presupposes an integrated staff and ministry. In India, the problem is complicated by the disproportionate size of the three Services and the peculiar operational concerns of the Army. The models of greatest relevance to us from shared or organisational history or democratic principles are of the UK and the USA. But these were derived from a need to manage huge, diverse, multi-national forces of complex alliances in a Cold War scenario of imminent nuclear threat. The British and American models would, therefore, require considerable modification and civilian and military officers working together. We have little experience and large work culture differences.

The CDS would preside over a combined headquarters, which would oversee joint or single Service operational commands. Here, the US model appears more relevant because of the sub-continental scale of our territory, the area of concern being regional rather than global. Joint and single Service functions would be segregated with the head of each Service having responsibility as Chief as well as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Staff functions would have to be empirically apportioned on a commonsense basis and phased in over two or three years. Fortunately, we have experience of several inter-Service activities being carried out under the COSC. The Defence Planning Staff can be readily expanded to its originally conceived Manning level and the JS (Military) merged. It can form the immediate nucleus secretariat for the CDS until the organisation evolves. There would naturally be a mixed secretariat for the MoD including the minister's personal staff.

The primary function of the joint staff would be to develop comprehensive threat assessments, required responses, force structures, budgets and operational plans. It would transmit JCS approved directives to operational commanders and provide operational staff support to the JCS and the Political Executive. A

joint War or Operations Room would have to be set up and close co-ordination maintained with individual Service Headquarters and a reorganised NSC secretariat.

Whereas the merger of the uniformed staff would pose some problem, inducting civilian officers into joint planning, budgeting, intelligence and other functions would throw up more complex cultural and attitudinal issues. This is where firm political direction would be essential. The identification of positions to be filled by civilian or uniformed personnel would be on the basis of professional qualifications and suitability for the function. It needs to be accepted that there will be some civilian presence in predominantly military staffs, e.g., Operations, and some uniformed presence in traditional civilian areas like general administration and finance.

A fundamental attitudinal change and perhaps the most intractable would be for the senior civil servants to accept that they would no longer be "approving" Service Headquarters proposals, ostensibly on behalf of the minister, but be active participants in developing and formulating them. All differences would have to be resolved at staff level before being put up to the political authority. An equally large attitudinal change will be required from senior military officers who tend to view the civil servants as contributing only delay in administration. The particular skills and continuity which can be available on the civil side will have to be identified, developed and integrated into what should be the national defence 'team' working together to a common purpose. This team has room for other disciplines, which have so far been on the periphery or altogether absent - foreign service, scientific, country experts, academics, specialists on contract etc., as integral members of staffs.

Within the MoD, some degree of integration exists in the DRDO. But the Department of Defence Production and Supplies has no uniformed personnel at the MoD level. This is a considerable anomaly as the usual generalists oversee very expensive, long duration, high technology projects for brief periods and are then on their way. An integrated set-up will mean drastic change in the way this department functions and many military technical personnel inducted.

Suggestions have been made that the CDS should be a rotational appointment, or that it should always be an Army general because of its size and responsibilities etc. I think it is more a question of the quality of the mind than the colour of the uniform. The head of the Armed Forces of a nuclear capable power knocking on the doors of the UN Security Council has to be a widely read professional groomed through several joint staff assignments, have a distinguished service record, held requisite operational and administrative positions, be sensitive to the culture and traditions of the individual military and civil services, preferably have international exposure, possess diplomatic and "people" skills, be firm and assertive when needed, display vision inspired by values and be able to deal effectively and constitutionally with the political authority.

Downstream integration at command levels has to be evolved on functional basis. The theatre concept has been advocated, organisational charts and geographical boundaries drawn and presentations made from time to time. Joint Operational Commands could be North-Western (Army/Air Force), Southern or Peninsular (Navy), Eastern (Air Force/Army), Central (Army). There would naturally be subordinate joint HQs with land, sea and/or air fighting units. In overlap areas, there may have to be some looseness in the tasking as well as the chain of command. This need not cause alarm and is quite common in the US, British and NATO forces due to size, complexity, location and practical considerations.

The nuclear question requires to be addressed in detail. The national nuclear doctrine is now a matter of public debate. There is advocacy for a separate Strategic Command assumed to automatically be an Air Force domain. In a triad (land, sea, air) based, no first use, second strike capable nuclear deterrent, this is by no means obvious. It may be better to assign strategic weapons to operational commanders, especially as the limited sea and air platforms would mostly be employed on other routine tasks and only specially prepared for the nuclear role when ordered. They would need to be "alerted", deployed and launched under strictly defined rules. Hopefully never!

Modernisation of the Forces has suffered and should be vigorously undertaken, accompanied by a reassessment of the hardware and quality of personnel required for future wars. A Revolution in Military Affairs may be underway, but the lessons of Iraq or Kosovo do not override the lessons of Kargil and the marching boot. High-tech battles against Iraq or Yugoslavia, both of which could not effectively retaliate, were waged with disproportionate ordnance by the overwhelming NATO alliance. They would not have succeeded against technologically capable or more determined countries as the Americans did not succeed in Vietnam or Somalia. We should therefore carefully assess threats to our national security over the next twenty five years and structure our forces accordingly. Here the political and military lessons from Iraq and Kosovo should be kept clearly in mind. We need both technological upgradation and high quality fighting men.

National security imperatives demand that integration and reorganisation of the MoD, Service Headquarters and the Armed Forces be progressed in a phased manner after careful consultation and planning. The creation of a National Security Council is a positive step, though its secretariat set-up is flawed, as is the office of the National Security Advisor, which should not be a two-hatted one. Major attitudinal and work culture reorientation is involved and elaborate preparatory and education work will be necessary. The changes will be fundamental and initially disruptive in nature, and should be effected without significantly compromising force readiness. The main objective should be greater force effectiveness, organisational efficiency, overall economy and personnel reduction through amalgamation of functions and elimination of unnecessary ones.

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www.members.tripod.com/usiofindia/htmlpages/Main.htm

Panel Discussion

Beyond Kargil

S KALYANARAMAN

If friendship with India is our goal, why was Pakistan created? — A viewer on Pakistan Television after the signing of the Lahore Declaration.¹

Indo-Pak tension and conflict will continue even after the Kashmir issue is solved. — Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf in an April 1999 speech.²

To my mind, the Simla Agreement is irrelevant as far as Kashmir is concerned.
— ZA Bhutto.³

The Kargil conflict must be seen within this larger context of Pakistan's antagonism towards India and the policies that inevitably flow from it. Intrusion in Kargil is merely the latest in a series of successive Pakistani attempts to grab Jammu and Kashmir from an India that has always adopted a reasonable, accommodative and 'live and let live' approach towards Islamabad. Coming as it did even before the ink on the Lahore Declaration had a chance to dry, Kargil has led to a lot of churning within the minds of the Indian strategic community about how to deal with such an intransigent and violently antagonistic neighbour. To discuss these issues, the USI held a Panel Discussion titled 'Beyond Kargil' on 2 July 1999 under the chairmanship of Air Chief Marshal SK Mehra, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd). Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Lt Gen VR Raghavan, PVSM, UVSM, AVSM (Retd), and Shri JN Dixit, IFS (Retd) were the panellists. General Nambiar focused on the military aspects of the conflict as well as India's future military options, while General Raghavan dealt with Pakistan's reactions to the unfolding events and its options. JN Dixit analysed the diplomatic aspects of the Kargil conflict. Important issues that came up in the discussion are presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

Dr S Kalyanaraman is working with the USI and the compilation work of the panel discussion has been done by him.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

**Salient Features of the Presentation on the Military Aspects by
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)**

Our troops are fighting in extremely difficult terrain against a well-entrenched enemy who, in addition, is in control of the dominating heights. This means that Operation Vijay will be a long and hard grind. The Pakistani intrusions took place in the Mushkoh Valley, Dras where the famous landmarks like Tiger Hill, etc., are located, Kaksar and Batalik. The other area in the news is Turtuk, which has now been renamed the 'Hanif' sector in memory of Lt Haneefuddin who died there in the recent conflict. Turtuk assumed significance only in the later half of May 1999 when aerial reconnaissance identified the construction of helipads and indications of preparations for the launch of operations by elements of the Pakistani Special Services Group (SSG) towards the East. If this operation had succeeded in its objective of turning our flanks along the Shyok River, our military position would have become considerably difficult. However, it was detected early enough to allow us to launch pre-emptive actions and thus prevent the Pakistanis from crossing the Line of Control (LoC) in that area. Chorbit La is under our control; but since it is contiguous to Turtuk, there were some actions there.

There are indications that Pakistan has reinforced its military presence in Occupied Kashmir, which falls under the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) with his headquarters at Gilgit. The Commander there is reportedly a close associate of Pakistan's present Army Chief. Also, Pakistan's Chief of General Staff is a former Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) man. Apparently, he had earlier submitted a plan to effect intrusions into this area when General Jahangir Karamat was Army Chief; but the latter dismissed it outright. When General Pervez Musharraf took over as Army Chief, the plan was activated.

The significance of the use of the Indian Air Force (IAF) lies in the fact that it upped the ante and made the international community sit up and take note of the happenings, which otherwise would have been reported in the media as heavy shelling or some such phrase. This led to enormous international pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its infiltrators and respect the sanctity of the

LoC. At the same time, the use of the Air Force indicated our resolve to deal firmly with the situation. Most importantly, it took the Pakistanis by surprise and completely upset their game plan. Questions have been raised as to why the IAF is not using incendiary or napalm bombs. The reason lies in the fact that the aircraft have to fly considerably lower to effectively use them, which would only increase their vulnerability to enemy Stinger and other anti-aircraft weapons.

Towards the end of May, the Indian Navy's strike elements were moved from the Eastern to the Western seaboard. And, during the first week of June, most of the Eastern Fleet was also moved to the Arabian Sea. These steps were intended to avoid any surprises, while at the same time conveying the kind of strategic threat that the Indian Navy could pose to Pakistan. These moves have caused a lot of concern in Islamabad. It is significant to note here that the Pakistan economy is rather dependent on the port of Karachi for most of its imports. Hence, a naval blockade or disruption in the free movement of goods into Karachi would lead to considerable hardship within Pakistan and could even cause its economic collapse. Indian naval intercepts indicate that Islamabad has already imposed a degree of caution on its Navy. Pakistan naval ships have been instructed not to come into contact with vessels of the Indian Navy.

Our troops are doing a great job, as the Service Chiefs and others have been repeatedly confirming. They are determined and in high spirits. A lot of this, of course, has to do with *paltan ki izzat* (the honour of the unit), which seems to be sustaining them more than anything else. They are generally upbeat about the way things are going in the battlefield, despite the growing number of casualties. The determination at the ground level and the manner in which operations are being carried out have also given them a great deal of confidence. They are well aware that *Operation Vijay* could take a long time and are prepared for it.

India's Military Options

India's options to a large extent depend on the actions of the

opponent. It is highly unlikely that Pakistan will pull back its troops. Even if it does, there will be so many residual problems on the ground that it would be a meaningless exercise. Pakistan will continue to, despite increasing evidence to the contrary, disown its troops and brand them as freedom fighters. Hence, a Pakistani undertaking to pull back will not resolve the problem of incursions in any way. India has to look for a more permanent solution, which has to be political but backed up by military strength.

India's way forward lies in continuing the military offensive, pegging away at the intruders and letting the process of attrition take its course. There are already some indications of panic among the intruders, judging from intercepts and the large number of bodies and equipment they had left behind. The relentless bombing in the form of air strikes, mortar and artillery shelling has to continue. We have to remember, however, that the longer the military operations take the more India has to be prepared diplomatically to withstand mounting international pressure. The possibility of international (read NATO) military intervention in the subcontinent is farfetched. Even if NATO decides and propels itself in this direction, it would take nothing less than a year for preparations and the build-up of sufficient force levels. India will thus have that much time to do what needs to be done.

There are growing calls for crossing the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir. India has two options in this regard: crossing by ground troops or by aircraft. The former option does not appear to have much meaning since our troops will anyway have to assault the peaks, which they can as well do from our side. More importantly, India also has to consider whether crossing the LoC would benefit the current military operations in any way. Moreover, such an escalatory step could result in open war. Before embarking on such an escalatory course, we have to answer several questions: for instance, Do we want a war? Can we afford one at this point of time? What would be the role of nuclear weapons in such a war?

India does not need a wider war at this juncture. However, we have to be prepared for that eventuality if the enemy forces it on the country. What India should do is bide time, make up the

deficiencies in equipment, spares, etc., fine-tune plans and prepare to launch the offensive at a time and place of its choosing. India has reacted to Pakistani moves for far too long. Now, things have to be done in such a manner as to make Pakistan react to our moves. Whether this entails crossing the LoC or the international border (IB) is an option that we should keep open. At the same time, we should also be prepared to do this earlier, should that option be forced upon us by any Pakistani escalation either in this sector or adjacent sectors. Also, if the timetable for the eviction of the intruders proves difficult to stick to, India should take the fight to the enemy. And operational plans should be focussed on the Pakistani province of Punjab. Pakistan must be punished there, for Punjab is its centre of gravity. Needless to say, operational plans have to necessarily crank in the nuclearised situation in the subcontinent. India no longer has the luxury of talking in terms of deep thrusts and totally decimating Pakistan. This would only push Islamabad into desperation. Hence, India's goals have to be necessarily limited.

To preclude Pakistan's quest for parity with India, it is essential that India build up its conventional capability in all three Services to such an extent that Pakistan cannot even dream of matching it. The country has neglected this aspect for a long time. If Pakistan were to attempt to catch up, it would simply result in the shattering of its economy. In short, India should do to Pakistan what the United States did to the Soviet Union. For, there is no longer any scope for arriving at a long-term accommodation with Pakistan. Obviously, India has to carry on the dialogue process; but we will be bluffing ourselves if we believe that we can arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Pakistan. In any case, this may not be possible for another generation or so. Even then, it would be driven more by economic forces.

While the Army has to be deployed on these heights after the intruders are cleared, it would be inadvisable to do this for the indefinite future as in the "Glaciers". India should so organise its options that it is able to pull its troops down. At the same time, it should convey to Pakistan the clear message that should the latter resort once again to such a misadventure, it would mean nothing but war. This should be conveyed through a conventional military

build-up and fine-tuning the country's nuclear command and control set up. I am not advocating that we prepare for a nuclear war, only that we convey to Pakistan our capabilities in this sphere.

The modernisation of our Armed Forces cannot be delayed any longer. One hopes that the support the Armed Forces have received so far does not dissipate once the present conflict is over. A nation of India's size, status, responsibilities and commitments cannot but have a military capability that stands out. India cannot afford to be otherwise. At the same time, we must apply ourselves to concretising the national security apparatus, higher defence organisation and decision making apparatus so that it not only creates confidence within the country but also is seen as effective by the international community.

Salient Features of the Presentation on Pakistan's Future Options by Lt Gen VR Raghavan PVSM, UVSM, AVSM (Retd)

It is essential to look at the immediate past before discussing Pakistan's future options. One thing that we have to acknowledge is that in this conflict Pakistan has chosen a ground or theatre of operations where India's military might cannot be brought to bear. It is not possible for India to use its strike corps, tank divisions or air force to full advantage in these mountainous heights. The second factor to be borne in mind is that Pakistan's gambit of using a small element of its regular forces (based mostly on the Northern Light Infantry) with a huge ballast of irregulars (products of the Afghan Civil War with expertise in handling modern weapons and good opponents) has succeeded in drawing a minimum of three Indian divisions into the small pocket of Dras to Batalik. While this is significant evidence of the kind of response that India is capable of, one wonders whether Islamabad expected this kind of an Indian response in the first place.

What the Pakistani incursions indicate are long preparations and the scope of the thought process that went into it. The plan did not drop from the skies, but is a result of the constant Pakistani attempt to try out alternate approaches that would raise the threshold of its Kashmir involvement. Ten years of involvement in the Valley

through infiltrations etc., had not produced the expected results for Pakistan. Indeed, one might say that the law of diminishing returns had started coming into play with Pakistan's decade-long policy in the Valley. Consequently, Islamabad must have felt the need for a change in policy. Obviously, this was something that was in Pakistani minds for quite some time. This is confirmed by Lt Gen Nambiar's statement about General Aziz having earlier presented a plan to effect intrusions into this region. This plan, while on paper and in some minds for many years, must have assumed a concrete shape in the immediate aftermath of both India and Pakistan going overtly nuclear in May 1998. While Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons much before the 1998 tests gave it confidence for checkmating India's advantages in conventional warfare, after Chagai Islamabad must have come to the conclusion that it must.

What has been Pakistan's response to the unfolding crisis? General Headquarters Rawalpindi has surprisingly moved nearly two divisions into the Northern Areas, i.e., Skardu, etc. Based in Peshawar, Quetta and elsewhere, these formations were not really meant to go there but were part of Pakistan's offensive and reserve formations. It is surprising because the Northern Area is a huge chunk of territory with a low density of population, an ambiguous status in the Pakistani Constitution, and without representation in the Pakistani Parliament (although Pakistan claims it not as part of Jammu and Kashmir but as a part of Pakistan). There has been long standing disaffection against Pakistan here for thirty years now, manifested, for instance, in the form of occasional mines going off under military vehicles. Pakistan has kept the area quiet under this motley headquarters called FCNA. It has never ever moved this sort of a force level into this area. One way to look at it is that Pakistan has upwards of two divisions there and is therefore planning to pour troops into Kargil across the LoC.

Another more probable interpretation could be that Pakistan suddenly found three infantry divisions massed up across the LoC within a small area between Batalik and Dras, which incidentally was earlier held by a brigade, and feared an Indian military thrust by this potential invasion force. This would be the natural reaction of any military planner when he suddenly sees a massive force in a formerly

empty pocket. Pakistanis will not look at it the way Indian Army planners do: that these are massive peaks and need tremendous day and night infantry operations that will simply eat away troops and hence the need for as many troops as possible. Moreover, India also needs to cover all the routes of entry across the LoC to prevent further Pakistani encroachment. Furthermore, Pakistanis will be suffering a tremendous sense of anxiety and panic. They will be monitoring our news media where there is much talk about Indian forces crossing the LoC; and they cannot help but speculate as to where India would do so. Since, most probably, India would make a thrust closer to the scene of action so as to relieve the Pakistani pressure, the focus naturally fell on the Northern Areas. Hence, the Pakistani reaction of moving its forces into the Northern Areas.

One interesting aspect of this Pakistani move is that there are no direct routes between the Pakistani heartland and Skardu. Everything has to come along the Indus river all the way to Chilas and then to Skardu. Though Pakistan has brought forward the force, it does not have the infrastructure to launch it in any meaningful fashion. Yet Pakistan has done it. It has brought itself to believe that it can do it because of the nuclear dimension. Islamabad believes that the nuclear dimension assures it from the traditional Indian response of crossing the international boundary if Pakistani forces crossed the LoC. Yet, by sending the formations all the way from the heartland to the Northern Areas, Islamabad has made itself vulnerable to an Indian thrust. Hence, Pakistan's resort to nuclear threats. It is signalling in the language of the nuclear grammar and means that India should not cross the threshold of the international boundary but rather confine its reactions.

Given this background, what are Pakistan's options? Pakistan could either escalate, de-escalate, or continue in the same fashion. In other words, it could try and win, lose or draw. Islamabad knows that a total victory is no longer possible. It cannot afford to lose. Hence, the best option is to play for a draw. What would a draw mean for Pakistan? It would mean stretching this operation out till September or October by retaining at least a few key points, based on which Kashmir could be dragged to the floor of the United Nations (UN) and hope for a Chapter 7 intervention. To some extent,

Pakistani options depend on what India does. September is a complex month for India — parliamentary elections, a huge political hump, in front of the political establishment in Delhi, the deadline for signing the CTBT, and the General Assembly session of the United Nations. So, while stretching out this operation, Pakistan will simultaneously seek a way out. I cannot see Pakistan attempting a major offensive; it may make smaller determined attempts to make inroads into the same sector of the LoC. It has large numbers of irregulars and must be pushing them hard to try and occupy some more positions and thus make it slower and more difficult for the Indian military to completely wipe out the intrusions.

Pakistan's other option is a very limited offensive but make it appear as a big gain. Pakistan now knows, after the tide of international public opinion has turned against it, that this route is out. Islamabad is in actual fact working on an extremely limited menu of options. India, therefore, has to think hard on how to make this menu still smaller and how to optimise on the limits faced by Pakistan. One cannot, of course, rule out the irrational. India has been a victim of irrational acts on the part of the Pakistani leadership in the past. Nobody can predict what that irrational element is or what shape it would assume. It would be in India's interest to ensure that it does not inadvertently create conditions where the irrational element takes over in Pakistan. Definitely, at the end of this conflict, whichever way it turns out, Pakistan's primary aim will be to retain all options in Jammu and Kashmir, i.e., many more Kargils in the future, more intrusions in some other parts of that state, and thus keep the pot boiling and the fires burning. Pakistan would like to get out of the present situation with all these options intact.

One thing to ponder about is that we are looking at the present conflict purely from the Indian point of view. How does the High Command in Rawalpindi look at this situation? One hears that the Pakistanis think that they are on a winning wicket; they think they have done very well in imposing heavy costs on the Indians compared to the costs they themselves are bearing. Kargil apparently is not front-page news in the Pakistani media. And although there are critiques of Pakistan's policy in the media, there is no upsurge of criticism as such. So, India has to take into account the way the situation is being perceived in Pakistan.

Salient Features of the Presentation on the Diplomatic Aspects by Shri JN Dixit

Any assessment of the challenges before Indian diplomacy should be predicated upon an analysis of Pakistan's broader objectives in this operation. Another aspect that should be factored in is the reactions of the international community and the major powers, and even more important, their longer term perceptions on the substantial issue of Jammu and Kashmir and their reaction to the passage of time.

Pakistan's actions are not aimed at just reactivating a short-term focus of international attention on the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Rather, the aim is to revive a longer-term attention of the international community in a manner where pressures would be generated on India to agree to a compromise on Kashmir within the framework of Pakistan's requirements and demands. This is the macro level political objective.

Pakistan's interim objectives could be that since a total compromise may not be forthcoming from India, the solution would be on some sort of a LoC in due course. So, the latest incursions are an attempt to change the LoC to its advantage by pushing it eastwards.

Pakistan's third objective is to, in this process of changing the LoC, generate centrifugal forces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Thereby, the Kashmir Valley would fall within its reach, Ladakh would get isolated and India would retain a tenuous hold on Jammu. This would also ensure Pakistan's strategic domination of the entire north-western access of India and contribute to safeguarding its geostrategic connections in the northern reaches of subcontinental Asia with China and provide access to Central Asia. At the same time, this would isolate India from Central Asia and deny New Delhi any foothold in this region and in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's tactical methodology is to practice brinkmanship, which would have diplomatic and political implications. This is the context for the Pakistani political leadership's bluster that there would

be many more Kargils and that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons and missiles against India if the necessity arises. It is unlikely that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons because of its unpredictable consequences and it may prove more disastrous. But the signal is to the world at large that Pakistan is losing patience after trying very hard, without any success, to come to a negotiated compromise with India. The 'freedom fighters' have started this intrusion in their impatience and Pakistan cannot but help being supportive of their actions.

Pakistan's objective of generating the impression that India is unreasonable has not totally failed. The BBC and CNN broadcasts make this adequately clear. They constantly refer to the Indian offensive against Pakistan and there was even a report that the latest events are a result of India's rigid and uncompromising, even 'unreasonable', stand with regard to the dispute over Kashmir. This is exactly what Pakistan wanted and is achieving, albeit partially.

More importantly, what are the perceptions of the international community, and the major powers particularly, on the Kashmir issue? The West's favourable reaction (if one could call it that) is temporary, tenuous, event-specific and short term. This is not their basic orientation or policy. As far as Kashmir is concerned, the basic elements of their perception are:

- (a) It is a disputed territory, the major portion of which is a Muslim-majority area. They cannot understand why India is so obstinate about not agreeing to Pakistan's claim or the area wanting to be independent, which was the logic of Partition.
- (b) Nobody is interested in the India Independence Act of 1947 nor the Instrument of Accession and the interim standstill agreement.
- (c) This is a small area about which a big country (India) is fighting a smaller neighbour. Since the big country has enough of its own large territory, why is it not being a little generous?
- (d) After the overt nuclear weaponisation by both countries, this area is a potential nuclear flashpoint.

The basic point is that nobody abroad is interested in the merits of the Kashmir issue. They are not even bothered about whether Kashmir wants to be independent or joins with Pakistan or remains with India. They simply see it as an irritant that constantly bothers them, especially now with the enormous possibility of an irresponsible nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Therefore, India and Pakistan should be stopped from reaching that stage of confrontation. Beyond that, they have no interest. The Chinese perhaps may have a little more interest in that the northern reaches of Jammu and Kashmir abut Tibet and Sinkiang. Moreover, Pakistan is an ally and if its position in that area gets consolidated strategically it may suit China. There is, however, a contradictory element therein. While China values defence co-operation and strategic partnership with Pakistan, it has its worries about extremist Islamism dominating that area abutting Sinkiang. These are the basic attitudes India has to face.

The reaction to Kargil is temporary because, on the face of it, nobody can deny that the intrusion has taken place. It is significant that no major power, in its formal or informal statements, has mentioned the direct involvement of Pakistani armed forces in this intrusion. The term that has been consistently used is 'intruders' or some similar abstract adjective. By implication, of course, they have accepted Pakistan's responsibility because the appeal is to Pakistan to withdraw the intruders. However, simultaneously, if one looks at the G-8 statement for instance, while it urges Pakistan to pull back, it also calls for a cease-fire meaning 'as is where is'. Thus, there is no unqualified endorsement of the Indian response to push the intruders back.

What is the likely scenario in diplomatic terms and what are its implications? Pakistan would like to expand this conflict and maintain a conflict atmosphere right till the second week of September 1999 because the UN General Assembly goes into session in the third week of that month and the Security Council session starts as well. Pakistan's attempts to activate the Security Council immediately after the commencement of Indian air strikes failed. Pakistan's appeals to China, the United States and the UN Secretary General that a special session of the UN Security Council

should be called failed to evoke a response. If the present conflict, however, expands along with the parallel threat of a nuclear confrontation, the Security Council would meet and initiate actions under Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. Chapter 6 is concerned with maintaining peace and stability, while Chapter 7 authorises punitive action to maintain peace and stability. Actions under Chapter 7, as in Iraq and Kosovo, are mandatory and if there is a major power consensus then one can only speculate about the nature of the intervention that would follow. The important point is that they can activate themselves despite all our chanting of the mantram of 'no international interference and mediation'. This is a challenge we have to be prepared to face.

Simultaneously, once this conflict settles down one way or the other, in terms of broader dimensions of international relations, the pressure on India would increase on nuclear issues and missile capacities. Pressures to sign the CTBT, become part of the FMCT regime, and to cap and reduce the size of the missile arsenal, will increase. The argument put forward would be that these are dangerous weapons to acquire (as they had repeatedly stated earlier) which is made doubly so by the intense animosities and unresolved conflict between India and Pakistan.

One important point to ponder is that whenever and wherever we stop, the political necessity is that we must collectively be willing for a long-term deployment of the Indian Armed Forces all along the LoC. It is a political and diplomatic necessity to avoid facing any such future predicament. Also, during the remaining part of this year, we should conduct a concerted diplomatic campaign to clearly spell out the entire set of our concerns and how we intend coping with them to both the major powers as well as our neighbours in South Asia.

OPEN DISCUSSION

Observations by Dr Raja Ramanna

I shall confine my comments to the nuclear issue. In 1994, during an international meeting at Goa, the former head of the

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the late Dr Munir Khan, informed us that 'we have got it'. Of course, they still would have had to go a long way before being able to use it. We knew about Pakistan's nuclear enrichment capabilities and had devised methods to assess how much they were enriching. We assumed that Pakistan would go in for the bomb soon, no matter what the pressures from the USA were. Till my time at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (about which I can speak with authority), we never slackened our efforts with respect to nuclear weapons. Now that India has gone nuclear, we should devise a philosophy and determine whether to view them as a deterrent or only as a showcase trophy, whether to mass-produce them and equip them with delivery vehicles. India must now give priority to its missile programme, in which field it has proved its capabilities.

It is very difficult to predict the accurate yields of the nuclear weapons that Pakistan tested at Chagai last year because they were carried out under a hill. These difficulties do not, of course, hinder American scientists who misread our measurements on the yields of the *Shakti* tests and sometimes even maliciously changed or criticised values. We then knew that even scientific measurements were not something that one could assume to be impartial and reliable. In this milieu, if India signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty there is no guarantee that a country has not broken its promise to abide by the terms of the treaty. Examples abound of international treaties being subverted and ignored. Pakistan was planning the incursions in Kargil even as it was signing the Lahore Declaration. When the United States undertook air strikes against Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue, it rudely pushed aside the United Nations. Yet, the West insists upon India signing the CTBT and throwing open its nuclear facilities to UN inspections. As the case of Richard Butler in Iraq proved, UN inspectors could be malicious; and the UN inspection agency could also be used as a front for intelligence gathering. If the Lahore Declaration could be broken so blatantly and if intelligence operatives could masquerade as UN inspectors, how can we ever be sure that such things would not happen with the CTBT as well.

Our Ordnance system is what keeps the Indian Armed Forces

backward. There has been no improvement in the functioning of the Ordnance Factories over the years. And the sad fact is that nothing has been done about it. During my tenure as a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, I constantly raised questions about Ordnance; but nothing ever happened. All the money that went into the DGQA could have been transferred for modernisation. According to Air Chief Marshal SK Mehra, our modernisation programme is quite clear with well-developed programmes. But there is no progress because of the lack of orientation.

Observations by Shri K Subrahmanyam

Our focus should not just be limited to India's challenges and options in the current context, but also on the actions and decisions of Pakistan. It is the latter that would determine our own course of action and vice versa. For example, Lt Gen Raghavan mentioned how Pakistan moved two divisions into the Northern Areas after India inducted three divisions into the Kargil sector. We are looking at a two-person game, with each acting and reacting to the other's moves. One has to take the dynamics of the situation further, step-by-step, to see how the whole situation would unfold.

Pakistan can claim a major victory in one of two ways: by successfully holding onto a large chunk of Indian territory, or by managing to drag the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. If the issue ends up at the United Nations, Pakistan would claim a great victory and assert that whatever it did was worth the while. In contrast, India should insist that any discussion of the Kashmir issue at the United Nations is not necessarily a defeat. And the focus of our diplomacy must be to project Pakistan as an international security threat as against Kashmir being so. If India could pull this off successfully, then it would rob Pakistan of a sense of victory in dragging the Kashmir issue before the United Nations.

Pakistan's failure to seize any territory in the event of the Indian Army successfully pushing all the intruders back would obviously mean a defeat. This would unleash dynamics within Pakistan between the Army and the political establishment. There are two

aspects to this political dynamics. One is that Mr Nawaz Sharif has become the most powerful Prime Minister since Mr ZA Bhutto. He has clipped the President of his powers and even got rid of one. He has established his supremacy over the judiciary and even the Army, evidenced by his forcing the resignation of a Chief Justice and a Chief of the Army Staff. At the same time, he is also immensely disliked by the powers that be — the feudal civil-military bureaucracy — because he is a mere industrial upstart. Hence, they want to replace him. Even the Army Chief has certain disadvantages. He is neither a Punjabi nor a Pathan, but a Mohajir. There are rumours of divisions among the seven Corps Commanders with four supporting Nawaz Sharif and the other three being loyal to Pervez Musharraf. India has to monitor the unfolding events within the Pakistan Army very carefully.

We also have to consider the penalties both countries would face if the conflict continues till September 1999. While the financial penalties on India would be a burden, they will not be impossible to bear. However, it is difficult to say this about Pakistan. The United States may delay the next tranche of the IMF package that is due. In addition, international opinion is firmly against Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil, which may restrict the flow of funds and investments into that country.

As Lt Gen Nambiar pointed out, if and when we cross the LoC it should be done first not by soldiers but by aircraft. The Indian Army should also consider capturing only the vital heights, which would help it to dominate the area and then take steps to force the intruders back. Another aspect that needs to be mentioned is that this is a small operation compared to those of 1965 and 1971. Yet, there is talk about postponing elections, which is totally unrealistic and uncalled for. Even if the present conflict escalates into an all out war, it is unlikely to last long. There will be international intervention - sanctions, oil embargoes, etc., which will force the war to a quick end. There are serious doubts about Pakistan's ability to withstand international pressure, domestic pressure and economic pressure for the next two months. Islamabad's options are, therefore, rather limited.

It is doubtful that the Kashmir issue would go to the United Nations. The country that would be most opposed to this issue being dragged into the United Nations is China because of the fear that this would set a precedent for Tibet.

General Discussion

Kashmir is not the 'core issue' between India and Pakistan. Pakistani assertions to this effect are only a diplomatic gambit. As General Pervez Musharraf stated in an April 1999 speech, the conflict and tension between India and Pakistan would continue even after the Kashmir problem is solved. He further added that the perception of national security varied between the different provinces of Pakistan. Since the only issue that unites all Pakistanis is Kashmir, it follows that Islamabad would perforce continue its present antagonistic policy towards India, which would help counter the centrifugal forces that may otherwise gather steam.

One group that is clearly in the ascendant within Pakistan is the militant Islamic orthodoxy, which is gradually pushing down the civilian, modern, democratic leadership. The Pakistani military, influenced by the rhetoric of the 'holy war' that it fostered in Afghanistan, has thrown in its lot with the Islamic militants in this domestic power game. This is clearly evident from the Kargil intrusions, which was planned and expedited by the Army in conjunction with Islamic militants. There is some speculation that the Pakistan Army is creating an entity within itself composed of the Afghans, which may come in handy for use in Jammu and Kashmir or other areas. 'Talibanising' of operations would enable Pakistan to harass India, while at the same time claiming non-involvement. There are indications that this is a long-term Pakistani plan. Pakistan is also not short of money for these purposes as is generally believed. The fact is that the money used by Pakistan for operations like the one in Kargil is generated through drug trafficking and hence beyond the control of international institutions.

After the Kargil conflict began, several Pakistani leaders issued statements about using nuclear weapons against India. Such threats are not only intended to coerce the international community into

intervening in Kashmir, but are also signals to India to desist from escalatory moves. Given this, have our decision-makers made a thorough assessment of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities? And have they conveyed to Islamabad our capabilities in this regard? It is imperative to avoid misperceptions in a nuclear environment. In this connection, it should be noted that there could be some doubts in the Pakistani mind about our nuclear capabilities, because the Indian military is not a full participant in the nuclear weaponisation process.

It is quite distressing to find that the Pakistani Army, which is about half the size of its Indian counterpart, periodically attempts to take its adversary on. We are solely responsible for this. Despite the fact that India looms large in relation to Pakistan, the proportion of GDP that it devotes to the military is only about half of what the latter does. As a recent RAND study reported, Pakistan would have an edge over India in a conventional war that lasted less than 22 days. Pakistani confidence is only boosted by the insistence of senior defence analysts that an Indo-Pak War would finish quickly. Do they not know that any small country could hold off a big country in a short war? Such reassurance only emboldens the Pakistani military, for it becomes absolutely sure that there will never be a fight to the finish.

One inexplicable aspect of our current approach to Pakistan is the repeated assertion that the Lahore Process would resume once the Pakistani intruders withdraw. The fact of the matter is that the Kargil conflict has disrupted the diplomatic process. It would indeed look odd if we simply brush this fact aside and resume negotiations. The conflict has cost us the lives of hundreds of our soldiers, many more have been wounded and scarce national resources have been expended. Before resuming negotiations, India should insist upon Pakistan giving concrete assurances that it would respect the sanctity of the LoC and dismantle the terrorist training camps on its territory. Similarly, there was no need for India to repeatedly affirm its intention of not crossing the LoC. Instead, we should have forced Pakistan to keep guessing and thus off balance. There was, indeed, considerable benefit from this policy in the form of international diplomatic support. However, it denied our troops the basic manoeuvre and flexibility that are vital principles of war, while

at the same time allowing Pakistan to concentrate its forces. This resulted in heavier casualties on our side.

Western diplomatic support to India during this conflict is only a temporary shift. We should not naively hope for similar support in the future. Here, one cannot help but express dismay at the submission of a former Foreign Secretary that the merits of our case in the Kashmir dispute are no longer important. Equally astounding is the claim that there is no harm in the Kashmir issue being discussed at the United Nations! If this were so what are we fighting in Kargil for and why are we sacrificing the lives of so many of our soldiers? This only goes to show that our defence and foreign policies are not in synergy. It is hoped that the appointment of Shri Arun Singh, former Minister of State for Defence, as Advisor to the External Affairs Minister is the first step in the process of harmonising our defence and diplomatic policies. At the same time we should also give serious thought to the aspect of political-military interaction and the rendering of direct military advice to the political leadership. We must breach the barrier between the civilian and military establishments, especially now that our chief executive, the Prime Minister, is sitting on the nuclear trigger and needs advice about various military options.

India's policy must be based on national interest, both immediate and long-term, and not an emotional reaction to teach Pakistan a lesson. The present policy to evict the intruders and restore the sanctity of the LoC is a very sound one. Any escalation of the conflict would not just be terrible for Pakistan, but also for India. According to Lt Gen AM Vohra, India should not enlarge the conflict and instead concentrate on diplomatic and economic measures to bring this Pakistani misadventure to an end. However, in case escalation is thrust upon us or it becomes necessary to escalate, he advocated a thrust through Rajasthan rather than Punjab as earlier suggested by Lt Gen Nambiar. He pointed out that Punjab is riverine country and does not offer adequate scope for the full employment of mobile forces. While affirming the validity of this point, Lt Gen Nambiar stated that his reason for suggesting Punjab was because of the fact that that province is the heart of Pakistan and hence an offensive thrust there would hurt Islamabad more than anywhere else.

To pressurise Islamabad, India could adopt unconventional measures in Karachi, which is Pakistan's 'Achilles Heel'. Karachi is not only a centre of trade and commerce, but also has a volatile population mix. Trouble there would considerably distract the Pakistani leadership, while at the same time hurting Nawaz Sharif's reputation as a capable leader. Another unconventional but very effective weapon that we have employed in this conflict is the Indian media. The Army's decision to grant access to the media resulted in extensive reporting, which has helped in mobilising the populace behind the nation and the Armed Forces like never before. The Army should grant similar privileges to the foreign media also, since this has the potential to win for us world public opinion as well.

In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict, India's defence policy will have to focus upon creating a whole new range of military capabilities to deal with a future Kargil-type operation. We may have to raise a whole corps that can fight in high mountains with massive artillery support and rapid reaction capabilities with heliborne operations at high altitudes.

India should not let this opportunity pass to force Islamabad to reaffirm the sanctity of the LoC and the terms of the Simla Agreement. This should also include ZA Bhutto's verbal undertaking to Smt Indira Gandhi that upon his return to Pakistan he would, over a period of time, prepare domestic public opinion to accept the conversion of the LoC into the international border. Prof PN Dhar, a participant in the Simla negotiations, confirmed this fact a few years ago in a newspaper column.

Finally, what should be India's future strategy towards Pakistan? To a large extent, this would depend on how the question -- Is a strong and stable Pakistan in our interest or is it otherwise? -- is answered. The Chairman, Air Chief Marshal SK Mehra, for one expressed his doubts about the utility of a strong and stable Pakistan for the future benefit of India.

¹This was brought to my attention by Prof Matin Zuberi.

²Cited by Lt Gen H Kaul during the discussion.

³Cited by SK Singh, in an article in *The Hindustan Times*, 17 July 1999.

A Provocation Too Far

AIR MRSHL KC CARIAPPA, PVSM, VM (RETD)

The shooting down of the Pakistan Navy *Atlantique* Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft a few weeks ago caused much disquiet in the minds of a few Cassandras within the Establishment and in our body politic. Was it really necessary to do so, they ask? Will not all the goodwill and appreciation for demonstrated restraint during the Kargil operations have been frittered away by this precipitate act? Others like myself believe that this will be an object lesson to 'would be' intruders for the future. Mr. K Subrahmanyam had lucidly explained the rationale behind the action taken by the IAF. He explained the 'command chain of responsibility' of an air defence (AD) organisation during peacetime, and why time is of the essence. In peace, there is no time to 'wait and see' what an intruder will do next. Probing a country's AD capability and reactions are part of a 'cat and mouse' game that nations play with each other, and they do so constantly with the aim of finding chinks in the armour. Because of the time element, AD responsibility and authority has been decentralised to the appropriate level to ensure that there are no delays in prosecuting necessary action.

At this juncture, it is relevant to state that Pakistan Navy aircraft have indulged in many such violations in the past, and have unfortunately gotten away with seeming impunity. One such intrusion occurred in July 1994. Then, as on this occasion, an *Atlantique* was acquired off the western coast, and in the vicinity of Sir Creek, by one of our AD radars. It was tracked (followed on the radarscope) as it entered overland India. By this time, a pair of AD aircraft which are always at readiness to thwart, or to intercept, such intrusions had been alerted. The situation then was identical to what occurred on this fateful (where the *Atlantique* was concerned) day. Our interceptors were "scrambled" and vectored (directed) to the area. It was a cloudy day with poor visibility, and scattered low cloud that hampered unimpeded vision. The

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999.

interceptors were able to make intermittent visual contact with the intruder, which was identified for what it was. There was no doubt in the mind of the pilots in the matter of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in dealing with intruding aircraft over-flying Indian airspace or carrying out an overt 'hostile act'. In the existing situation, the interceptors were not able to close in on the intruder because of the prevailing weather conditions, and an 'on-the-ball' Pakistan pilot who managed to get away.

In peace, as in war, every effort is made to get to know as much about the enemy as is possible through covert or overt means. Thus, apart from using the time-honoured (?) spy, other methods involve the use of airborne electronic or optical sensors to determine what is known as the enemy's Order of Battle (ORBAT). This information includes knowledge of electromagnetic operating frequencies used for radar or voice transmissions, and photographic evidence of troop build-ups close to, or along the international border. It would also provide information on whether there have been any changes in the defences along the border in the form of anti-tank obstacles and other strong points that may have been constructed. Often, fighter aircraft carry out feints, or probe missions, to determine the alertness and efficacy of the potential enemy's AD reaction in ordering the AD interceptors into the air. Thus, any violation of national airspace by foreign, or a potential enemy's, military aircraft are considered 'hostile acts'.

Civil aircraft operations are governed by a set of rules internationally accepted, and to which all countries are signatories. Thus, before over-flying a country, a commercial or private aircraft is expected to file a flight plan indicating date, time and point of entry into and departure out of a nation's airspace. Such aircraft are flown along Air Traffic Surveillance routes and directed to report over predetermined 'reporting points'. There have been instances where civilian aircraft have violated or disregarded instructions, sometime knowingly, and sometime inadvertently. When this occurs, the errant pilot is informed that he has strayed from the authorised flight path and is advised to return to it. There are times when a pilot may inform that the violation has been because of severe bad weather ahead en route. In case the pilot has not, or does not, make radio contact, it is quite likely that AD aircraft will be 'scrambled' to investigate the infringement. They will

make every effort to contact the errant aircraft and, if unsuccessful, will note nationality and registration number. In no circumstance will they shoot it down, unless there are specific orders from the highest authority. You will recall, however, that in the not too distant past there were two occasions when commercial aircraft were shot down without warning – the first by the erstwhile Soviet Air Force and the second by a US Navy ship in the Persian Gulf.

When military aircraft are involved, a different set of 'rules of engagement' are in force. As stated earlier, there are many reasons why such willful violations are carried out. To thwart such infringements, the SOPs demand that action taken is more aggressive and menacing and quite explicit. A few years ago, if a 'hostile' or unidentified track was seen on the AD radar, the following action was taken:

- AD interceptors are scrambled and directed to the area where the intruding aircraft was 'picked up' on radar.
- Once the interceptors acquire the intruder, either visually or on their integral radar, they separate from each other.
- The 'lead' aircraft closes in to make visual identification of the intruder and to note nationality, aircraft type and serial number. He attempts to make radio contact on the international radio frequency with the aircraft, which is ordered to turn towards the nearest IAF base. The aircraft is told to lower his undercarriage (wheels), indicating thereby that he has understood the instructions and will comply. The intruding pilot is also cautioned that any disobedience of orders could result in his being shot down.
- During this operation, the second of the two interceptors is out of sight of the intruder. He is positioned to take necessary action should his 'Leader' be threatened by any offensive manoeuvring of the 'enemy'.
- If the intercepted aircraft does comply, he will be escorted to the receiving airfield.

In the recent incident, interceptors will have taken action as specified by the SOPs. Therefore, the following assumptions and facts must be considered:

- The Captain of the *Atlantique* disregarded instructions, believing that because of his proximity to the Pakistan border he would be able to get back easily.
- The aircraft was under radar control from its own side.
- Given the Indian tendency to 'turn the other cheek', the possibility of his being shot down was remote.
- Finally, and as a clinching argument, Pakistan Navy *Atlantiques* are known to have been modified to carry air-to-air missiles for self-defence. The aircraft disregarded instructions and instead of turning on to the ordered direction did so towards the interceptor thereby threatening him.
- The aircraft is used specifically for detecting submarines and surface ships from what are known as 'stand off' ranges. This precludes the necessity of closing in on fleet air defences and thereby jeopardising its own security.
- The aircraft is configured to monitor radar and radio transmission and emissions of our various radars, each of which has its own specific 'signature'. This is rather a thumb impression, quite unique, and which tells an operator exactly what system is being operated. The enemy is then able to devise counter-measures, which in war would be used to 'blind' our radars, or interfere with radio transmissions. The aircraft has over ten radar consoles that are constantly monitored by specialist crews.
- Why should the Pakistan Navy carry out a training exercise so close to land over Indian airspace, that too when tensions are high and indeed mounting?

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Remoulding the Subcontinent

PART I

MAJ GEN VINOD SAIGHAL, VSM (RETD)

Introduction

It is not perhaps known how the last millennium (going by the Gregorian calendar) ended. It is known that the current millennium seems to be ending on a dismal note. On the human plane, the forces in the ascendant are propelling the world towards:

- Eco-Destruction of the Planet;
- Remilitarisation of the Planet; and
- Dehumanisation of the Planet (due to the breakdown of the social cohesion of societies).

As the close of the century approaches, two events have intruded rudely on to the global consciousness, Kosovo and Kargil. In the first case, that of Kosovo, the Western powers, in their collective might, fired a warning shot of 'unilateralism' across the bows of the established international order, which was based on the primacy of the United Nations to sanction military interventions.

In the second case, the Kargil intrusion was a 'wake up' call to the Indian nation; to shake it out of its self-induced somnolence. Monumental inadequacies in the ascending hierarchical spiral - an invitation for Kargil to happen - were magnificently retrieved at the business end, at the lowest end of the military ladder, albeit at great cost in life and limb. The saga of gallantry and sacrifice galvanised the nation as never before. It demonstrated that the nation is as united as any nation could hope to be in this day and age. It clearly brought out that the divisions had been artificially introduced, over the years, by the self-serving policies of the governing hierarchy.

Where Do We Go From Here

If India has to come to the forefront in the 21st Century - which

Excerpts of the talk delivered at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi on 11 August 1999.

Maj Gen Vinod Saighal retired from the Directorate General of Military Training, Army Headquarters.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

it must if it wishes to survive in the emerging world order - then it must respond firmly to the threats that loom large on the time horizon of the next century. The foremost threat still remains the internal threat, brought about through venality and misgovernance. Taking a leaf out of the book of the valiant youth of India who fought at the front, the public must proceed to deal in like manner with the elements 'within' the land who have sapped its strength for a full fifty years. Acting in unison, the nation should now give short shrift to all such elements.

To deal effectively with external, or externally-inspired threats, it behoves a nation the size of India to clearly define its security parameters; and even make transparent its pattern of future response to the type of mischief that nearly tripped up the nation in a big way.

India's external security parameters in the next century would have to have two distinct components: the core component and a complementary component. The policy statement relating to the core component would explicitly lay down:

- The centrality of India's commitment to universal nuclear disarmament.
- Strengthening of the UN system to introduce a more equitable and universally respected dispensation.
- Creation of sufficient military and economic strength to: (i) exclude outside interference in the subcontinent; (ii) maintain the security and peaceful co-existence of India and its trading partners in the Indian Ocean Region; (iii) harmonisation of the subcontinent for the peaceful development of its member states.
- Strengthening efforts for the demilitarisation of the Himalayas as an ecological imperative.
- Unequivocal support for the ecological revival of the planet.
- Demilitarisation of space.

The complementary component relating to India's security policy would centre around:

- Maintaining the economic viability and physical integrity of South East Asia, in concert with all the regional powers,

notably China and Japan.

- Maintaining the inter-relatedness and harmony of the Central Asian Republics in concert with the regional powers, namely Russia, China, Turkey and Iran.
- Diminishing, or demolishing, the ability of Pakistan to create further mischief in the region.
- Maintaining the regional sanctity of the Bay of Bengal in concert with the littoral states.
- Eliciting global support for the *doctrine of primary responsibility* which states that "a state transferring or selling nuclear weapons or nuclear material to any group would be held responsible for all damage resulting to another state from such transaction i.e., the action of the group or groups to whom the nuclear weapons or material had been transferred. The transferring state would thus become liable to be dealt with as if it had itself used those weapons in an act of aggression against another state." (The doctrine can be endorsed after due deliberation by the International Court of Justice and the concerned UN agencies).

As it transpires, none of the above statements, taken singly, or collectively, fly in the face of the emerging global consensus on these issues. In order to meet its primary and secondary objectives India should progressively endeavour to:

- Maintain its defence expenditure at between 3 and 3.5 per cent of the GDP, at constant prices. (Even with slight improvement in governance, transparency and accountability it would be possible to bring down the budget deficit considerably).
- Maintain a 'robust' nuclear deterrent sufficient to deter any threat to its interests in and around the subcontinent as well as in the Indian Ocean.
- Maintain a viable (independent) defensive posture with separate 'credible' offensive components in the North and North East.
- Maintain sufficient naval strength in the Indian Ocean to ensure the primacy of its interests in the region.
- Progressively create a Rapid Action Force of sufficient strength for deployment anywhere in the region, for dealing with adverse situations.

- In case of sustained terrorist activities, sponsored from outside, India will reserve the right, with effect from 1 January 2000, to take all necessary measures to neutralise such activities at source. (Sufficient warning is thereby given to 'all' regional states harbouring individuals who have been persistently indulging in extortion, terrorism or mayhem in India).
- By the same token India reserves the right to strike at any camp, in any state, where mercenaries are being trained for terrorism on Indian territory. India's actions will be limited to elimination of such camps. Should the sponsoring state escalate tensions, thereafter, it would bear full responsibility for further retaliation by India.
- India has abjured the use of nuclear weapons to settle international disputes. It has no desire to invade the territory of any other state. It hopes that such self-restraint will not result in adventurism on the part of other states.

The interesting definition of 'aggressive patrolling' provided by the Army Chief of a neighbouring state in a recent interview to the international media would no doubt have been taken note of by his Indian counterpart. It would doubtless be put to effective use for dealing with cross border terrorism in future. Local commanders could well be given the initiative to destroy the build-up of infiltrators at assembly points across the border before they are able to infiltrate and kill women and children. To prevent any misunderstanding as to the intent and 'limited' scope of the exercise, Army Headquarters would lay down the radii up to which such actions could take place with the permission of the sector commanders, not below the level of divisional commanders, from resources "integral" to the formation taking the action. The Government of India should also make an official announcement to this effect - limiting the action to sectors where infiltration routinely takes place.

Global Ramifications of the Restoration of the Status Quo in Kargil: Actions of the Indian Army

While the nation takes legitimate pride in its Armed Forces, analysts around the world are only now beginning to take stock of the global ramifications of the demonstrated prowess of the Indian

Army at the lowest end of the technology spectrum. Before coming on to these global ramifications which will, hereafter, have to be factored into the defence planning of nations in the next century it is relevant to reproduce an excerpt from an article written in a national newspaper in 1995:

Where it is a question of sheer guts and grit and fighting at impossible heights under impossible climatic conditions, the Indian Army remains one of the finest battle forces in the world. High technology domination of the battlefield by the armed forces of the more advanced countries falls into an entirely different category. That category, referred to as force multiplication in military parlance, is actually a multiplication factor based on pounds, shillings and pence. In time the Indian Army will deal with the foreign mercenaries and elements working against the interests of the state. It is not inconceivable that in the process the unfinished agenda on the other side of the Line of Control too might get resolved to India's satisfaction thanks to the opening provided by the induction of mercenaries.."¹

It is being again alluded to here because it is pivotal to several options that emerge for India in the national and regional security fields in the next century. It should be appreciated that regardless of the lack of international support for Pakistan's attack on Indian territory in the Kargil sector, and the support provided with high precision weapons by the IAF, the situation could not have turned to India's advantage unless the Indian Army had demonstrated its ability to physically recapture those heights, in spite of the very high casualties being sustained. The real pressure on the Pakistan Prime Minister was the realisation that the gambit had failed. He allowed himself to be persuaded only after it had become clear to him that reverses on the ground had indeed started taking place.

Whereas other skills and capabilities can be augmented rapidly through high tech purchases, the special skills inhering in the Indian Army take years, if not a lifetime, to develop. The military hierarchy must never lose sight of this aspect. The national security policy of the country should take into account this demonstrated prowess. It follows, therefrom, that if pushed beyond its threshold of tolerance, the country has the ability to fight its way to the Hindu Kush to

neutralise any and every threat to the sanctity and security of the subcontinent.

Dealing with Pakistan

It should have become eminently clear by now that pacific accommodation with Pakistan would be unlikely till the time that the establishment that has pushed that country into its fourth misadventure with India is demolished. Unless saner elements come to the fore, here onwards, the Indian policy towards Pakistan, stripped to its essentials, could well become: "the marginalisation of the elements that repress the natural growth of Pakistan and the subcontinent."

India has no choice but to lock in its Kargil victory in a manner such that the question of another action against India - covert or overt - does not arise. Translated into a policy directive it means that:

- The additional deployment forced upon India in Kargil should no longer be construed as a purely defensive deployment. If India's hand is again forced, it could just as easily become the launch pad, at the time of India's choosing, to rest the flanks of the Indian Army on the Hindukush.
- India might be obliged to create additional strike elements for the mountains in Jammu and Kashmir.
- After due parleys with all concerned, India should establish a Counter Insurgency and Mountain Warfare School (CI&MWS) at a selected location in one of the Central Asian States.
- India will keep all options open for its rapid deployment force.
- Hereafter, the elimination of mercenaries that have infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir (and elsewhere) will be carried out with the same despatch and vigour as the Kargil operation.

It is reiterated that the Pakistan military establishment's ability to create mischief through religion-inspired terrorism should be made to end with the 20th Century - for the sake of the region, for the sake of the world, as well as for the sake of the moderate elements in Pakistan itself. India will now take all necessary steps to ensure that the scope for such mischief is considerably curtailed in the next century.

This country continues to believe that, regardless of the emotiveness of the Kashmir issue, the silent majority in Pakistan, and especially its non-Punjab provinces would be ready to explore saner alternatives for a harmonised subcontinent, at peace with its neighbours and at peace with itself. To these elements desiring peaceful co-existence, proposals should be offered for economic betterment of both countries. In the first instance, it is proposed to construct an oil and gas pipeline running from CAR through Iran, Baluchistan and Sind to Rajasthan.

A task force to prepare the blueprint should be set up for the purpose. Generous partnership incentives should be offered to the leaders of Baluchistan and Sind at a special conference in Tehran, New Delhi or London. The consortium and its lead bankers should be identified. The Government of Pakistan can consider coming aboard in due course, failing which conditions should be created for the said provinces in Pakistan to break away, retain their autonomy in a subcontinental confederation and join the consortium as independent entities. Since it will take a few years to finalise the blueprint, the other stakeholders should proceed on the basis that in due course saner counsels "will" prevail in Pakistan. Should Western oil majors decide to back the proposal they will find that geologically, technically, environmentally and from the point of view of the economics of the proposal it provides perhaps the best alternative for marketing the hydrocarbon wealth of the Central Asian region.

The damage caused to the Himalayan ecology as a result of the military build-up and confrontation cannot be fully appreciated by this generation. Its horrendous consequences will be felt by the coming generations in the subcontinent and in China. It would be worth reproducing an excerpt from a UN report prepared consequent to the military intervention during the Kosovo crisis:

" Through explosive reactions, fires and the burning of great amounts of different materials and chemicals and through intensive actions of military airplanes, the millions of tons of oxygen that the living world needs, have been irretrievably spent."²

Here is another excerpt from a paper circulated at the behest of the UN Secretary General to the task force set up for the purpose

in the Balkans:

".... it would not be easy to make the world at large see the enormity of the harm being done to myriad life forms on the ecological plane - life forms that depend upon their in built sensors to communicate, navigate, attract mates, find food or to ward off danger.. There have been protests about the ecological damage to the Danube river basin but nowhere commensurate to the magnitude of the ecological impoverishment of the region taking place day by day with increasing intensity. . . ."³

As an alternative to the enhanced military build-up being effected by both sides as a result of the Kargil conflagration, complete demilitarisation of the region is proposed along the following lines:

- Complete demilitarisation of all areas East and North of Zojila, to include Ladakh, the Aksai Chin region under Chinese occupation, Baltistan - Skardu and Gilgit.
- In the first instance, the demilitarisation to be effective for fifty years.
- The demilitarisation will respect the de facto status quo (present position of the three countries) without prejudicing their right to negotiate a more lasting settlement. Adequate safeguards would be incorporated for denial of infiltration to hostile elements - hostile to the concerned states as well as elements hostile to the spirit of the accord.
- The demilitarisation instrument to be deposited with the International Court of Justice as a binding protocol.
- The entire region will, thereafter, be turned into a giant Himalayan ecological park.

A tripartite commission comprising non-governmental organisations and other nonmilitary elements should work out a hundred years ecological revival package for the region. All the concerned countries will act as co-guarantors for its ecological revival. UNDP and other interested organisations could be co-opted to assist in the ecological restoration package. Light border posts could continue to be manned by paramilitary forces till the time

mutual confidence is restored. Local communities will be given employment as ecological wardens. A special fund - possibly one twentieth the cost of full military deployment - should be created for ecological restoration work. A corpus could also be created with the help of the World Bank and other national and international agencies. Personnel of these agencies would be debarred from entering should they be found to be acting against the interests of the region, or any of the members. Concomitantly, it is proposed that a joint Indo-Pak commission, possibly under the aegis of the Indian and Pakistan chapters of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature be set up, to carry out a study of the ecological consequences of the Himalayan military deployments and conflicts.

It would have been noticed that while on the question of dealing with Pakistan several options, at both the sterner and softer ends of the spectrum, have been spelled out. The elements currently in the ascendant, successors to those others who can be credited with having engineered the break-up of Pakistan, are likely to oppose the saner options. Indian media, the business fraternity, diplomats, NRIs, and Non-Resident Pakistanis (NRPs) must try and see to it that the debate is enlarged within Pakistan before that country hurtles further towards self-destruction. The moderate elements in Pakistan would be well advised to erect their own protective barriers in anticipation of the enactment of the Pakistan Shariat Bill and the resultant 'talibanisation' of their society. People who enforce their writ through the gun do not understand any other language than that of equal or superior force. The moderate elements should give a thought to raising their own militia to ensure they do not go the way of the hapless women of Afghanistan.

The Government of India and responsible media elements of both countries must make it their business to educate the public on the subcontinent as to the consequences of a nuclear exchange so that persons making such irresponsible statements are obliged to shut up and keep shut. This exercise needs to be undertaken on priority.

(To be Concluded)

Notes

¹ Vinod Saigal, "Time India Changed its Defence Perspective", *The Hindu*, 17 October 1995.

² Report of the *Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission* dispatched by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

³ "The Ecological Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis," note prepared by *Eco Monitors Society*, April 1999.

Importance of Regional Ocean Communities

VICE ADMIRAL MIHIR ROY PVSM, AVSM, (RETD)

New Ocean Order

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) has been one of the most significant achievements of this century by its universal acceptability (presently 127 states) and the remarkable uniformity with which it is being applied in practice. As the former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali stated "the dream of a comprehensive law of the oceans is an old one. Turning this dream into reality has been one of the greatest achievements of this century. It will be one of our most enduring legacies".

UNCLOS imposes a duty on all states to ensure through proper conservation and management, the long-term sustainability of marine resources and environment and for the protection of the oceans, which is being regarded as a fish pond, mineral reservoir, energy producer, dustbin and self-effacing battlefield. It has established itself as part of the global system for peace and security and reflects a delicate balance between competing interests in the use of the oceans and its resources by taking a functional approach in establishing the various maritime zones, which has added 2.2 million sq kms to Delhi's jurisdiction and without limiting other legitimate uses of the seas.

The Laws of the Seas sets forth rules for the conduct of marine scientific research as also guaranteed access to the seas for landlocked states. In addition, the Convention provides a mechanism such as the 'International Tribunal' for compulsory settlement of disputes. While earlier, the right of free passage and the inexhaustible resources of the seas were regarded as the

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

common heritage of mankind enabling the stronger maritime powers to influence decisions in their favour, today there is an increasing awareness of the rights of coastal states to take advantage of the emerging ocean regime. For example, India's Continental Shelf could extend to an additional 1.5 million sq kms. India has been granted a "Pioneer Status" for seabed mineral exploration and occupies an influential position in the further development of the international law of the seas. India has a judge on the International Tribunal as also an expert member on the Continental Shelf. It has a seat in the Council of the Seabed Authority and is a member of Legal and Technical Commissions. Its scientists, oceanographers and technical institutions are widely recognised for their scholarship and research.¹

The undermentioned technical organisations have been provided by the UN to oversee marine-related matters:

- (a) Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO with global observing systems.
- (b) International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
- (c) International Seabed Authority.
- (d) Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf.
- (e) Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).
- (f) International Tribunal to settle disputes.
- (g) Continental Shelf Commission.
- (h) Regional and Technical Commission.

Therefore, the UN organisations and the provisions of UNCLOS, particularly relevant to the Indian Ocean encompassing 35 states (29 littoral and 6 island), merits close monitoring in order to take full advantage of the new ocean order for achieving national aims and aspirations such as search and rescue (Art 98); anti-piracy (Art-14); drug trafficking (Art 108); environmental protection (Art 192); anti-pollution (Art-194); science and technology (Art 274); regional maritime research (Art 277) and sustainable development (Agenda 21).

But unfortunately in India, the requisite action in many cases has not been taken in time and thus lost by default as there is neither a Ministry of Oceans nor a National Council for Ocean Affairs for co-ordinating and implementing the responsibilities of seven ministries directly involved with the oceans: Department of Ocean Development, Agriculture, Food Processing, Environment, Defence, Revenue and Ministry of Surface Transport; as also seven additional departments such as Mining, Space, Petroleum, Science and Technology, Atomic Energy etc., which indirectly deal with ocean activities.

Indian Ocean Region

It is said that the Atlantic was the 'ocean of the past', Pacific the 'ocean of the present' and the Indian Ocean, which the evangelist of Sea Power, Admiral Mahan, predicted would be the 'Ocean of Destiny' in the 21st Century. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto stated at the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Commemoration lecture on 8 March 1999 at Karachi: " In the 18th and 19th Centuries, South Asia remained the golden trade route of rich markets. The wealth of the East was conquered by the gunpowder of the West".

The Indian Ocean is a heterogeneous region with a wide diversity of languages and culture and per capita income ranging from \$90 in Mozambique, \$390 in India, \$3,400 in South Africa and \$20,540 in Australia. Hence the level of economic, social and human development and exposure to external trade and investment flows are on a roller coaster paradigm. Nonetheless, this embayed ocean contains a third of the world's population. Half of the world's container ships and tankers carrying two-thirds of oil shipments pass through her ice-free waters, which is a lifeline for international commerce with US 750 billion dollars in global trade and 100 billion dollars in intra-regional trade. But the lack of infrastructure, the slow turn round of ships and high cargo handling costs continue to impose a penalty of US 250 million dollars per year on Indian exporters and importers as per World Bank report.

Regional Associations

With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the abolition of Apartheid

(which in Afrikaans means 'apartness' or segregation'), the setting up of the World Trade Organisation and emphasis on globalisation has changed the course of world politics from geo-political issues to geo-economic priorities, from the power game to the wealth game (Tsutomu Kikuchi) and from military pacts such as NATO and SEATO to mega-regional trading blocs like ASEAN, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), NAFTA, (North America Free Trade Area) and EU (European Union), which are underpinned by strong sub-regional organisations such as SADC (South African Development Community), GCC and IOMAC.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ASEAN was established in August 1967 for diffusing regional tensions based on a shared perception of common internal and external threats. It provided a framework to address disputes such as between Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia and Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah, which met with a measure of success by the ASEAN way of consensus. The Thai Foreign Minister described the mechanism as 'flexible engagement for discussing domestic issues or developments which may impinge on the interests of member states'.

ASEAN, which initially encompassed five nations, was enlarged with the independence of Brunei in 1984. Vietnam became a member in 1995. Cambodia and Myanmar also joined ASEAN, with the latter becoming the 'Albatross in ASEAN relations' with the West because of differing concepts of human rights.²

Moreover, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was the outcome of the quest to manage regional security according to own pace and agenda. In addition, a category of Dialogue Partners was initiated, which came into prominence in the early eighties and in which category India has been interacting with ASEAN.

The current trend is more towards economic integration as per the example of the European Union and APEC, rather than free trade and economic co-operation as envisaged by the ASEAN

Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2003 and ASEAN Investment Area (AIR) by 2016. It has been predicted that an 'Asian Free Economic Zone' would be in existence by 2010 with nearly 3 billion people and a GNP of around \$3 billions. The Asian Free Zone could be at the same level, in GNP terms, as the EU, US or Japan. In terms of economics, the Asian zone would have the greatest influence, voice and clout in the 21st Century.

There has, however, been a change in the environment in South East Asia following the meltdown of currencies, political instability in Indonesia which country was central to ASEAN and support to pro-democracy movements for autonomy such as in East Timor. The significant part played by the IMF and Japan to assist selected countries to improve their economic security also merits mention. Hence, there is a need for a more pragmatic road map between SAARC and ASEAN to reap the benefits of this populated and resource-rich region.

SAARC

SAARC was formalised at Dhaka in 1993, emphasising the region's collective economic strength as a mega market of a billion consumers. This resulted in the creation of South Asia food reserves, cultural and academic exchanges, weather forecasting, tackling terrorism, and South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) leading to South Asian Free Trade Arrangements (SAFTA). But at the 10th SAARC Summit in Colombo in July 1998, it was apparent that in view of the Indo-Pakistan gridlock, Pokhran II, and the drop in oil prices, the progress of SAARC remained unsatisfactory. Hopefully, this would be accelerated with the Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy as the scale of social deprivation and human despair in South Asia is traumatic. To quote from the late Mahabul Haq's UNDP report which was recently echoed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen,

"with India and Pakistan leading the way, South Asia trails behind while the rest of the developing world surges ahead. Even the Sub-Saharan African basket case is doing better in some sectors. Their average literacy rate is 50% compared

with South Asia's 47%. 800 million South Asians do without elementary sanitation and another 300 million drink from ponds rather than taps."

It will nevertheless be of interest to highlight the illegal trade between India and Pakistan, which is several times the official trade figure of Rs 600 crores per annum. The Lahore Declaration has established Indo-Pakistan business interaction with a target of Rs 3,000 crores per annum.

The 'look West' policy of Delhi must necessarily be matched by a 'look East' policy by the Bay of Bengal communities.

Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC)

The need to formulate and implement programmes of economic co-operation including *inter alia* the expansion of trade and tourism, direct investment, scientific and technological exchanges along with the necessity to lower barriers for free and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment and technology has become a compulsion to the underdeveloped countries of the Indian Ocean, which Gandhiji aptly defined as 'a rich region with poor people'. This was given a kickstart during President Mandela's state visit to Delhi in January 1995 when he declared, "The natural urge of the facts of the history and geography that Nehru spoke of should broaden itself to exploring the concept of an Indian Ocean Rim for socio-economic co-operation and to improve the lot of developing nations."

Accordingly, the Charter for Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) was signed in March 1997 at Mauritius based on respect for sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and peaceful co-existence of all countries. Former Prime Minister Gujral described it as 'a vehicle for the transformation of the lives of the people of the Rim.' But due to growing disinterestedness of Australia for her 'look West' policy, particularly after Pokhran II, and South Africa's involvement in SADC, which gives her an edge as the only developed country on the African

continent, the fall in oil prices, general decline in world trade as also the meltdown of South East Asian currencies, the Indian Ocean Rim Association remains comparatively becalmed in this ocean of tomorrow.

It is, therefore, for consideration that a more homogeneous and compact sub-regional oceanic community such as the Bay of Bengal Community (BoB Com), which as per Article XXIV of GATT is acceptable to WTO, be structured for more effectively extracting the advantage of the new ocean regime for not only employment and incomes, but also for social, economic and environmental partnerships. Hence, the logical necessity for a regional developmental strategy by encouraging a borderless economy to promote exports in the global market place³, instead of the present flourishing illegal trade between neighbours.

Bay of Bengal Community (BoB Com)

Nehru stated in his book *The Discovery of India* that just as Hellenism spread from Greece to the countries of the Mediterranean, India's cultural influence spread to many countries in the South and South East and left its imprint in this ocean region.⁴ Panikar, Nilakanta Sastri, RC Mazumdar and Ashim Das Gupta have all used the term of South East Asia to cover both South Asia and South East Asia. To quote Prof Kenneth McPherson, currently the Director of the Indian Ocean Society at Perth,

This region was the home of the world's earliest urban civilisation and the centre of the first sophisticated commercial and maritime activities. This ocean area was a great highway and source of food and raw materials moulding the man and societies on its shores into a composite homogenous and ecological unit.

A recent publication of the UN financial Bay of Bengal Programme stated that the Bay of Bengal is a gift of "Mother Nature", with nutrient-rich riverine basins and the unique Sunderbans mangrove systems of India and Bangladesh and the invaluable coral reefs of Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar.⁵

The Bay of Bengal Community encompasses India,

Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, which have witnessed dynamic interaction between maritime, trade and cultural relations. It is a composite geographical and ecological unit about the same size as the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, India has already settled its maritime boundaries with Indonesia (1974), Thailand (1978), Burma (1987), Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976). The only unsettled maritime border is New Moore – Purbasha or South Talpatty Island as referred to in Bangladesh – being a disputed area, but which being a sea gull rookery at times submerged during high water is of a lesser dimension than many of the land border disputes that have been amicably settled.

Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand - Economic Co-operation (BIMST-EC)

The exploitation and exploration of living and non-living marine resources, disaster management, global warming, poaching, dumping of nuclear waste, narco-linked terrorism, search and rescue at sea in order to ensure a balance of interests both of economies and sea power, has many common factors among the Bay of Bengal Community. The establishment of BIMST-EC in March 1998 comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand for accelerating economic co-operation and promoting active collaboration and natural assistance in the economic, social, technical and scientific fields merits greater attention from Chambers of Commerce, academicians and policy planners.

In a ministerial meeting held at Bangkok, it was agreed to implement an integrated work programme to initially cover six areas: Bangladesh (trade and investment); India (technology, education, engineering, medical, private investment, and computer science); Myanmar (Asian highways and energy); Sri Lanka (tourism, fiscal and inland waterways); and Thailand (transportation and communications).

The struggle for control and influence over the resources lies at the core of inter-state disagreements. With the rate of population growth in this littoral region, the curve of human expectations concerning environmental implications such as dynamics of water movement, chemistry and biology of estuarine eco-system and

effluent load as well as the annual losses due to cyclones and floods, climatic fluctuation such as *El Nino* and man-made environmental disasters are significantly applicable to many of the countries in this ocean region.

Towards this end, there are more factors common to the Bay of Bengal community that merits highlighting not only as benchmarks but also for identifying gaps and predicting changes to both normal climate fluctuations, natural disasters and man-made environmental modifications. The underlying idea is not to replace SAARC or ASEAN, but to have an additional flyover to bring India closer to her South-Eastern neighbours.⁶ At a regional level, the formation of a Centre for Regional Maritime Cooperation for SAARC has already been suggested. Moreover, there is more homogeneity in this ocean sector than in any other segment of the Indian Ocean where oil, fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, authoritarianism and adventurism continue to be the ideology of distrust. For example, the conflicts between the modern and the traditional sectors, between aquaculture and deep sea trawlers poaching for Tuna and Tiger prawns, as also between growth enthusiasts and environmentalists strike a more sympathetic chord in many countries of the Bay of Bengal region.

In maritime terms, security issues are linked to the central strategic balance where the United States' overarching presence in the eastern and southern sectors of the Indian Ocean is the responsibility of their Seventh Fleet based at Hawaii, which is the headquarters of the Pacific command. However, their Fifth Fleet under the US Central Command is located in the Gulf, and is responsible for the Arabian Sea. Complicating the overall security perspective of this sub-ocean is the fact that, while the developed world pursues an agenda focussed on trade and collective security transcending national sovereignty and national sensitiveness, the developing countries are more prickly about their new-found sovereignty and therefore issue-based regional co-operation can be better achieved by a homogenous Bay of Bengal community whose members can interact more transparently with each other to benefit their own economies and socio-economic development.

Naval Co-operation

In South East Asia, the Royal Thai Navy conducts regular joint exercises with the Royal Australian Navy (*Austhai*), the Royal Malaysian Navy (*Thalay Laut* and *Seax Thamal*), RSN (*Sing Siam*), Indonesia (*Sea Garuda, Kakadu*), RAN and RNZN as also with the Indian Navy. The US Navy conducts *Cobra Gold* and *Sea Eagle* with RTN, *Optima* between Indonesia and Malaysia and *Indo-Sin* between Singapore and Indonesia. Australia has based *P-3 C Orions* at the Royal Malaysian air base at Butterworth, which recently buzzed the Indian missile destroyer INS Delhi while on a goodwill visit to Malaysia.

India hosted multinational warships from all ASEAN countries and Australia since 1995 for annual exercises at Port Blair in the Andamans appropriately termed *Milan*.

A second track organisation CSCAP (Council for Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific) in which Australia takes a leading part with five working groups dialoguing maritime cooperation discusses regional maritime issues, conflict resolution, regional security, confidence building and adherence to UNCLOS III.

Response to Pokhran II

It will be noticed that while the Nuclear Powers, particularly the US and the UK as also their Trojan horses, were vehement in condemning India and Pakistan, the reaction in South East Asia was comparatively muted. Despite strong pressure from the United States, the ASEAN leaders sidestepped the issue of outrightly condemning the nuclear tests on the subcontinent.

Even as they thrust CTBT, FMCT, NPT and other nuclear treaties on India, the Nuclear Powers have nonetheless taken an ambiguous stand on the Treaty of South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). It will, therefore, be a counterpoint if India endorses this treaty so as to preserve the homogeneity of this ocean area.

Hence, it strengthens the logic for the creation of a Bay of

Bengal Community, which will enable this ocean region to come out of the Indo-Pakistan 'Catch 22' position as also loosen the influence of the US and China to inject their economic and security interests in this compact and homogeneous sea area, which is comparatively free of tension.

The second factor that is central to the Indian Ocean mindset is China, whose "Brown Water" navy has sailed through its green water (EEZ) and entered the blue waters to occupy the disputed Paracel Islands and declare its intention to recover the Spratlys and Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. The fact that China does not belong to the Bay of Bengal community would perforce reduce strategic dissonance in this region. But China is assisting Myanmar to modernise her naval infrastructure at Akyab and Mergui as also Hangyi Islands in the Bay of Bengal, albeit for trade and commerce. In addition, radar stations have been installed in the Great Coco Islands in the North Andamans. Moreover, China is building up the Myanmar Army and is the largest provider of military hardware in exchange for Burma's teak, rice and other valuable resources. Hence, the proposal to upgrade the Fortress Commander of Andamans and Nicobar into an independent South East Naval Command merits early recognition.

Beijing is likely to step up the export of military hardware, nuclear material and missiles to Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian countries, particularly as it has become a net importer of oil. Moreover, with Hongkong, which has the eighth largest economy, becoming part of China and their Southern Naval Command shifting to the erstwhile British naval anchorage, it will be an ideal jump off base for Beijing's entry into the Indian Ocean. China has responded to the economic crisis enveloping SE Asia by not devaluing the Yuan which could have further destabilised the economies of the countries, but this has in a manner affected China's export sector and may require reconsideration. Therefore, it stands to reason that China has given priority for modernising and expanding her naval forces. Admiral Liu Huaqing stated that,

The Navy is the tool of the country's foreign policy. Unlike the PLA Army, the Navy can project its presence far

away from home thus making it the most strategic force in peace time, a pillar for the country's foreign policy and the embodiment of the nation's will and power.

The acquisition of new submarines, destroyers and frigates, amphibious forces, air refuelling, electronic warfare platforms and possibly an aircraft carrier will significantly shift the balance in the South China Sea and allow China to make her presence felt in the Indian Ocean.

Therefore, the upgrading of the navies of Singapore, which is acquiring submarines, Thailand which has commissioned an aircraft carrier and Indonesia which has bought almost the entire East German Navy are visible pointers in this direction as there will be nearly three dozen modern submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. A multinational Bay standing naval force, sitting astride the Malacca Straits, will ensure the tranquility of this sub-region as China is not an Indian Ocean power. Moreover, Beijing is developing the old Burma route to have a twin approach into the enlarging consumer market of this heavily populated area. Hence, as Deng Xioping cryptically remarked, it does not matter if a cat is black, brown or white, so long as it catches mice.

Conclusion

It will be observed that the emergent changes in the relationship between the seas and the state emphasises the necessity for planners to invest in the exploitation of the seas and seabed; structure interdisciplinary institutions and infrastructure for ocean management; effectively manage ports and carriage of cargo, encourage coastal shipping and utilise the growing spectrum of maritime activities for not only expanding economic growth but also to provide new vistas of employment such as utilising the large inland ports of Calcutta, Khulna and Mongla (similar to New Orleans and Duisberg ports), to interface between the seas and inland waterways with appropriate Ro-Ro vessels and Lash barges, which could navigate the draughts of our national waterways both by day and night and thereby effectively strengthen the Asian highway.

The innovative proposals of the International Union of Railways (IUR) for a multi-modal approach for moving containerised freight from Singapore to Bangladesh and thence to India and across the subcontinent to Europe merits serious attention. This route will be more lucrative for global trade than the existing China-Europe link, which transits through the snow-bound region of Northern Russia. In comparison, the Asian Railway will be an all-weather track. The mismatch in gauge can be solved either by the technological breakthrough of enabling the axles of trains to expand or contract according to gauge or by transferring containers with the help of high-speed cranes, which are already in operation.

There is hence a need to formalise a Bay of Bengal Community for preserving the marine environment of the Bay of Bengal, accelerate economic co-operation, structure a free trade zone, and enlarge employment and incomes from ocean-based industries such as ship building, fishing, and port development. It will also encourage the reduction of transactional bottlenecks, double taxation, issue of visas and a host of other marine-related activities, which have been dormant due to the Indo-Pak gridlock largely based on suspicions, prejudices and egos.

It may be summarised that a Bay of Bengal Community (BoB) could well be a natural bridge between SAARC and ASEAN for exploiting maritime resources, trade and commerce as also by encouraging inland waterways and port development, tourism, cultural activities and in addition revolutionise infrastructure and communications for the Indian Ocean Community to step into the next millennium.

Notes

1. Satya N Nandan, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica.
2. Condemnation of Myanmar by the US and other Western countries has become a regular feature in both ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences and in ASEM.

3. Mohammed Humayun Kabir, "Sub-regional Cooperation in ASEAN : Lessons for South Asia" *Bllss* (Dhaka), 31 May 1998.
4. V Suryanarayanan, "Bay of Bengal Community", *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, Vol.6, November 1998, p.24.
5. Ibid, p.25.
6. PC Sinha, "Coastal Environment of India", *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, Vol. 4, no.3, July 1997.

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The Disintegration of Yugoslavia

LT GEN EA VAS PVSM (RETD)

Introduction

The first casualty of war is truth. The Western media, after commencing air strikes on Yugoslavia, projected Slobodan Milosevic as Europe's bad boy. There was talk about "genocide" to describe the human tragedy in the Balkans. The Serbian media offered its own version of the crisis, branding NATO forces as brutal criminals who were killing innocent civilians.

Indians are conscious of the moral dilemma of ethnic upheavals. We experienced our 1947 partition where six million non-Muslims fled from Pakistan and roughly the same number of Muslims went over from India to Pakistan; indiscriminate killings took place on both sides of the border. Again in 1971, one million Bangladeshis were murdered by the Pakistanis in cold blood; another 10 million fled to India. The USA then supported Pakistan and even attempted to coax China into taking military action against India. When the Vietnamese evicted the genocidal Pol Pot regime from Phnom Penh in 1978, the Western powers supported Prince Sihanouk's coalition whose mainstay was the Khmer Rouge. This ensured that Pol Pot's appointee represented Cambodia in the UN General Assembly. With this background, Indians are cautious to accept expressions of Western sympathy for the Kosovars. The aim of this article is to analyse events in Yugoslavia dispassionately.

Background to the Crisis

When the idyllic blanket of Communism was swept away by history, long-suppressed demons of ethnicity and religion were exposed all over Eastern Europe. Tito's Yugoslavia also began to unravel. Slovenia and Croatia were the first to break away. Slovenia's secession was accomplished peacefully. A sizeable number of Serbs resided in Croatia. The Croats, with tacit support

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

from Germany, which had a World War II grudge against the Serbs, began asserting their muscle power; 150,000 Serbian refugees fled to Yugoslavia which was forced to recognise Croatia as an independent republic. The Serbs were the first victims of Balkan ethnic cleansing.

Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia, wanted to stop the process of disintegration and preserve a 'Greater Serbia' consisting of the five provinces of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. When Macedonia in 1992 announced that it wanted independence, there were indications that Yugoslavia might use force to prevent this. The President of Macedonia asked for a contingent of UN soldiers to be located in the country as a trip-wire against the Serbs. A UN Preventive Deployment Force known as UNPREDEP was made up, mostly of Nordic troops and stiffened by a batch of Americans. Its 1,200 soldiers kept watch on Macedonia's border with Serbia, patrolling the Macedonian side of the frontier.

UNPREDEP worked surprisingly well, perhaps because Belgrade was distracted by the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is populated by an equal number of Serbs and Muslim Croats. Serbian para-military forces indulged in savage acts of ethnic cleansing in an attempt to terrorise the Bosnian Croats. Eventually, professional peacemakers in Washington scripted a Bosnian peace. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two roughly equal entities: the Serb Republic and the Muslim Croat Federation, each with its own army under a central government. The belligerent Bosnian Serb militia has been kept under UN control by 30,000 peacekeeping troops.

Kosovo Peace Talks

The province of Kosovo consisted of 90 per cent Muslim Albanians and 10 per cent Serbs. Muslim guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were well-entrenched in the hills of Kosovo. They demanded a separate state. Serbian forces were deployed in Kosovo to prevent secession and safeguard the minority. The European Union (EU) looked upon the Balkans as being very

much a part of Europe and wanted this region to be fully integrated into the Union. Gross human rights violations against European Albanians, even if they be Muslims, were not an acceptable European value. In 1997, Europe began a series of peace talks with Milosevic on the future of Kosovo. A Contact Group consisting of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and America offered a deal, which would ensure Serbia's territorial integrity and give Kosovo a broad autonomy whilst some 30,000 NATO peacekeepers guaranteed peace. The delegation representing Kosovo's Muslim majority was divided in accepting the Paris proposals, whereas Milosevic said that he was keeping his options open.

In February 1999, China used its veto to end UNPREDEP's mission in Macedonia. However, the government of Macedonia had maintained close relations with NATO. Over 2,000 NATO troops were already stationed in the country, ready if needed to rescue any unarmed "verifiers" provided by NATO in Kosovo. Moreover, of the 30,000 peacekeepers NATO eventually planned to send to Kosovo if a peace deal was signed, some 10,000 were already on their way via Greece. The headquarters for all of them was to be Macedonia. With so many NATO soldiers on its soil, Macedonia had little to fear from Belgrade after the withdrawal of UNPREDEP.

The Paris peace talks had laid out terms for continuing Europe's partnership with Serbia. These were that Milosevic should hand Kosovo over to Western protectors in return for which he would be helped to stay in power in Belgrade and preserve his notion of a 'Greater Serbia'. Whilst we may not hold a brief for Milosevic, it must be accepted that his government has been facing incremental threats to the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia from 1992 onwards. The pressure has been generated by Europe, rushing to recognise Croatia and other secessionist provinces, allowing no time for the Yugoslav leadership to resolve these differences peacefully. Kosovo was the consequence of unthinking encouragement to the break-up of pluralistic Yugoslavia. Milosevic had resorted to force to preserve his country's unity and territorial integrity. The West kept assuring Milosevic that it did not want to break up Yugoslavia; it just wanted an end to genocidal violence; it wanted neither side to win. Milosevic believed that NATO did not undertake the French talks in good faith; it was a massive military alliance dictating unequal terms to Yugoslavia.

Milosevic hoped to take advantage of internal dissensions in the Kosovar delegation by provoking the KLA into abandoning the peace talks. However, under American pressure the Kosovar delegation patched up its differences and agreed to the Contact Group's deal. Now it was Milosevic who began stalling. The Contact Group warned Milosevic that he would face air strikes if he refused the deal. The same threats had been made in 1998, when Western embassies twice evacuated their staff while the threats were never made good. That vacillation had encouraged Milosevic who assessed that the European Union [EU] was powerless if the US was unwilling to commit its forces to an aerial bombardment in the Balkans. After the breakdown of the peace talks in France in March, the US President called a press conference, his first in nine months, on Kosovo. He followed this up with active lobbying of key senators and then launched his charm offensive to win support for NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia.

Prelude to War

A Gallup Poll taken after the US President's press conference showed narrow public support for air strikes. Within the Administration, the Secretary of State was a staunch interventionist. The Pentagon's top brass hated the idea of getting involved in Kosovo's peace keeping, which it regards as "social work". Republicans were as divided as Democrats were on this aspect of foreign policy. Most preferred to sit on the fence and assert American power only if there was a quick way out. When the House voted in March, 58 to 41 supported air strikes. The vote supporting military action was hedged about with conditions and promises: it required the president to explain the precise nature of American interests in Kosovo, the cost of intervention, his exit strategy and so on. The views of individual senators were also qualified. However, with America's intervention assured, NATO was ready for action.

At this stage Milosevic seemed apparently unperturbed. He sacked the Generals who had advised him six months earlier to make concessions to NATO and replaced them with loyal hard-liners. Many already blamed him for losing Serb lands in Croatia

and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo is of great politico-ethnic importance to Serbia as the place where they resisted the expansion of Ottoman power as early as the 13th Century. It was a Serb-majority area till the end of the Second World War. It became an Albanian-majority area only because Tito allowed liberal immigration of Albanians from the oppressive communist regime in Albania. Hardliners told Milosevic that to allow NATO troops into Kosovo without a fight might be a final humiliating blow to his regime. By now, Macedonia was host to over 20,000 NATO troops.

When Milosevic was given a NATO deadline by which to accept the peace agreement or face the danger of air strikes, he was still hoping that NATO would settle for hitting a few remote installations, causing little real damage to his army. That would allow him to channel popular anger towards the US and away from himself. While making a virtue of necessity, he could then capitulate in Kosovo and claim that he was saving the Serb nation from further harm. Undoubtedly, Washington happens to be the common denominator in almost every high-profile peace process. Thus, it is always easy to play up the "the arrogance of America in a unipolar world". But the Serbs underestimated the fact that NATO had its credibility to think of. It was due to celebrate its 50th Anniversary on 24 April; Milosevic would not be allowed to spoil that celebration.

NATO Air Strikes

On the night of 24 March 1999, NATO aircraft began a sustained bombing campaign with raids on airfields and radar stations. The US President announced that the raids were intended to demonstrate NATO's "opposition to aggression", to deter further attacks on civilians and "if necessary" to damage Serbia's capacity to make war. In other words, the first wave of strikes was intended as a warning, and only if it were ignored would NATO start seriously destroying the Yugoslav arsenal. Missiles struck with deadly precision. After one week, the attack was switched to aircraft factories, road and rail communications, military barracks, storage depots and oil installations. Three bridges over the river Danube were destroyed cutting railway routes between Belgrade and Europe, and blocking barge traffic.

On 4 April, after 10 days of non-stop bombing, Milosevic proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire, to extend from 6 April till the Orthodox Easter on 11 April, "out of respect for the Holy Easter season." NATO said that this was a diversionary ploy and a cynical attempt to reopen differences within NATO over prolonged military action. NATO governments dismissed the offer. If Milosevic was serious, then he should permit the induction of a NATO peacekeeping force and withdraw his army from Kosovo. NATO stepped up its missile attacks. A few missiles struck unintended targets raising worldwide protests. But the percentage of accidents was very low considering the scale of operations. Having degraded Serbian radar and anti-aircraft installations, NATO began using aircraft and armed helicopters to attack Serbian ground forces operating in Kosovo. NATO military headquarters declared that the air campaign was being hampered by bad weather.

Armchair strategists recalled the Vietnam War, where it was seen that continuous and intense bombing failed to humble the Vietnamese. But others pointed out that this war was not like Vietnam, but a totally new experience arising from the advent of revolutionary guided missiles. Today, one aircraft or missile could do what 1,000 bombers could not do in Vietnam. The power of precision missiles would force even the most stubborn opponent to accept a hopeless situation. For the Serbs to challenge NATO air power was as tragic as tribals armed with spears facing machine guns. Pessimists insisted that at some stage ground troops would have to be sent into Kosovo. They reminded NATO of the courage and fortitude with which Serbian guerrillas had confronted Nazi occupiers during World War II. Realists said that it was fallacious to compare today's conditions with World War II. If NATO forces were ever inducted into Kosovo, it would be with Belgrade's consent. They would be operating in friendly territory in which it would be difficult for the Serbs to adopt guerrilla tactics.

The Legal Position

Quite apart from the question of whether NATO's air strikes make military or political sense, there is the aspect of legality. The basic issues of the Balkan situation were threefold: parts of

Yugoslavia desired secession and resorted to violence to achieve this. Secondly, the Yugoslav Government took drastic action to counter secession, leading to violations of human rights and the mass exodus of refugees into Albania and Macedonia. Thirdly, NATO decided to take military action against a sovereign state, which is grappling with an internal secessionist movement.

According to the UN charter, the use of force is allowed in only two circumstances: self defence against a direct threat, and in carrying out a specific mandate of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. NATO countries do not claim that the Serbs' behaviour in Kosovo constitutes a direct attack on any neighbouring state or on them. Although the Security Council has labelled the crisis in Kosovo a threat to peace and security in the Balkans, it has pointedly not authorised the use of force against Yugoslavia. Therefore, NATO's bombing is a clear breach of the UN Charter. It is also a clear breach of NATO's own founding document, which explicitly binds NATO to act within the UN Charter, and violates its own Article 5 which endorses the use of force only to repel an armed attack against a NATO member.

Many argue that the extension of human rights law, and a series of humanitarian interventions over the past few decades, some authorised by the Security Council, have challenged the old notion of international sovereignty as inviolable. They go further and argue that there are enough precedents to justify the claim that armed humanitarian intervention is now accepted by most states as legal. For instance, India's invasion of erstwhile East Pakistan was done partly to halt appalling atrocities and ensure the safe return of six million refugees. Again, Tanzania invaded Uganda to put an end to the barbaric rule of Idi Amin. Both those actions were widely accepted by the world. The Allied intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 to save the Kurds, and the imposition of a no-fly zone in southern Iraq to save Shia Muslims, were undertaken without the explicit authorisation of a Security Council resolution, and are also widely accepted as legitimate.

Supporters of NATO's action are careful to explain that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would not permit any country to use force whenever it likes. To be lawful, there will have to be impartial determination of three facts; that a catastrophe is occurring, that it is a threat to international peace, and who is responsible. NATO claims that all three ingredients have been established in Kosovo, and this makes its bombing legal. But international law experts dismiss this reasoning as wishful thinking. Although a resolution put before the Security Council condemning NATO's bombing in Serbia was defeated by Twelve votes to three on 26 March implying acceptance of the action as legal, the three countries that spoke in favour of the Security Council Resolution, Russia, China and India, represent 40 per cent of humanity. There is no authorisation in the agreements governing NATO enabling it to undertake military operation for humanitarian purposes inside another state. NATO operations are in violation of the UN Charter, which is why it did not use the instrumentality of the UN; it knew that Russia and China would object. One day, humanitarian intervention may be accepted as legal; if NATO's action in Kosovo succeeds it may be a step in that direction. But in March 1999, NATO countries, albeit with the best of motives, put themselves, like Milosevic, outside the law.

World Reactions

In today's world, the historical Slav solidarity has little value in terms of military returns. Russia's policy on Yugoslavia is more sentimental than practical; it reflects a dislike of NATO's growing influence, not any great interest in the details of Balkan politics. Russia was party to an international agreement of arms sanctions to the Balkans. Mr. Primakov confirmed that "Russia has not broken any sanctions yet", but warned that if pressed beyond a limit, it would sell Serbia anti-aircraft missiles that could threaten NATO planes. Meanwhile, Russia began moving an aircraft carrier and several naval support ships to the Adriatic Sea. In military terms, this show of force meant nothing. It merely emphasised Russian impotence. The Prime Minister spends most of his time concentrating on his country's crumbling economy – a more urgent matter for most Russians. All that Russia wants from the West is money and

respect. It knew that its most invaluable asset in the Balkan crisis is its diplomatic influence in the peace moves, which began to take place.

No matter how uneasy the Muslim world may be about the plight of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, conflicting political views have left it without a clear unified opinion on Kosovo. Libya and Iraq, which have been at the receiving end of US bombing raids, were quick to condemn NATO. Egypt and Jordan have made a gesture of support for NATO's action in Kosovo. Syria criticised the strikes as lacking UN Security Council endorsement. Yasser Arafat confined himself to saying that he hoped that NATO's actions would yield a positive result, but Palestinian students demonstrated against Yugoslavia. Saudi Arabia condemned Serbia's actions in Kosovo as "a criminal matter" about which the world should not remain silent. Iran reacted cautiously and expressed deep regret over the human catastrophe and the tyranny on Kosovo Muslims.

Meanwhile, missiles continued to pound Serbian targets, destroying Belgrade's radio and television transmitting towers. One missile was directed through Milosevic's front door but the family was not at home. The residence was destroyed. The government in Belgrade showed no signs of relenting. The bombs, predictably, brought an initial upsurge of Serbian patriotic solidarity. Peace overtures by Russia and Germany were rebuffed. Milosevic had built his career by teaching the Serbs that they should revel in martyrdom and defeat; the trouncing he dwells on most was that delivered by the Ottomans in Kosovo 600 years ago, paving the way for their five centuries of subjugation by Muslims. So he kept urging his people that now was the time to drive the Muslim Kosovars back to Albania. The Muslim refugee exodus from Kosovo to makeshift camps in Albania and Macedonia exceeded 800,000.

Different Perspectives

In the fifth week of bombing, the fourth and last major bridge across the Danube was destroyed. Many, who witnessed the Balkan tragedy, condemned military action. They asked: is the world's first war "to stop genocidal violence" merely promoting it?

The question, which followed from this is, can NATO achieve peace through air strikes? Undoubtedly there is a point beyond which bombing becomes counterproductive. NATO military headquarters believed that point had not yet been reached. It has never clarified what would happen if it became clear that air bombing by itself could no longer persuade Milosevic to come to the negotiating table. So the bombing continued.

The Balkan crisis had been simmering ever since Tito passed away. It boiled over in 1992 with Croatia's declaration of independence. Over the years, NATO never spoke with a unified voice on this issue. Each member nation had its own perception of the situation based on different factors other than human rights. These perceptions kept changing and even now are not constant. The US branded the KLA as "terrorists" in 1998. It now supported the KLA. Some may say that this confirms that no principle or morality underlies the war in the Balkans; the strong can do what they please and get away even with aggression. Cynics fail to see that NATO's 19 nations are democracies of one sort or another. Each one of them has to convince its electorate and public opinion about the rights and wrongs of the crisis. History tells us that the powerful US military machine failed in Vietnam not only because of the valiant opposition put up by the North Vietnamese and mounting US battle casualties, but also because of dissent by the American people. Despite all the military and economic power at the disposal of a nation or alliance, in the final analysis a moral foundation, which is accepted by one's own nationals and world public opinion, is a basic value which must underline any long-term security policy.

Even autocrats cannot escape the moral pressure of public opinion. Thus by the end of the fifth week of air bombardment, it became evident that Milosevic had become increasingly isolated from his own top leadership. Some began criticising the state media for misrepresenting the situation to the public. On 29 April Milosevic sacked his Deputy Prime Minister for openly expressing views, which supported the stationing of international peacekeeping troops in Kosovo under UN control. As NATO continued its methodical bombing, President Clinton authorised the Pentagon to call up 33,000 reservists for active duty in NATO's air war. Russia launched a

peace offensive to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Its top Balkan envoy shuttled to Brussels and Belgrade. He announced that Yugoslavia was ready to compromise and agreed to an unarmed international presence in Kosovo under UN leadership. The offer was rejected.

Events Leading to the Cease-fire

NATO bombing was intensified on field army targets in Kosovo. Bombers struck at Serbia's power grid plunging the whole province into darkness. It now became clear to Milosevic, his senior military advisers and the Serbs that the power of deliberate precision missiles was something they had never imagined. It was a no win situation for them. Russia's envoy to Belgrade began a fresh round of peace moves. At the start of the seventh week of air bombing, the foreign ministers of the Group of Eight nations (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan the USA and Russia) agreed on a draft peace plan for Kosovo. This called for the "development in Kosovo, of effective international civil and security presences endorsed and adopted by the UN." It also called for the "safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons."

After a week of deliberation, during which time the bombing continued, the Yugoslav Government agreed to the peace plan. The US gave a cautious and wary welcome to Yugoslavia's decision to bow to NATO's demands, but said that bombing would continue until it was satisfied that a foolproof system of surveillance and verification had been set up to oversee the withdrawal of Serbian forces and their replacement by 50,000 NATO peacekeepers. On 10 June, after 78 days of sustained bombing, NATO suspended air strikes. The death figures tell their own tale: NATO servicemen, nil; Serb soldiers 6,000, Serb civilians 2,000; Kosovars 600,000 displaced and wounded within Kosovo, 800,000 driven out. Untold material damage had been inflicted in Kosovo and Serbia. Peacekeepers have the daunting task of rebuilding the Balkans, and organising the safe return of refugees to their homes.

The EU and America have begun planning to rehabilitate Kosovo, but the Americans say that reconstruction aid will only be provided to Yugoslavia if the Serbs reject Milosevic. Whatever

form the diplomatic decisions now take, perhaps in time there can be a general redrawing of Balkan borders, with Serbia losing Kosovo and gaining half of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But that must await a period of peace. If a US-led NATO is to serve as an anchoring force in global civil society, it must provide a plausible moral and political vision abroad as well as at home. That means avoiding retreats into protectionism, encouraging common international projects and loyalties beyond ethnic, cultural and religious kinship. EU's governments have begun planning a broad economic and political strategy that will encompass all of South Eastern Europe, from former Yugoslavia and Albania to Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

The Future

It is necessary for Indian leaders to dispassionately assess whether Kosovo signals a major shift in the international value system. Admittedly, the concept of nation states still retains a potent political appeal. But can India, or any other nation, accept the globalisation of its communications and economy, and yet hope to avoid the globalisation of some aspects of its national sovereignty? The British Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, at NATO's 50th Anniversary celebrations created a stir when he said,

"We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to exist. Intervention is justified to prevent genocide....(which) can never be a purely internal matter. Globalisation is not just an economic but a political and security phenomenon. We are all internationalists now whether we like it or not. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and violations of human rights within other countries."

Other member nations went beyond this and spoke of intervention being acceptable to deal with terrorism or to destroy installations producing weapons of mass destruction, which threaten global security or the world's environment. Are we heading for a world in which strong military alliances can dominate a weak nation and force it to relinquish its sovereignty over part of its territory in support of an externally backed insurgency where US-led NATO can adopt the role of global policemen and unleash a barrage of missiles to ensure obedience?

These concerns should lead us to conclude that in the coming decade, the growing threat facing India is poor governance arising from instability at the centre and in the states. Poor governance, in simplistic terms, is the failure of a government to win the hearts and minds of its own nationals. This gives rise to internal unrest. The answer to poor governance is dedicated political leadership, an honest and transparent administration and an independent and incorruptible judiciary. The security threats posed by internal unrest arising from poor governance cannot be solved by armed forces. Events in the erstwhile Soviet Union show that the possession of nuclear weapons is no substitute for poor governance.

India's detractors will find it difficult to accuse New Delhi of perpetrating organised acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights. Admittedly there have been attacks against innocent Dalits, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians and their places of worship. But it is widely accepted that these acts are aberrations in an otherwise democratic pluralistic system. These take place due to failures of governance. Admittedly the public is fed up with inefficient administration, repeated inconclusive elections, fractured mandates and corrupt politicians. But as long as public discontent and internal unrest is confined within India's borders, it is of no relevance to outsiders. It is something, which we must and can resolve in our own time and in our own way. It is therefore unlikely that the precedent of Kosovo can be quoted to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

However, the world will not remain indifferent if India manufactures nuclear weapons. That affects neighbours and everyone everywhere. An expansion of NATO's strategy, which authorises it to deal with situations beyond Europe, should warn India of the risks facing it in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles which are opposed to global demands for a non-proliferation regime.

The immediate imposition of economic and technological sanctions against India are a clear indication that the US takes a serious view of the nuclear test explosions carried out by India in May 1998. It would be unwise to assume that those sanctions are

a display of US hegemony. On the contrary, India should recall what happened when it argued for a postponement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was being discussed in the UN General Assembly in 1997. Of the 186 nations present, only Libya and Bhutan supported India's stand. Poor governance and political instability in New Delhi may not remain internal matters if this results in a delay in the signing of the (CTBT) by the end of 1999. This could become a focal point and unite all 185 member nations of the UN to demand that India take steps to dismantle its nuclear weapon facilities. India's enemies could then try to ride the anti-Indian wave and link up the Kashmir issue to India's disadvantage. It would be shortsighted to ignore this danger or imagine that it is far-fetched.

THE BALKANS



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(Publishers, Distributors & Exporters)

4819, Mathur Lane, 24, Ansari Road,

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Ph.: 3260783, 3265523, 3984388; Fax: 011-3272766

China's Changing National Security Doctrine

PART II

SWARAN SINGH

War-Fighting II : From People's War to Limited High-Technology War

Compared to its thinking on nuclear warfighting, China's conventional warfighting doctrines have been relatively known and explicit. During the last 50 years, China's conventional warfighting doctrines have broadly moved from Mao's "People's War" to "People's War Under Modern Conditions" and later from "Limited, Local War" to "Limited War Under High-Technology Conditions". The first challenge to Mao's People's War had begun to emerge as early as during the Korean War and the first expressions of "People's War Under Modern Conditions" had begun to appear by 1959.²³ Official endorsement began with Su Yu's famous article soon after Mao's death introducing the term "People's War under modern condition". It was followed by Deng's elucidation that Mao had himself sanctioned such a departure by stressing on the necessity of "seeking truth from facts". Following this, the new ideas had begun to germinate newer operational doctrines, though these were not to obtain a formal official seal of approval until another 10 to 15 years.²⁴

Some of these ideas took a long time to come to the surface and effect changes in China's doctrinal thinking. Deng's preference for offensive defence for example — which gave priority to weapons and skill over manpower — had been one of the reasons for him being successively purged before 1979. In the very presence of Chairman Mao in 1975, Deng had admonished the PLA as guilty of "bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia" and denounced

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

it as an "over expanded and inefficient Army [which] is not combat worthy."²⁵ This was also partly the reason for the fall of two of Mao's defence ministers, Peng Dehui and Lin Biao. It was the demise of Mao in 1976 followed by China's loss of face in its war with Vietnam in 1979 that finally provided a kick-start for China's doctrinal shift from the 'passive defence' of People's War years and revived concepts like "Active Defence", that obtained an altogether new meaning under "People's War under modern condition". It made the following major deviations from Mao's People's War.²⁶ Firstly, rather than luring the enemy deep into own territory the adversary was sought to be defeated close to the borders. Secondly, not the later but the early battles were considered decisive thus rejecting the notion of protracted war. Thirdly, positional war was stressed as much as Mao's mobile war and fluid front. Fourthly, cities were to be defended, which was a departure from Mao's advocacy of vacating cities for vast rural areas from where the enemy was to be surrounded and annihilated. And finally, assuming the inevitability of nuclear attack, the old strategy of deterrence-through-denial was to be supplemented by a notion of strategic deterrence through retaliation. And, it is in this context of increasing emphasis on Active Defence, once again, that concepts like limited nuclear deterrence and limited war were to find their first rudimentary expressions.

As regards China's Limited War thinking, the earliest traces of this have been discovered in the early 1980s.²⁷ Since then various Chinese strategists have been arguing how certain weapon technologies in target acquisition, precision, lethality, stealth and surprise and their increasing power-projections have a direct relationship with making "Limited War" more, and not less, likely in the future.²⁸ These scholars must have felt vindicated by the Persian Gulf War where the "surprise" and "control" elements of western technological sophistication finally made a deep impression on China's leadership.²⁹ In terms of public expressions of this new thinking, as early as March 1991, General Qin Jiwei, then Minister of Defence, told the National People's Congress (NPC) that "in the next ten years, the international situation will be complicated and changeable. Although major war is unlikely to take place, limited local wars will be endless."³⁰ Later, in the spring of 1991, Beijing's

Academy of Military Science (AMS) organised a conference on the Persian Gulf War, where most participants agreed that in the future "limited war would be the major point of Chinese strategy and military construction."³¹ It was following these debates that China's uncertain expressions of its post-Cold War conventional warfighting doctrine took a definite shape of "Limited War Under High-Technology Conditions".³²

But this clearly stands in contrast to Beijing's traditional thinking on war-fighting which, at its core, relies on the methodology of "offensive defence" and even believes in pre-empting the enemy. Instead of trying to fight a protracted war and to 'lure the enemy deep' it requires the PLA to keep its operations extremely swift and short and wishes to conduct them in restricted local war-zones either away from China's shores or confined to its bordering territories.³³ At the end, this has nothing in common with Mao's 'People's War' where 'politicisation', 'mass-mobilisation', 'protraction', and 'essentially defensive operations' form the four cardinal principles in all conventional military operations. However, much of this still remains at the level of debates and despite being apparently the guiding principle of PLA's modernisation, it still remains short of having been formally adopted as China's national security doctrine.

The limited war doctrine has its own 'Chinese characteristics' which makes it distinctive from similar western models that had evolved during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Firstly, unlike Western doctrines of limited war, the Chinese do not completely discard their notion of People's War which still remains a basic element in war-fighting. This is partly because People's War was historically conceived as a technique of fighting against a superior military power and, by that logic, China still remains behind in terms of its military technologies. Secondly, constrained by their limited nuclear arsenals and relatively antiquated conventional inventories and skill, Chinese strategists do not see the capability to fight a total war as a pre-condition for the success of their limited war doctrine. Instead they emphasise on their tradition of People's War which still remains their weapon of last resort, in case their limited war operations escalate beyond considered ends or means.

Thirdly, unlike most western doctrines, China's Limited War also remains in a fluid evolving process and has been described as its national security doctrine during its transition i.e., until either "certain strategic breakthroughs" materialise or other middle and high intensity wars become imminent again.³⁴ And finally, it is its extension to China's internal security strategies that make China's limited war so much different from western doctrines.

Internal Defence : Vigilance versus Enforcement

At a still lower rung of the national security ladder, internal defence has always been integral to China's national security thinking and one of PLA's critical responsibilities. Though the Cultural Revolution had been a devastating experience, most scholars consider the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 as the most important dividing line in the evolution of China's internal defence apparatus and thinking.³⁵ To put it in perspective, it was Deng's endeavour to streamline China's bloated armed forces as also to deal with the rising problems of internal security that had resulted in the separation of China's military and police forces during the early 1980s. This was required because unlike China's internal security chaos of 1960s where ideology lay at the core of the crisis, the roots of the internal security problem during the 1980s lay in Deng's deliberate marketisation of China's centrally controlled economy. This experiment had made China's traditional tool of making speeches by charismatic leaders virtually ineffective and leaders had to evolve newer methods and apparatus in order to deal with changed circumstances. The origins of this new internal security challenge lay in the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978 which had initiated the process of a certain amount of economic competition for the first time. The resultant rise in profits and free-market prices was accompanied by chronic shortages and by a similar rise in conspicuous consumption, corruption and violence which began to take the shape of a national crisis since the early 1980s. This transformation from a centrally planned to more of a self-regulating economy seem to obtain the authoritarian state a more important role than it had enjoyed even during the campaigns of China's Cultural Revolution.

Though the much maligned Public Security Bureau of the Cultural Revolution years was able to control the crime rate during 1983-85, still the state responded by emphasising on taking a fresh look at China's internal defence and, apart from laying greater stress on vigilance and enforcement, it created two new internal security agencies: a para-military force designed to counter internal riot and rebellion, and a secret service for counter-espionage and control of subversives.³⁶ Also, following the gradual demise of security service special unit "8341" since the late 1970s, in 1983 a new Ministry of State Security was created and charged with counter-espionage and intelligence-gathering activities. However, a more visible organisation the People's Armed Police (PAP) was created on 5 April 1983 with a transfer of 500,000 soldiers from the PLA and their strength had crossed 1.2 billion by 1996.³⁷ By the time the Tiananmen Square protests blew out of control in May-June 1989 these internal security agencies had already put in place a colossal individual and household control system and issued over 500 million electronically coded computerised identity cards to PRC citizens advising them to prepare themselves for frequent police verification.³⁸

Apart from other sections of the Chinese society, malice was particularly high amongst China's Armed Forces. Widespread retrenchment, continuing low salaries, and severe political interference following the purge of the Yang brothers were some of the reasons for this brewing discontent amongst PLA officers. Since the early 1980s, news about the 'disillusioned army' of Wuqiang, armed uprisings in Guangdong, demonstrations by laid-off soldiers in Hainan and physical defections by crews of five fighter aircraft, and a submarine and missile boat were too obvious an indication for China's leadership.³⁹ The cumulative effect of this was to be later witnessed when Lt Gen Xu Qinxian, Commander of the elite 38th Group Army stationed at Beijing, refused to send his troops to quell the demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square. This was to see scores of PLA officers and men being court-martialed and later executed, jailed, dismissed, suspended and forcibly retired.⁴⁰

Shortly after the Tiananmen Square crisis of June 1989, a second detachment of 10,000 troops was added to Beijing's

People's Armed Police (PAP) taking the total to 40,000. As a long-term measure, PLA units were transferred to PAP detachments in China's major cities and border regions. In addition to providing them with new weapons and logistics, the PAP has also been involved in regular regimental and unit-level field exercises, long-distance deployments, night manoeuvres, and other types of sophisticated simulated combat operations.⁴¹ At a more subtle level of national security doctrine, internal security forces have since been evolved as the regime's first line of defence against any form of urban public protest and they are expected to work as a buffer between the PLA and Chinese society.⁴² President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly underlined how in resolving domestic hostilities China's leaders must first depend on the People's Armed Police (PAP) and only then resort to using regular troops.⁴³ And once again, following from their doctrines of limited high-technology war, these forces have been aimed at obtaining China's leaders an option of a "graduated response" in dealing with China's internal defence contingencies. In fact, completing this re-integration of the PLA and the PAP into China's limited war trilogy, more recent military regulations by the CMC direct the PAP to have regular joint military exercises with the PLA forces and to assist them in what they describe as PLA's "high-technology regional warfare".⁴⁴

Implementing New Doctrine : Re-organising Force Structures

Re-organisation of the PLA's force structures perhaps presents one potent method for corroborating the credibility of how authentic are these signals of change that appear to indicate shifts in China's national security doctrine. And here, force planning since early 1990 clearly demonstrates how increasing efforts have been made towards not only "defending" against but "winning a localised war under high-tech conditions."⁴⁵ And here, following their double edged policy of retrenchment-and-reform, while the PLA may have been downsized from 4.1 million to 2.9 million during the 1980s and is expected to slide further to 2.4 million by the year 2000, in actual practice, this indicates a greater stress on building a 'lean and mean' standing armed forces. The CMC, on the other hand, still continues to control over 9 million combat ready troops which include over 5 million reserves and militia and about 1.2 million of

PAP which form an integral part of China's Armed Forces. However, the focus of this new force planning seems to be at managing national defence with relatively smaller standing armies while ensuring that a large, well-trained reserve force in the background will provide a broad base for rapid mobilisation in the event of a crisis. For the same purpose, China's military regions have also been re-organised and reduced from 13 to 11 in 1971 and again 7 in 1986, with the next round of re-organisation already under discussion. Also, China's former 36 field armies of the ground forces were gradually re-organised into combined arms 24 Group Armies that are being trained more and more in 'combined arms operations' in 'joint land-sea-air warfare.' There are even reports of China planning to reorganise its military regions into command systems.⁴⁶

Keeping in line with the offensive strategy of preparing for a "Limited War Under High-Technology Conditions" the emphasis has also shifted towards building selective elite units called *quantou* or fist units. These have been the recipients of the best of the upgraded or newly procured foreign equipment. The world had witnessed their performance as early as during the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis when units of the 15th Group Army (Air Mobile) based near Wuhan were flown into Beijing overnight to clear the protestors from the scene.⁴⁷ Even amongst the specialised forces the focus has clearly shifted in favour of China's Air Force and Naval forces.⁴⁸ China's CMC, for example, has set up in 1998 a 200,000 strong special para-military force called the "maritime cruise unit" from amongst retiring PLA troops. To be kept under the administrative control of the State Oceanography Administration, this special force will ensure that PLAN is not repeatedly brought into minor day-to-day conflicts. This unit, however, is going to be more than a simple police force and will have access to fairly sophisticated weapons systems and equipment including marine surveillance aircraft, surveillance stations, radar, computers, satellite remote sensing equipment, *Zhi-9* helicopters, and so on.⁴⁹ Similarly, CMC is also establishing a combined land and maritime border defence squad under the Ministry of Public Security which will safeguard maritime law and order, crack down on criminal activities at sea, and assist relevant departments in dealing with marine

accidents. Besides, following the example of the US Marines, China's Marine forces have also been providing support to PLA's operations. These forces have been tasked with testing new concepts of operations and tactics and are at the cutting edge of China's doctrinal changes as it prepares to enter the 21st Century.⁵⁰

According to China's latest General Training Programme (GTP) of the General Staff Department (GSD), which became effective from early 1996, key areas of experimentation include joint and combined arms operations, night operations, opposing force training and live fire exercise.⁵¹ The elements of mobility and concentrated fire-power have come to be the central element of their training, which represents China's new offensive limited war doctrine. China has made efforts towards mechanising its foot-soldiers army since the early 1980s and this has resulted in making over 66 per cent PLA battalions either tank or APC-borne. China has expanded its air-borne brigades into full-fledged divisions.⁵² With high school level now being the minimum qualification for recruits, the PLA now comprises of relatively younger, better educated soldiers with state-of-art weapon-systems and logistics.⁵³ The PLA today has 21 institutes with 138 disciplines which offer upto PhD level courses and 54 units with 523 disciplines for MA studies. These have trained over 17,000 officers during Deng's reign of 15 years (1979-1994).⁵⁴ 80 per cent of the PLA's leaders have masters or doctorate degrees, and over one-half of the technical officers are scientists and engineers.⁵⁵ An increasing number of them are now getting directly involved in academic research on China's national security doctrines at various research institutes.

Conclusion

Fifty years ago, Mao had established the world's largest revolutionary state which openly challenged the United States in Korea and Vietnam and later denounced its mentor, the former Soviet Union, as a revisionist power and fought a war with it in 1969. During its first three decades, it had donned a role of an anti-hegemonic power. It has since been accommodated in the very

league that it had sought to confront and demolish. As regards China's future, despite its economic success being the most visible element, nothing perhaps defines the direction of China's future profile better than its national security thinking and planning which clearly portends it emerging as the next *status quo* global power in-the-making. In-the-making because, China's official enunciation in this regard remains as circumspect as ever. According to China's recently released White Paper on National Defence the basic objectives of China's defence policy involve nothing more than "consolidating national defence, resisting aggression, curbing armed subversion, and defending the state's sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security."⁵⁶ Greater stress seems to be laid on defending sovereignty and curbing internal disturbances. Considering the continuing territorial dispute that China shares with its neighbours, stress on national unification is bound to delay and complicate China's rise as the next global power, be it status quoist or otherwise. China also remains entangled in numerous internal problems that might become decisive in shaping its future course of events and thus influence its thinking and doctrines. Uncertainties about its future make China's leaders circumspect in clearly enunciating on its national security doctrine, though signals of change can be seen.

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National Perspective on Information Warfare

PART II

COLONEL NARINDER SINGH

Strategy

Deterrence has been the main strategy for the last few years. It is best conceived as a game where one side's move shapes the response of the opponent. It uses fear to de-motivate an adversary before war begins, and it depends on the credibility of the threat. Without clear information about the capabilities and tactics of the opponent, any deterrence strategy would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Deterrence can fail if the deterrer's strategy does not raise costs above expected benefits to be gained by military action; or the deterrer's strategy threatens sufficient costs.

The accessibility, availability, affordability and speed of information management and connectivity, breeds some serious vulnerabilities. The consequences of net war need not be limited to specific attacks on personal, electronic, or institutional records. It may be conducted on a broader scale, where connectivity is indiscriminately targeted. The loss of information thus would have tangible personal, institutional, and social costs. The information age has revolutionised the instruments of soft power and the opportunities to apply them project the appeal of its ideals, ideology, culture, economic model, social and political institutions, libertarian and egalitarian currents by dominating the mass media, viz., films, television and electronic communication. Higher education is another means of soft power. Universities in the United States draw approximately 4,50,000 students every year. India has not yet formulated any policy for mass media, education etc. Large

Edited text of the Essay which won the Second Prize in Group A of the Gold Medal Competition, 1997.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999.

tracts of India are uncovered by television even in sensitive areas, like Kashmir. We have not yet formulated any policy for international broadcasting or education. The strategy calls for :

- (a) Aggressive broadcasting policy to project to the world what India is and how much we can offer. BBC, Voice Of America, Radio Moscow have all been propagating their views. In fact, for Indians, the BBC has become the main source of accurate and authentic information.
- (b) Open universities for foreign students by providing quality education at reasonable costs. India, with its vast technical manpower, can easily do it.
- (c) Liberal policy of movement in and out of the country.
- (d) Target African countries for investment.
- (e) Negotiate from a position of strength with information and not in ambiguity.

Crises Consultation and Communication

In an era in which soft power increasingly influences international affairs, threats, and the image of arrogance and belligerence that tends to go with them undercut an image of reason, democracy and open dialogue. Emerging military capabilities - particularly those that provide real time understanding of what is taking place in a large geographical area - can help blunt this paradox. Information so collected offer far greater pre-crises transparency. It will enable better reaction. But the effect may be more general, for all nations now operate in an ambiguous world, a context that is not entirely benign or soothing. The Nation needs to employ all available means to consult before, during, and after the crises. In no way should the channels of communications be closed.

Alerting and Mobilisation

The growing interdependence of the world does not necessarily establish greater harmony. The superior awareness enables nations to apply instruments of power - power to project the appeal of its ideals, ideology, culture, economic model, and social and political institutions. A large broadcasting network would

assist in alerting the society and building public opinion to accomplish national goals.

Legal

Modern communications traverse international boundaries in a short span of time. In fact, it can reach the common man. This has led to the problems of security, technology piracy and other economic and hacker warfare actions. India needs to formulate laws to safeguard national interests. A national advisory body should be established to go over legal aspects and formulate appropriate laws.

Command and Control

With accurate information, uncertainty about the surrounding environment can be reduced and decisions affecting the readiness, movement, and application of soft power or military force can be taken with a clearer understanding of the likely costs and benefits. If processed and delivered promptly, information can also provide more time for these decisions to be taken and implemented successfully. Overall, it permits a clearer assessment of situations, generates policy choices to achieve a specific outcome, and allows those choices to be weighed for their relative pay-off. Not surprisingly, information has been called the "most vital of all combat commodities" and the "soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics." (SLA Marshall, *Men Against Fire*).

India's founding fathers chose the British parliamentary system of governance. But they looked to the American experience in major areas like having a written Constitution, organising their polity on federal principles, a written Bill of Rights, having an Upper House where one-third of the members retire every second year. The Constitution of India has accepted the supremacy of Parliament in all matters of legislation. In the United Kingdom, when separate departments for each of the three Services existed during World War II, the problem was to create a central authority to coordinate their activities without depriving them of their responsibility for the (day-to-day) administration and operations of their services. The solution was found in the creation of the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff Organization, in which the three Chiefs

of Staff and officials of other departments associated with defence were brought together in a series of committees to formulate appreciations, plans and advice to the government. The Chiefs of Staff Organization was converted into the Ministry of Defence in 1946 taking the then existing Department of Defence of India as a model. In the new Ministry of Defence, production and procurement were controlled by the Service head.

It is observed that policy making in India is also influenced by American developments in the areas of national security policy and the organisational system for it. With the increased interplay of foreign and domestic policy on the one hand and foreign and defence policy on the other, the need to develop an integrated and well-coordinated security policy was felt in the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The National Security Act, 1947 was passed during the tenure of President Truman which created, among others, the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC today consists of the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence. Others like the Secretary of Treasury, the Director Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Advisor, invariably attend as permanent invitees.

The NSC was primarily intended to serve as the advisory institution of the President in the formulation of national security policy. To this end, the NSC is to integrate "domestic, foreign and military policies", objectively assess the "actual and potential military power" in relation to the risks to United States national security, and coordinate the policies of other departments and agencies of the Government in relation to national security. The NSC is thus the highest body to coordinate and plan all matters pertaining to national security.

India does not have a suitable machinery to plan and coordinate 'national security policy'. In the mid 1960's after much experimentation, a Policy Planning and Review Division (PPRD), and a Policy Planning and Review Committee (PPRC) to supervise its work, were created in the Ministry of External Affairs. But the experience so far shows that its work suffers from the same limitations as the work of Policy Planning Council. Other departments of the Government with a role in the formulation of

national security policy, like Economic, Commerce, Defence, Intelligence etc., do not like to be coordinated by a division of another Ministry. In this context Professor Jáyantanuja Bandopadhyā, formerly of the Indian Foreign Service, has argued that :

... the main reason for the failure of foreign office to play any significant role with regard to policy planning would seem to be faulty conception of the machinery of planning ... on equal basis the planning cannot be performed by one of the many divisions of the Ministries, close coordination of the problem and policies of various related ministries such as External, Defence, Commerce, Atomic Energy, Information and Broadcasting...cannot be achieved by a division or even by a Committee within the Ministry.

The Indian parliamentary system has a Council of Ministers vested with constitutional powers; and the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs has been acting as the policy coordination body at the political level, though it is not a statutory body.

India also experimented with a National Security Council during the days of Mr. V P Singh as the Prime Minister. The short lived experiment did not stabilise due to its very large composition.

The principal components of Indian Command and Control are :-

- (a) Cabinet.
- (b) CCPA.
- (c) Minister of Defence.
- (d) Defence Committee.
- (e) Chiefs of Staff Committee.
- (f) Defence Research and Development Policy Committee.
- (g) Defence Production Department.

Recommended Organisation

In the absence of a national security policy, planning and a single body to coordinate all aspects relating to it, there is need

to evolve a coherent policy and the creation of a Secretariat for National Security to advice and provide services to the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs. This committee should be a statutory body created under the constitution. It should not be drawn from the bureaucracy but from the talent available across the board within the nation. It should have a Chairman to look after the day-to-day functioning. The Chairman should be answerable to the Cabinet and not to the Minister of Defence *per se*.

After a Secretariat for National Security comes the Defence Committee consisting of Minister of Defence, Chiefs of Staff, Defence Secretary, members of other ministries (Foreign, Commerce, Economics etc.) with Scientific Advisor, Master General of Ordnance and others on as required basis. It will be the governing and controlling body. Meeting once a month it would be a mandatory and a statutory body under the Constitution. It will ensure higher direction and control of the whole organisation in the name of the government. The procurement and provision (Supply Board) would be part of it; however, this latter would be headed by the Master General of Ordnance, answerable to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in turn to the Defence Committee.

Battlefield Conditions

In the 'Information Age', battlefield conditions as visualised would vary dramatically from the present. The likely conditions as anticipated are given below:

- (a) Information would be gathered by dedicated sensors and once the target is acquired a weapon system would be dedicated to destroy or neutralise it.
- (b) Secure areas would be defined more by time than space and determined by information (passive) and not force (active).
- (c) Operations are predicated on synergy created by integration of combat power effects against multiple critical points in a near simultaneous manner.
- (d) Critical points or objectives are the defining characteristics of the battlefield framework, not the contiguous forward limit of one's own troops or international boundaries. The concept of deep, close and rear battlefield areas are obsolete.

- (e) Combat power is applied in increased numbers of smaller, distributed formations with increased lethality.
- (f) The fluid battlefield is an environment of constant movement and variable tempo.
- (g) Success on this battlefield requires greater intellectual effort.
- (h) Economy of force and precision strikes are major aspects of information warfare.

To summarise, the battlefield would be transparent and accurate, effective, weapons systems would engage with greater lethality. It would have a tight controlled loop of Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence with computers to store and analyse the information and intelligence.

Battlefield Concepts

Winning the information war is essential for success in the modern, three-dimensional battlefield. By using emerging technologies, the Commander would be able to access the tactical situation on the ground, air and sea, enabling him to 'get-inside' the adversary's decision-making cycle or his ability to react at a critical juncture, thus providing him an opportunity to attack the enemy's centre of gravity and exploit his weaknesses, thereby, making an optimal use of his own resources. Current thought holds that battle-space is composed of separate, discrete, physical and electromagnetic dimensions, each of which must be controlled if operations are to be successful. Armoured spearheads and amphibious thrusts seek to defeat opposing forces by exploiting physical weaknesses leaving the electromagnetic dimension untouched.

The future battlefield would also be different for two other reasons. First, non-traditional adversaries and forms of conflict have evolved in the recent past that challenge the assumptions that underpin manoeuvre warfare. Various "*grey area phenomena*", including terrorists, narco-cartels and forces based on clan and ethnic affiliations bring to '*conflict*' characteristics that are different from conventional forms of warfare. Since such forces stay away from the battlefield, they have no option but to leave the three-

dimensional battlespace doctrine acknowledged. Examples of this form include blending of terrorists into unarmed population mobs and civilian clothed terrorists. The present doctrines of conventional warfare are insufficient to meet this challenge. The second aspect is the advent of advanced target detection and precision guided munitions. Any military force which can be acquired can be targeted, hit and killed. This would compel dispersion to prevent acquisition and get targeted.

The battlespace of the future would thus be composed of two parts, viz., '*human space*', and '*cyber space*'. Human space represents the traditional physical dimension of the human senses with which the military operates. Cyber space, on the other hand, represents not only the electromagnetic spectrum, but also that dimension in which military forces seek refuge for defensive purposes. Forces in cyber space are invulnerable to attack from human sensing-based weapon systems. For this reason, the goal of the Army would be beyond securing assigned politico-military objectives. It will also be that of total cyber space dominance. The means to enter cyber space would be based on the application of stealth technology. Stealth based forces would be countered by using information gathered over electromagnetic spectrum to locate stealth based forces in space and time.

The old concepts of attack, defence and manoeuvre warfare may thus be made obsolete. Instead, new principles need to be evolved. The emphasis would be on acquisition and denial of information, survivability and intensity.

Denial. It involves denying enemy command and control elements of the use of automated or electronic decision-making aids. It includes total blackout of data bases, data fusion systems, electronic processing and display systems for command centre. It would involve identifying and then destroying key decision modes at the top of the enemy echelons, cutting or denying the enemy information transfer media, denying, disrupting, degrading or destroying enemy transmission modes, stopping all communication, destroying sensors and personnel, denying electronic radiation and overpowering passive sensors. The same is applicable for terrestrial sensors.

Acquisition of Information. Information and its acquisition have been the basic requirement of all commanders. To have real time and accurate information, we have to ensure that surveillance and reconnaissance are frequent, thorough and multi-spectral. There is a need to ensure faster decision loop for rapid acquisition of information and engagement.

Survivability. All assets of information warfare must survive. The larger the number of assets, the greater are the chances of survivability. In general, the larger the number of nodes and greater the system, larger the pathways, greater the bandwidth and greater is the chance of survivability. Large numbers of nodes make targeting difficult. Lastly, to ensure survivability the systems should be interoperable. This could be achieved by rationalisation and standardisation of the systems.

Command and Control in Information Warfare

Personnel have managed to convey so evocatively how a military commander can lose control over his forces with such disastrous consequences as Leo Tolstoy in his account of the Battle of Bordino in 1812. As he records, Napoleon was too far from the scene of action to sense what was happening and directly influence the course of the battle. In short, he lost control of his forces and, in the confusion and uncertainty that prevailed, thousands of men perished. While the Napoleonic wars, "marked the end of an epoch in which it was possible for a Commander-in-Chief to overlook a field and take a direct part in the conduct of the engagement," subsequent technical and managerial innovations to help keep decision makers in touch with events and in control of operations have not succeeded in turning the clock back to an earlier era. Just over a century later, despite the advent of elaborate staff systems, reconnaissance aircraft, and field telephones, the British high command was just as ignorant, perhaps more so, of what was transpiring during the Battle of the Somme as Napoleon had been at Bordino. More than eighty years later, with all the technological marvels at the disposal of modern military commanders, the command is no easier and in many respects has grown much harder than it was in Napoleon's days. While the basic purpose has remained constant, the challenge to effective

management of information in daily relations, in both internal and external environments, have undoubtedly grown despite, and sometimes paradoxically because of, the technical and organisational efforts to make it easier. The most significant challenges are as follows :-

- (a) Greater dependency on technical support systems.
- (b) Electro-mechanical systems and devices are indispensable to the collection, processing and dissemination of information.
- (c) Command response time is so short that it precludes useful human involvement in decision-making, leaving this function to automated devices.
- (d) Greater organisational complexity.
- (e) Greater devolution of authority.

Analytical judgments are necessary for the assessment on the strength of the force. But the existing method of manual analysis is insufficient for a complete and realistic assessment of the potential effectiveness of military force. Vital information that could significantly affect the conclusions of the analysis may be missing as human senses cannot retain and analyse everything. Communication channels, therefore, are not just conduits for information but, are also in effect, the reins of power that bind the force together, assist in analysis and maintain its cohesion. As a result, communication links typically parallel the lines of hierarchy in the force.

The use made of information, authority and communications, which make up three vital ingredients of command and control, influences the efficiency with which military inputs (manpower, weapons systems, logistics, and so on) are converted into military outputs (relative attrition, damage inflicted, territory occupied, or space controlled) by affecting the readiness, density, motion (direction and speed), and application of military force. The relationship can be illustrated abstractly by examining the behavior of a military force before, during and after a battle.

Command practices the world over are at crossroads. The

function of command is carried out by direction, by plan, or by influence. While not mutually exclusive and often employed in combination, these methods are dominant. Technological advances have affected these methods incrementally over time. The command by influence is fast being replaced by command by planned approach.

Each of the approaches to command offers a response to the pensive underlying the commander's quandary - uncertainty and insufficient information. Martin Van Creveld in his classic work *Command in War* states that a Commander is not lacking in quantity of information but speaks of the quality of information in the right form, at the right place, and in time. A Commander's information needs are rarely specific, but are highly variable and human-intensive. Thus command and control requirements are not information-intensive but information-sensitive.

The hallmark of command by influence is the use of "mission type orders" as developed. The ability to move information rapidly and to process it will change the way we command troops in battle. It focuses on what a commander must be able to do throughout the full cycle of force projection operations and not on the system composed of people, technology, organisations, procedure and sub-systems that exist to support the commander during the fight. The shift in focus from systems and things to the commander and his effectiveness is evolutionary, not revolutionary.

Flexibility. It allows a commander to adapt his decision making process and leadership style to different situations. It permits commanders to exploit opportunity within higher commander's intent based on the situation. Flexibility fosters independent initiative and ingenuity allowing the commander to achieve a constructive balance between the complex and often paradoxical forces.

Judgment. It is the process of forming an accurate opinion based on available information. Battle judgment is the ability to analyse a situation and make a right decision.

Intuition. This is the ability to demonstrate immediate understanding of the important aspect of a situation without evident rational thought and inference.

Empathy. Being aware and sensitive to the feelings and thoughts of soldiers and their families.

Structure of Force

When a breathless junior officer reported that Pakistan had successfully tested a missile, a senior officer, his superior - so the tale goes - blanched and asked whether it was the Navy or the Air Force? The prevalence of such stories indicate both the problems besetting and the diagnosis applied to the national defence establishments. Practically every news commentator, news paper and journal has featured the battle of the South Block at some time or the other during the last fifty years - 'Inter service violence as an example of internecine fratricide'. Large numbers of critics, parliamentarians, and members of defence services have analysed the problem of inter-service rivalry and suggested solutions. The diagnosis is lack of unification and the remedy - centralisation, less autonomy for the Services if not their complete abolition, and a single Chief of Staff. The concept of the three Services is outmoded, these are the vestigial remains of the last war and present an era that is past - a time when armies fought armies, navy fought the navy and aircraft engaged aircraft. Modern war is different. It will be instantaneous, total and undeclared. The three, separate and tied to outmoded concepts, are obviously incapable of meeting the threat. Merge the three Services or, if not that, at least create new ones oriented to modern needs, viz., strategic operations, home defence, LIC Operations and internal security.

Furthermore, since the military has to be subject to civilian control, retain the present top structure with the Defence Minister possessing real authority to run the department from top down. If the policy bodies like Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee take a service or parochial view on defence problems, assign military planning and policy to an officer and staff free from parochial interests and make them responsible for creating a defence policy.

Subordinate Units. From the trends world over, one thing is certain that there is good reason to think conventional decision process will not work under the visualised conditions. The force structure needs a total overhaul.

Theatre Command. This will be the main command, with both strategic and operational responsibilities. The Field Army Commander will be responsible for the conduct of the battle and, in addition, act as a link between the Corps and the strategic decision makers at the national level. It will have all the three Services under its control.

Corps. It will have an organic headquarter and would control anything upto eight brigades. There is a need to eliminate the divisional headquarters to reduce reaction time in the decision loop.

Brigades. This will consist of 4000 to 6000 men. It would have approximately one-third the strength of the current division. However, with enhanced mobility and lethality of weapons it will have an area of responsibility equivalent to a division and capability of continuous operations in a non-linear battlefield. These brigades would be capable of fighting in any terrain at any time. This would be adequately supported by air.

Conclusion

When the nation enters the 21st Century, it will look back to the 1990's with regret if the opportunity to formulate a policy on 'Information Warfare' is missed. The Gulf War has demonstrated that success comes from the use of space for surveillance and communications, and from acquiring sensors and platforms. Targets were acquired by high frequency radars or infra-red signatures. Actual photographs of bigger targets were acquired and fed into television homing devices and digital maps were supplied. The battle was won by information dominance and not by large numbers of weapons.

Concept of Modern Warfare : Are We Prepared?

MAJ TD KUMAR

INTRODUCTION

The concept and the contours of national security are as complex as they are dynamic. The rapid strides in the scientific world, the changing social mores and value systems, the irrelevance caused to time and distance by the boom in communication technology have combined to alter the essence and meaning of the defence of a nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The threats, consequently, are no more merely military in nature. Nor is any aspect or segment of the country or society immune to aggression. Therefore, the security of the nation is to be safeguarded not only at its frontiers but also at the psychological, institutional and societal planes.

Besides the mammoth military force, the State maintains a plethora of agencies including the para-military, para police, police and intelligence agencies to ensure territorial inviolability and national integrity. While the former is exclusively for external security, the latter ought to be entirely responsible for internal security (IS). With the increase in the nature and type of threats to the IS, there has been a consistent accretion to the IS force levels. Yet, the Indian Army is called upon with predictable regularity to render succour. Though the Army is presumed to be capable and invariably asked to contain and root out crises ranging from law and order to insurgency and low intensity conflicts (LIC), it is itself made to remain in a cocoon under the dictum of apoliticism. Thereby, its capabilities and versatility are reduced to mere brute force employed in fire brigade actions.

Edited version of the Essay which won the First Prize in Group B of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1998.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

The paper is in four parts:-

- (a) Part-I. Internal Security Environment and threat to national security.
- (b) Part-II. Role of the Security Forces.
- (c) Part-III. Changed role of the Security Forces in the context of current internal threats.
- (d) Part-IV. Conclusion.

INTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Internal Security Environment

The widening gulf between the rich and the poor, regional economic imbalances, political demagoguery and the debasement of political leadership, unabated population growth nullifying the general economic development, have all combined to cause the growth and spread of communalism, secessionism, parochialism, casteism, animosities between tribals and non-tribals, hill and Plains people, naxalism, etc. Unlike the countries in our neighbourhood, India has enjoyed relative political stability. Yet, the country has been drifting into a period of uncertainty and collapse of democratic institutions since the early eighties, owing essentially to myopic political expediency and power games. This can lead to dangerous consequences.

The drift into decadence is essentially a sequel to the growth of population not being commensurate with the national resources and sustainability. With the pace of economic growth not being sufficient to fulfil the legitimate and growing material aspirations of the people, the concentration of political and economic power at Delhi to the detriment and exclusion of regional seats of power and political corruption have only worsened the situation. The consequences of these ills and their varied manifestations threaten

the body politic and contribute to the state of violence, political turbulence, sense of insecurity and deprivation.

Threat to National Security

The multipronged threats to national security in the contemporary milieu are many and dynamic. The significant ones among these are:-

(a) External

- (i) Military aggression (e.g., Sino-Indian conflict, 1962).
- (ii) Limited territorial violation (e.g., Shaksgam Valley, 1963; Saltoro Watershed, 1984).
- (iii) LIC (e.g., Jammu and Kashmir).
- (iv) Economic aggression (abridgement of sovereignty through neo-colonialism (e.g., intimate guidance of macro economic policies, Super 301 etc).
- (v) Politico-diplomatic aggression (e.g., NPT, Missile Technology Control Regime, Amnesty International).
- (vi) Religious aggression (e.g., Missionary proselytism, Islamic funding).
- (vii) Subversion and sabotage (e.g., Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab).
- (viii) Demographic aggression (e.g., refugees from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal).

(b) Internal

- (i) Secessionist (e.g., Punjab, Assam).
- (ii) Parochial (e.g., Jharkhand, Gorkhaland).

- (iii) Religious (e.g., Ram Janambhoomi, RSS vs ISS in Kerala, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra).
- (iv) Revolutionary (e.g., Naxalism).
- (v) Casteist (e.g., Mandal, Bihar)
- (vi) Espionage (e.g., alleged moles of CIA).
- (vii) Corruption at the upper reaches of power and authority (e.g., Bofors).

ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCES

Role of the Army. Though the primary role of the Army is safeguarding the nation's territorial integrity against external aggression, it has also been called upon to assist the para-military forces (PMF) in the following contingencies :-

- (a) Communal violence wherein the police has failed to restore order and there is fear of violence spreading.
- (b) Widespread disturbances covering both urban and rural areas, which stretch police resources beyond breaking strain.
- (c) Terrorism, as of the Punjab variety, where the Army releases the police from static duties and, by acting as a backup force, helps it to develop strike capabilities.
- (d) Policing duties in remote regions, largely in a counter-insurgency role in areas such as Nagaland and Mizoram, where the administrative system is very thinly spread on the ground. Here the transport and communications network of the Army would give it a mobility which the police lacks.
- (e) An insurgency situation as in Jammu and Kashmir where, internal security duties apart, the Army has to ensure that the borders are kept safe from infiltration and attack.

Role of the CPO and PMF. The assigned duties of the PMF and CPO forces in the Indian Union are :-

- (a) Border guarding to thwart infiltration, smuggling and trans-border crimes.
- (b) Counter-insurgency operations in border areas like in North East and Jammu and Kashmir.
- (c) Counter terrorism; examples, Punjab and Assam.
- (d) Help State Governments/local administration in preventing breakdown of law and order situation in various areas of the country, in particular on major social, political and regional issues.

Border Security Force (BSF). This force was raised in December 1965 to guard the International Border against Pakistan (both West and East). Presently, it has approximately one lakh personnel in 147 battalions. It fills the gap between Army and the police for low-intensity military and border tasks. They have small arms, light artillery, their own transport and liaison and communication air support. Its roles are:-

(a) *Peace*

- (i) To give a sense of security to people living in border areas.
- (ii) Prevent trans-border crime, unauthorised entry into or exit from Indian territory and smuggling.
- (iii) To collect such intelligence as it can in the course of patrolling, transborder observations and interrogation of suspects.
- (iv) To handle, by itself or with such reinforcements as may be available from its own reserves, minor skirmishes and incidents of firing from across the border.

(b) *War*

- (i) Hold ground in less threatened sectors.
- (ii) Protection of vital installations against enemy commando/para-trooper raids.

(iii) Providing extensions to the flanks of the main defence line by holding strong points in conjunction with other units.

(iv) Limited aggressive action against para-military or irregular forces of the enemy within the overall plan of the Armed Forces.

(v) Acting as guides in an area of responsibility where routes are known.

(vi) Performing specific tasks connected with intelligence, including raids.

(vii) Maintenance of law and order in enemy territory, administered under control of the Army.

(viii) Guarding the prisoners of war cages.

(ix) Assistance in control of refugees.

(x) Anti-infiltration duties in specified areas.

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). This force has a strength of 95,000 (reserve 2,50,000) in 125 battalions tailored to help states in countering law and order situations. However, they are more often used for counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist tasks. Its roles are:-

(a) *In Peace*

(i) Maintenance of law and order.

(ii) Internal Security.

(iii) Border Security.

(iv) Guarding vital installations.

(v) Anti-dacoity operations of an interstate nature.

(b) *In War*

(i) Protection of vital installations.

(ii) Guarding of prisoners and prisoners of war cages.

- (iii) Provision of escorts.
- (iv) Operations against insurgents.
- (v) Assistance and control of refugees.
- (vi) Maintenance of law and order in the enemy territory administered under civil affairs organisation.

Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). It has a strength of approximately 14,000 personnel in 18 battalions. It was raised to man the border with Tibet and has similar tasks to those of BSF. Some battalions were raised for elections in Punjab and their charter now includes providing security to banks and other soft targets. Its commandos are being employed for VIP security and special missions. It is armed with light weapons, though it does have a complement of heavy support weapons.

National Security Guard (NSG). It comprises of some 5,000 personnel. The force was raised in 1984. Its main task is anti-terrorism, anti-hijacking and contingency deployment. It comprises elements of Army, CRPF and SSG. It also carries out VIP security duties.

Special Services Group (SSG). It was raised to provide security to VIPs. Its strength is approximately 1,500 personnel.

Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). It is meant for protection of industrial complexes and its strength is approximately 70,000 personnel.

Assam Rifles (AR). It has 32 battalions with a strength of nearly 40,000. Its strength may be increased to 40 battalions. They are lightly equipped and are basically meant to guard the border in the North East with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Tibet and Bhutan.

Rashtriya Rifles (RR). It has a strength of six battalions, though originally 15 were approved as per erstwhile Prime Minister's statement in the Lok Sabha. They are tasked to combat LIC in peace and provide the second line of defence to the Army during war.

CHANGED ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT INTERNAL THREATS

Role for the Army

Does the Army have a role in Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC)? There is a view which advocates that the Army should remain insulated from this virus and argues that LIC is not the job of the Armed Forces. Employment of the Army on such tasks, accordingly, is fraught with the danger of compromising on threats to national security from external agencies. Apart from the fatigue caused to the soldiers on such missions, it also tends to cut into the mental and psychological make up of these soldiers, alienating them from those very masses whose security they are responsible for. Not only this, the Army's equipment get worn out and the primary training of the soldiers tends to be neglected.

Admittedly, Armed Forces are raised and trained to combat external threats. That nevertheless is not the only charter. While it is the principal reason for their existence, no country can afford the luxury of having different types of security forces for different threats. In any case, to argue that LIC does not fall within the ambit of warfare would be an erroneous perception. LIC itself is a form of conflict, which provides adversaries a low cost option to destabilise countries in pursuit of their national objective as has been our experience in both Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. Be that as it may, it is equally true that continued employment of the Army in such a role will, in the final analysis, prove to be counter-productive and may also visibly affect the fabric of this national asset.

The above notwithstanding, to employ national armed forces to combat what is seemingly a civilian threat would be logically construed as misapplication of this expensive and scare resource. Thus, uprisings in the hinterland with no external abetment may be a situation which does not require armed forces to combat. However, conflicts on border regions which are capable of exploitation and leading to an open confrontation may well require intervention by armed forces at an appropriate time, to prevent conflagration in the future. While it is difficult to lay down such a

categoric distinction, a general rule or a guideline could be evolved.

Having seen both sides of the cause, the logical answer would be that employment of the Army should be the last resort and for the shortest possible time. Here, one runs into numerous problems. LIC is an open-ended commitment and for the duration of employment of the Army to remain minimal, it needs the concerted effort of all elements of the state to orchestrate their plans towards achievement of the ultimate goal. In a multi-party democracy, inter-party and intra-party pressures do not always allow the smooth functioning of the apparatus of the state. For effective operations, certain emergency steps like changing judicial procedures, setting up of special courts for speedy disposal of cases, arming the security forces with greater powers while ensuring a strict code of conduct on their accountability, more deliberate media management, an effective public distribution and grievance redressal system and above all a clean administration are the fundamental requirements in such operations. When such basic changes are put into effect, the insurgents are put on the defensive. The problems arise only when there is ambivalence in the implementation of such programmes.

Whereas the Army and its rank and file are governed by the stringent application of the "Army Act" in addition to the other laws of the land, no such stringency is apparent in the civil law enforcement agencies. Creation and employment of a variety of these forces like BSF, CRPF, ITBP, Armed Police, Home Guards and so on in these duties, each with different levels of training and discipline, apart from separate rules governing them, have their own problems. Being basically police organisations, their actions, even when they are legitimate, are seen or associated with excesses of the local state police. Since they operate under the direct control of the political administration, their actions do tend to be associated with party loyalties and other such sectarian elements.

Thus, to offset the inadequacy of PMF and CPO, the new role and employment for the Army in combating LIC bush fires is unavoidable.

Role for CPO and PMF

Border Guards and LIC along the IB. Border guarding and LIC along the IB are sensitive issues and should be handled by a single agency for better cohesion, potency, exchange of vital information and using all available combat power for restoring normalcy. A border guarding force, with responsibility to undertake LIC along border states, must be constituted by amalgamation of BSF, Assam Rifles, ITBP and Rashtriya Rifles and should be organised on a regional basis. Their strength would depend upon the requirement per region. The movement of the force will be within the region to cater for peace and field tenures. On mobilisation, this force would come under the Army for rear area security.

In order that the Army has a viable second line of defence, to keep it young and to bring down the pension bill, it is recommended that 60 per cent of the recruitment in suggested Rashtriya Rifles force be ex-Army, with 40 per cent direct recruitment. The proposed Rashtriya Rifles battalions should be organised and equipped on the same lines as the existing Rashtriya Rifles battalions. The sensitive IB and where the IB has not been delineated should continue to be manned by the Army.

LIC in Hinterland. For quelling internal security situations other than those in border States, the Central Government should have one force, namely the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) under the Ministry of Internal Security. SSG, NSG, CRPF and CISF should amalgamate and comprise this force. For economy, better command and co-ordination, the organisation should be divided into force and sub-force headquarters and located region-wise, depending upon threat perceptions. Minimum force to be moved should be a battalion and not company. These battalions should be equipped with better weapons and equipment. The communication should be provided upto platoon level. The deployment should be upto platoon level and not section or sub-section wise. On permanent move, battalions should change affiliation to new force/sub-force headquarters and must not retain permanent attachments. CRPF should have the following tasks:-

- (a) Internal security (including LIC).
- (b) Anti-hijacking and anti-terrorist.
- (c) Protection of industrial complexes.
- (d) Security of VVIPs.

There should not be separate specialist organisations like SSG and NSG, but specialist battalions under CRPF. This would save in overheads in each of these headquarters. (As a point of interest, for maintaining 5,500 personnel of NSG, it has an equal number of personnel in support). Specialist battalions would carry out surgical operations and revert to affiliated force headquarters.

Law and Order. Law and order should continue to be under the respective State Governments. State Police, State Armed Police and Home Guards should be entrusted the task of maintaining law and order in the State.

CONCLUSION

The threats to national security have assumed complex and multi-faceted contours, to the extent that their very discernment becomes difficult to the conventional bureaucratic apparatus of macro management. These threats are only likely to increase in the foreseeable future. While the force levels available for the safeguarding of external and internal security are adequate, the inherent flaws in the organisation and higher direction is impeding the optimal orchestration of these forces to the detriment of the very integrity of the Nation. The proposed designation of new roles needs in-depth analysis, political will and popular acceptance; it is the only optimal and cost effective method of successfully managing national security without jeopardising the primary role of the Indian Army.

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Health Care of Personnel on Board Ships in Blue Waters

CDR PREM P BATRA (RETD)

Introduction

With on board service on nine warships and twenty merchant vessels spread over forty years, I always felt a sense of unease in an alien health culture, practised on board ships in blue waters, under the paradigm of laws enacted under the Indian Navy Act and the Indian Merchant Act. These Acts are in conformity with World Health Organisation (WHO) stipulations. The basic truth is that the Indian mind does not readily accept western allopathic concepts in its entirety, steeped as it has been for ages in Ayurveda, Unani, and so on. The ancient Indian health system was based on the self as against the non-self in the western system, and medicine was one functional part of the gamut of healthy living, eating and thinking in a cleaner and purer environment. While western medical science attempts to treat the disease and its symptoms, Ayurveda lays stress on the central role of the mind, spirituality and soul for the restoration of health. Eastern medical concepts like Ayurveda are gaining increasing attention in the West now under the name of 'alternative medicine'.

The System of Medical Cover on Board Ships

The medical system customised for ships essentially depends on the number of personnel on board, the size of the vessel, the role of the vessel, the number of days it is likely to spend in open waters, and so on. Irrespective of the size of a merchant ship, it is generally manned by twenty or 50 crew members in case of advanced countries, and by over fifty in case of Indian ships. But no qualified doctor is part of the crew, except for super-specialised vessels like passenger ships, oil platforms, diving tenders, etc, though temporary inclusions can be made. Merchant ships generally

are being increasingly well-equipped and have a universal medicine chest and one or two bed hospital, along with the WHO Guide Book for Masters. All crew members undergo First Aid Training and Rescue Systems. On the other hand, warships have more crew members, thousands in the case of an aircraft carrier, and consequently carry specialised medical teams for various contingencies.

On board merchant vessels, equipment is maintained for medical emergencies like treating wounds and fractures, cardiac arrest, minor surgery, etc. These days WHO regulations stipulate the provisioning of more and more medical equipment on board ships, including arrangements for physiotherapy, and imparting specialised training for Masters to save lives. The objective is to bring life aboard ships at par with life ashore. Some countries like Germany have their own Medical Guide Book and additional medicines and medical equipment over and above those prescribed by WHO. Before vessels are allowed to leave port, they have to fulfill a number of medical stipulations, including stocking up their medicinal chests, carrying medical equipment, not carry patients who ought to be quarantined, and maintain sanitation standards of the visiting country's port rules. Otherwise, the vessel may be detained at the owner's cost and their Masters imprisoned.

Incidents Involving Health Care

During a training sortie, while serving as Executive Officer and Second-In-Command, I was asked to attend to a seaman who had been suffering from seasickness due to stormy weather. He had not been able to retain any food for two or three days and was on the verge of passing away. For guidance, I had a voluminous reference book and a Nursing Orderly to help. After removing the sailor to the Mess, I began administering him small doses of canned peach fruit and syrup to enable him to absorb sugar and regain energy. When he retained this, I administered him a couple of spoonfuls of brandy. Next morning, I advised him to breathe in some fresh air before returning to his Mess. This helped him, and there were no further complaints.

While serving as Second Mate on board a German-owned but Panama-registered general cargo vessel, just off Port Said, I had

to attend to a Turkish seaman who had tripped on strewn cargo and badly hurt his leg, with the ankle bone protruding out. With the help of the Chief Mate, I pushed the bone into the flesh and bandaged the ankle to restrict the loss of blood. The Master prohibited the administration of any sedative to soothe the pain because that would mean paying medical insurance claims. Soon, a launch came up from the port and took the sailor away.

Another incident involved a black seaman on another German vessel whose hand was crushed under the hatch pontoon. The bandage and sling that I had dressed him with was removed on the orders of the Master, who wanted to avoid public display of the injury which would have forced him to divert to Britain or France to seek medical help for the injured sailor, thus causing delay in reaching the destination and incurring additional cost. This, in spite of the fact that all diversions and medical costs are covered by insurance and thus recoverable.

As Chief Officer of a Garware Shipping Company ship, *Rishi August*, I twisted my back while trying to avoid damage to bow thruster propeller in near hurricane wind conditions during the process of casting off at the Ecuadorian port of Sallaverri. This happened because the Master and the Pilot were trying to cut corners and additional costs to the Owners and the Charterers. At the port of Lima (Peru), I was sent to a downtown doctor instead of a proper hospital. Obviously, the latter would have meant spending more time and the doctors there do not accept any pressure for treatment or compensation. After four days, I was repatriated to India unaccompanied by a doctor, in spite of the fact that I was suffering from agonising pain. After two months of visiting a pharmaceutical doctor who was in medicine sales, I was pronounced fit for service, even though I could barely walk. All this because, the company wanted to avoid the liability of paying me compensation. For six months I was jobless not to mention the absence of insurance cover, and a family to support. It took me months of pleading and the kindly intervention of two Admirals to get a release from the Garware Company, and I joined SCI Limited - a public sector company - so much for saving the ship and lives aboard!

Routine Medical Cover at Ports

At the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), prior to computerisation of medical records in 1994, the poorly paid officers and seamen routinely exercised their Union rights to visit a doctor under company medical insurance cover while at port. This was done partly to carry out their personal errands and partly to collect expensive medicines for use at home. Of course, this does not mean that there were no genuine patients needing medical cover. After computerisation of medical records, there was a sudden drop in the number of sick people needing medical attention at ports! This was because such people were now asked to consult accredited specialists at their own expense and obtain fitness certificates before being cleared for service on board again.

Peculiarities of Indian Ships in the Field of Health Care

At SCI, unlike officers, seamen are engaged on a geographical basis as Calcutta crew, Mumbai crew, Chennai crew and so on. They not only have their own cooks on board, but also bring their indigenous medicines along. The three Serangs (Bosun) - Deck, Engine, and Chief Cook - are de facto healers on board as well as repositories of all the doctoring that should and could be done on board. In case of sickness, the concerned Serang would be the first to know and he can use the ship's medicine through the Second Mate. A good Chief Officer with experience knows how to handle such sicknesses and rarely any outside medical (radio) advice or diversion of vessel becomes necessary. As per the international law it is the judgement of the Master which will be the deciding factor. The Indian Serangs and senior seamen are mostly uneducated and have little knowledge of English. They do not take easily to new technology and western medicine. Instead, they rely on their tried and trusted ancient medical practices and seamanship knowledge. It must be noted that 70 to 80 per cent of India belongs to the rural and semi-rural populace and it is from these areas that the seamen for merchant ships are drawn.

Indian ships do not strictly adhere to WHO stipulations. The literature supplied to Masters during their 12-day Medicare course does not conform to WHO Captain's Medical Guide Book. Moreover, while the products of Indian pharmaceutical companies are stacked

in ships' medical chests, indigenous medicines, without the benefits of hospital-tested attestation and medical insurance cover, are neglected. Neither do Indian ships adhere to world standards in sanitation, pest control, drinking water purity, etc. The indigenous research and development in this area is negligible and a system for quarantine checks is lacking. During visits to foreign ports, Masters of Indian vessels have the unenviable task of working around international health standards.

On board Indian ships, another lacuna is the general inability to conform to WHO norms in sanitation. Indian vessels are generally manned by a larger crew in contrast to Western ships, which make do with a smaller crew. Thus the number of toilets, bathrooms, cabins, electrical cables, air-conditioning ducts, etc., are more than in Western ships, but crew designated space is determined by ship design which ratio remains the same as more importance is given to the carriage of goods to earn more revenue.

Suggestions to Improve Health Care on Board Indian Ships

- Cooking equipment needs to be modified. Flat hot plate and oven need to be replaced with tawa-like plate for making chapatis and paranthas and vessels to make curries. Electric tandoors and safety gloves to work inside them are available. The main criteria in inducting new equipment should be reasonable cost, rugged design and suitability for taking aboard ships.
- Since reduction of crew members would take time, efforts should be made to engineer high performance pumps for the same weight and energy ratio for sanitary lines.
- Air-conditioning, which is a must as per habitability laws and Union rules, is a rare phenomenon. The resulting non-conducive temperature and humidity leads to reduced productivity. Tropicalisation and better care and maintenance are important.
- In consultation with the WHO, the Captain's Ship Health Guide Book should be modified by a composite group of Indian medical practitioners drawn from various systems of indigenous medicine and issued as the Indian National Medical

Guide Book for Indian Masters on Indian Vessels and that too in various Indian languages for maximum benefit. Ship medicine chests, besides being stocked up with WHO recommended medicines, should additionally have Indian herbal medicines for routine dispensation on board. The Government needs to have an objective approach while assessing the value of allopathic and herbal medicines, and equitably allocate resources. It would be in the long-term interests of big companies also to contribute towards this endeavour rather than letting the Government alone to do the needful.

- WHO sanitary and quarantine rules and regulations need to be translated into various Indian languages to enable the crew to understand and inculcate them.
- Using NEEM tree derivatives for purifying water and preserving food stuff should be explored.
- International Maritime Organisation mandated STCW syllabi for First Aid and Medicare training courses for officers and crews must be made more comprehensive by including the Indian system of medication.
- In case of dislocations and simple fractures, the traditional method of setting the bones right without anaesthesia and the casting of plaster of Paris practised widely throughout India should be adopted to provide immediate relief on board. Traditional medication methods could be of immense help for back pains and other ailments, especially for ageing seamen. But then, this centuries-old knowledge in traditional medications needs to be scientifically processed and documented, before being eventually included in the Captain's Medical Guide Book. The Department of Indian Medical Sciences could perhaps take the initiative in this matter.
- The Director General of Shipping who is the highest statutory authority according to the Merchant Navy Act must be designated as the nodal authority under the guidance of the Ministry of Surface Transport to initiate in-depth studies for finding practical and indigenous solutions for health related matters on board vessels.

Letter to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services

Dear Sir,

Air Vice Marshal Sen's article on "Defence Technology and Industrial Base" in the April-June 1999 issue of the *USI Journal* blames our founding fathers-Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers and King's Commission Officers (KCOs) of yore-for the ills of Defence Industrial base. I write in their defence.

Historically, it was our first Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh's report that laid the foundation of unified control of the Research and Development (R and D), production, inspection and utilisation of the civil industrial base, under a Controller General of Defence Production (CGDP). The Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers like HM Patel, MK Vellodi, PVR Rao and Harish Sarin; were second to none. KCOs, Thimayya, Subroto Mukherjee and Bijji Kaul were close to Pundit Nehru.

The Technical Development Establishments (TDEs) were under the Master General of Ordnance (MGO). The last Director was Lieutenant General JS Dhillon. Dr Wansborough Jones, the Chief Scientist to the British Ministry of Defence, recommended that a scientist with war experience be appointed-but we had none. There were no British Generals as Principal Staff Officers (PSO's). Dr Kothari, an eminent scientist, was appointed as Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister in 1957. To form the Defence science organisation, the TDEs were split, laboratories were set up in surplus accommodation at various places under the Chief Controller Maj Gen BD Kapur (CCRD.) This led to distancing of research from the Services and the factories. It was a major error of judgement. BD accepted the folly of certain doings such as the separation of development from production. In my letter published in the July-September 1994 issue of the *USI Journal*; I had quoted from his book-"The CCRD decided to subordinate his status to that of the CGDP-approval of the Government was obtained, but Dr. Bhagwantam the newly appointed scientific advisor opposed the breaking up of his Empire."

Now that the Defence Minister has promised the restructuring of the MoD, the elimination of two tier system, by which the Service HQs are treated as attached offices to the Ministry; and have to apply for sanction

even for purchase of budgeted items to the Ministry; gives the bureaucracy a stranglehold for arranging cuts and commissions. It is expected that integration of all aspects of weapons production will also be brought under the purview of a central authority – a "Czar" of production who ensures that money spent not only goes towards strengthening defence but also benefits Indian economy.

The British have a "Procurement Executive." France has the Delegation General for Armament (DGA). The present Indian system, defies all logic. For example the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which produced the Gnat fighters, called "Sabre killers" in the 1965 War, is struggling with the development of Light-Combat Aircraft (LCA) even after 25 years. It does not manufacture the much needed surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) -what to say of trainers and transport planes. The Air Force still awaits import of the Advance Jet Trainer (AJT); and anomalies – today more than a decade after buying the Bofors we import its ammunition! Reform is imperative

Major General Partap Narain (Retd)

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Burma 1942*

LT GEN SL MENEZES, PVSM, SC (RETD)**

The word 'if' is undoubtedly the central word in 'Life', and this splendid book on the 1942 Burma campaign, where both sides tell the story of a savage jungle war, abundantly establishes that in war luck chases some, but many have to chase it. In 1942 in Burma luck chased very few, and even fewer were in a position to chase it. The British and Indian Armies, which had fought many jungle wars, were totally unprepared for the conditions of this one, while the Japanese, Britain's First World War ally, who had hitherto never fought in the jungle, used the difficult conditions successfully. It was therefore a felicitous decision on the part of Major General Ian Lyall Grant, MC, to have so meticulously researched this infelicitous campaign, warts and all, including through unit and formation war diaries, entailing the longest-ever retreat of British-Indian forces, and thereafter to have published this definitive and brilliantly-produced book himself. It was also felicitous to have co-opted Kazuo Tamayama as a co-author; the latter is a member of the Japanese War History Society and Secretary of the Japan-British Society, having been appointed MBE for his contribution in his latter capacity. There have been earlier accounts of this period of the war in Burma, but none based on such extensive personal experience as that of Major General Lyall Grant as a 26-year old Major in the Bengal Sappers, as well as no conjoined book with such detailed presentation of Japanese actions from the latter's point of view. The narrative of events from January to May 1942 encompasses both pathos and bathos - the myopic strategic decisions at Whitehall that left Burma, in effect, defenceless; then a series of belated ad hoc measures to endeavour to save it, which materialised too late either to save Burma, or the careers of some brilliant and promising commanders, eg, Major General JG

**Japanese Invasion - Both Sides Tell the Story of a Savage Jungle War. By Ian Lyall Grant and Kazuo Tamayama (Chichester : The Zampi Press, 1999), pp. 416, £20.00, ISBN 0-9521083-1-3.*

**Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.

Smyth, VC, MC, GOC 17th Indian Division who happened to be rushed from Headquarters 18 (later renumbered 19) Indian Division, to the wrong place at the wrong time (he had been physically unwell, and had recently suffered a mild heart attack); and eventually falling back on that great constant, the unfailing heroism and endurance of Indian, British and Gorkha troops, as also in this theatre some Burmese and many Chinese, as well as the Europeans and Anglo-Burmans of the Burma Auxiliary force, despite foul-ups like the premature blowing of the Sittang Bridge. The gallant actions of many are narrated, including those of the then Captains SHFJ Manekshaw and SK Korla. The formations in Burma, 1st Burma Division and 17th Indian Division, were both 'patchwork' affairs. The 1st Burma Division was put together in July 1941 with the 1st and 2nd Burma Brigades, and the recently arrived 13th Indian Infantry Brigade. The 17th Indian Division only commenced raising in the 1941 Indian expansion programme, and in the same year was ordered to move two brigades to Malaya, and divisional headquarters and one brigade to Burma. The training that had been imparted was all for open warfare and not jungle warfare, for arguably the 17th Indian Division was intended for the North-West Frontier. In 1971, Brigadier Smyth, the erstwhile GOC, by then a former Member of the British Parliament, was to write, "It is a somewhat ungenerous - but not unusual - characteristic of the British people that, having countenanced a state of military unpreparedness in times of peace, they should have to salve their consciences by seeking scapegoats for the inevitable disasters which follow when war comes upon them".

To go back a bit in time, as covered by the author, on 1 April 1937, following a recommendation of the 1930 Indian Statutory Commission (the Simon Commission), Burma ceased to be a province under the Government of India, and was constitutionally separated from India. Until that date, the defence of Burma had been India's responsibility. Now it ceased to be, though India was conditionally committed to reinforce Burma in an emergency, the Army in Burma, commanded by a General Officer under the Governor, comprising only :

- Headquarters Army in Burma, about the same size as the former Burma District Headquarters.

- Headquarters Rangoon Brigade Area.
- Two British infantry battalions.
- Four Burma Rifles battalions, each with its own depot company.
- One Indian mountain battery and one Indian field company, on loan from India, the latter to be replaced in 1940 by a Burma field company.
- Ancillary units, without provision for second line transport.
- Battalion of the Burma Auxiliary Force, of Europeans/Anglo-Burmans.

Before separation there were no distinct establishments in Burma, for local naval and air defence, provision thereafter being left to HMG and Burma; India was, however, notified that Burma would protect the Imperial air routes through Burma, but that it was not considered necessary to maintain a permanent air force there. As to local naval defence, Burma was to rely on Singapore for reinforcement, and failing Singapore on India. India reminded Burma somewhat fruitlessly that sufficient airfields were essential for air reinforcement, and informed HMG that the local naval defence of India and Burma was a single strategic problem, and that it could not be undertaken from Singapore. The civil force of Burma Military Police was reorganised, some two-thirds of it being allotted to a Burma Frontier Force, commanded by an Inspector General under the Governor, and one third for law and order under the Home Minister. The above forces were sought to be expanded between 1939 and the end of 1941, eg, the number of Burma Rifles battalions was doubled to eight, but the ostensible additional strength was impaired by inherent defects, both equipment-wise and training-wise. Just before the outbreak of war with Japan, Burma Army Headquarters was simultaneously a War Office, a GHQ, a Corps HQ, and an L of C Area HQ. Matters could have been worked out more quickly and efficiently by GHQ (India), but this was not to be till 15 December 1941, by which time it was too late (the Japanese having already attacked Malaya), having been under London till

September 1940, and then under Far Eastern Command at Singapore, and this despite the repeated representations in 1940 and 1941 to place Burma within Indian Command, as the defence of Burma was vital to India, but not to Malaya.

What needs mentioning in this book, in fairness to the then Viceroy of India, in relation to the many 'ifs' of this campaign, is that on 11 May 1936 Lord Linlithgow had recorded, with remarkable prescience, if not clairvoyance, for which he was not given sufficient credit by HMG, including by Winston Churchill, either then or subsequently, and which 1936 file of the Historical Section (India), also referred to by Sir Compton Mackenzie in his 'Eastern Epic', this reviewer chanced to read in 1947 when posted to the new Army HQ (India), in the context of the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Burma, "The position becomes infinitely more anxious if and when British naval forces based on Singapore are crippled or beaten. My contention is that...the first and most vital precaution that is within our power to effect is the construction of proper communication by land between Bengal and Burma... Even though the initial landing and occupation of Burma by the Japanese were successfully completed, such an Indo-Burma railway or road would render possible the effective employment in Burma of the Army in India, whether or not the control of the Bay of Bengal were in enemy hands." It was thereafter estimated that it would take eight years to build a railway link by way of the Hukawng Valley, and five years for a motorable road from Manipur to the Chindwin. The then C-in-C (India), Sir Robert Cassells, minuted on the file, on 25 September 1936, "We have now sufficient material in hand to tackle this scheme if and when the time does come for tackling it seriously." There the matter rested until mid-December 1941, when orders were given by Wavell for India to widen the existing road from Dimapur to Imphal, and build a road from there to Tamu over the existing bridle-track; Burma was to construct a road from Kalewa to Tamu. The road was manifestly not finished, but a rough track cut through the Kabaw Valley was just passable enough to let the Army in Burma through as the monsoon broke in 1942. By how perilously narrow a margin that Army got out, this enthralling book encapsulates grippingly; it was more successful than is generally realised, particularly in relation to the heroic performance of Indian

troops, in that the lessons learnt the hard way in 1942 were to lead to Burma's reconquest, and Japan's greatest defeat two years later. In Compton Mackenzie's words "It is no exaggeration to give Lord Linlithgow's strategic imagination the virtue of having saved many lives, for although nothing was done until over five years after his enquiry, it may be doubted if it would have been done even then without it, and we may feel reasonably sure that if HMG had been clearer-sighted over the strategic future of Burma and entrusted its defence to India, the road would have been started earlier." (Of course, it can conversely be argued that, had the road been commenced when Linlithgow originally conceived it, the Japanese would have been the ultimate beneficiaries in 1942.)

This is an absorbing book that will make every reader ponder in a more enlightened way about a campaign 57 years ago, which many of us thought we knew all about, but which no one has researched with such imagination, or with such excellence. It would be ungracious to cavil at a few omissions in emphasis in such a prodigious work, with verily outstanding maps and photographs, which encompasses such a large canvas, eg, the considerable bravery in the evacuation on the part of many of the staff of the Burma Railways, but these will undoubtedly be remedied in the next edition as and when brought to the author's notice by readers. A very rewarding read.

Learning From Rand*

COL PK GAUTAM**

From the beginning of the Cold War, scholars and analysts from the RAND corporation were instrumental in moulding strategic opinion and researching strategies to contain the Soviet Union. Now nearly 50 years later, analysts from RAND have taken a fresh "US centric" approach on the question of "how much is enough" at the conclusion of the Cold War. Till 1994, the US had completed two evolutionary reviews on Post Cold War assessment of US Military starting with the 1991 Base Force Plan followed by the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR). The third review was in 1995 – Directions For Defence (DFD) report. By May 1997 the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released by the US Department of Defense (DOD).

The essays have been organised in four parts, viz. Principles of Defence Planning, Planning at Strategic Level, Planning at Operational or Campaign Level and Building the Defence Programme. Some important themes are:

(a) **Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).** Chapters 10, 16 and 23 deal with BMD drawing heavily on the unsuccessful anti-Scud operations of the 1991 Gulf War. Should the tactics be based on early kill layers or late kill using systems like the *Patriot* or updates? Where should the sparse budget be spent or invested? What is the pay-off to ensure a counterforce option using F-15 aircraft to destroy the Transport Erector Launcher (TEL). These essays can easily be extrapolated or interpolated by any analyst dealing with similar missiles, both in attack and defence. Defence officers and scientists dealing with missiles will find these chapters very useful.

(b) **Campaign Analysis.** Chapter 12 explains the difference between strategic warning (prior to attack) and tactical warning

*New Challenges for Defense Planning : Rethinking How Much is Enough. Ed by Paul K Davis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1994), pp.769, £6.99, ISBN 0-8330-1527-3.

** Colonel PK Gautam is an instructor at the School of Artillery, Devlali.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 537, July-September, 1999

(after start of hostilities). The chapter gives a notional sequence of events by a Joint Force in a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) from initial mobilisation to build up, defeat of adversary and post conflict stability.

(c) **Air Power.** Chapter 13 explains various methodologies of using long range bomber based air power to respond strategically without tactical air force to engage an armoured division and other high value targets. The figures and diagrams covering variables would be very relevant to any air defence expert to evaluate point or area defence. Each complex situation is broken down into flight paths and other tactical details. The bomber 'threat' has been covered comprehensively and so is the philosophy of targeting. Surely the age of slide rules and logarithms is history when compared to the computer simulations possible, though the rare human 'common sense' is still considered vital in the complex art and science of bomber analysis. Chapters 18 and 19 address fighter aircraft force modernisation with affordability. Chapter 19 expands on modernising of an aging air power with multi purpose F - 22 and its upgrades while addressing the conflicting needs for air superiority and air to ground capabilities.

(d) **Logistics and Administration.** Chapter 22 evaluates the example from successful corporate and business practices and how these strategies can be suitably applied to force maintenance and sustainment. Logistics needs to focus on the customer (operational commanders), it needs to be efficient and effective and the weapons systems designed need to be readily supportable. Logistics even during Rommel's desert war in the 1940s has remained a "quartermaster's nightmare." Yet, in 1992, absurd as viewed from civil business practices, US had \$150 billion locked up in inventories and \$80 billion in spares, and routine repairs to equipment took three to nine months. Even worse, during the Gulf War, 25,000 containers of size 40 feet had to be opened to determine their contents! Perhaps the most insightful observation which is the underlying principle of "need pull" in the present information dominance and transportation control by the authors is: "the current system was designed when military material was relatively inexpen-

sive and transportation relatively expensive - the opposite is the situation today (p.700.") Chapter 21 discusses the triad of strategic mobility (air lift, sea lift and pre-positioning). Analogous parallels to our context can be drawn when strategic mobility problems are analysed even basing it on road and rail lift vs air lift. The chapter highlights that the weight and foot print of an army division has increased by up to 9 per cent. One can compare the world-wise debate over the heavy and light tank or the towed or self propelled howitzer when moving them by air to road and rail is concerned and arriving at the conflicting requirements of strategic and tactical mobility and capability. Chapter 20 assesses the structure and mix of Active and Reserve Army Forces. The need for rapid mobilisation, embodiment, training and integration with a field force have been touched upon in this chapter. Officers dealing with manpower planning would find this chapter useful.

(e) **Adaptiveness or Flexibility.** Historical analyses has often proved Moltke's dictum that "no plan survives contact with the enemy." Essays in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 discuss uncertainties and shocks of combat when the forces are incorrectly prepared to fight the last war. Chapter 7 ends with a truism: "The goal of planning, however, is comprehensiveness, not simplicity."

(f) **Miscellaneous.** Chapter 9 covers military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). It emphasises that by 2000 AD half the world population would be urban as against 17 per cent 50 years ago, which would imply more war-fighting in urban areas. Chapters 2,3 and 5 would be of interest to financial pundits, where a fresh approach to Planning, Programme and Budgeting System (PPBS) has been attempted. In Chapter 5, poorly managed budget (discipline gap) has been highlighted from history, and "teeth to tail" as also ratio of C³I assets versus shooters ratio re-looked.

This is a book for professional readers by 31 highly qualified authors, six of them have military background, three are women. The U.S. Military Forces have a new operational concept "Joint Vision 2010", comprising of Dominant Manoeuvre, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and Focussed Logistics. The book provides some background of these concepts.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

On the Causes of War. By H Suganami (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996), pp.235, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-19-827338-X.

Suganami makes no secret of his clientele. It is a book targeted at his scholarly peers. Dealing with the central question of *what causes war*, he has been severe on preceding work that have since come to be regarded as essential texts, in particular Waltz's pioneering work *Man, the State and War*. To him Waltz's answer of "international anarchy" being the "permissive condition" for the phenomenon of war has conceptual flaws. These he dwells on as a starting point for launching into his own contribution to expanding the theory on the origins of war.

His position is that wars are a multi-casual phenomenon and have family resemblances in their causes. He, therefore, attributes their recurrence to six 'acts of governments,' namely: resistance; belligerence; contributory negligence; insensitivity; thoughtlessness; and, recklessness. In short, he rejects the idea of 'single, permissive, underlying cause of war'. He arrives at this understanding by a philosophical enquiry into causation that he himself admits may be criticised as 'hair splitting', 'logic chopping' and not quite 'down to earth'.

Whereas, the book is indeed meant for those with a theoretical grounding, its relevance for the lay reader is when it is read in conjunction with Waltz's work and that of others like Nelson and Olin's *Why War?*. Such a scholastic repast may be time consuming, but it would be time well spent if one is to understand the cruel visitation that has lent its name to this century – the Century of Wars.

Major Ali Ahmed

Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. By Michael W Doyle (New York : WW Norton & Company, 1997), pp.557, £ 14.95, ISBN 0-393-03826-2.

The book examines the influence of Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism on war and peace in international affairs. While the realist philosophers like Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau categorise international system as a "jungle in a state of war" – not a continuous war but with constant possibility of war between states – a political paradigm, where states must follow the

doctrine of "realpolitik", i.e. "national interest" and calculate relative "balance of power" among competing states, Liberalism of John Locke and internationalism of Immanuel Kant perceive a more peaceful society based on democratic values of individual rights and right to dissent, which create possibilities of peace within and among nations. liberal regimes are more likely to establish "zones of peace" and settle differences amongst themselves by peaceful means. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao see the division of the world on economic basis into three tiers: the first tier, comprises the USA, Japan and Germany which are in a dominant position the second and the third tiers, comprising of countries as the Russian Federation, Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia and others, are the dependencies. In this paradigm, the likely admixture of inter-class solidarity and inter-class conflicts could lead to war between classes.

It is interesting to read Kautilya's "Circle of States" doctrine (p-164) dealing with relations amongst nations grounded in a 'balance of power' system to maintain peace, formulated more than two thousand years ago.

The author, who is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, has provided for a scientific and in-depth analysis of war and peace with critical insight; the outcome is a work of great interest to all those concerned with war and peace and international power politics.

Air Commodore NB Singh (Retd)

Masters of War. By Robert Buzzanco (UK : Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 386, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-521-48046-9.

Vietnam War was a total defeat for the American Army, because of poor strategic planning. Throughout the Vietnam War, many military officials consistently warned the US against the perils of waging a conventional war in Vietnam. Even advocates of the US involvement recognised the political and military obstacles to the US success. Stories that would create capital for the politicians and help soldiers vindicate themselves have been many. Defenders of the US role in Vietnam attribute America's defeat not to an unnecessary intervention or military shortcomings but rather to a failure of will because national leaders, principally President Lyndon Johnson, had forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs".

The American military commanders have charged both Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, of unduly limiting their ability to fight the Vietnam War. Robert Buzzanco points out that political leaders and not the military brass pressed for war. According to

the author, political leaders had decided to extend containment, which in the case of Vietnam amounted to rollback, to Indochina, in the first instance to restore Asian capitalism and then to maintain their credibility as guardians of the world's political economy. The author has explored these crucial issues of military dissent, inter-services rivalries, civil-military relations and politics that went into the fashioning of the Vietnam fiasco, in a cogent and comprehensive manner. The author proves that the war was lost because of poor strategy and lack of coordination at various levels.

A comprehensive read.

Colonel PK Vasudeva (Retd)

Caging the Nuclear Genie : An American Challenge for Global Security,
By Stansfield Turner (Boulder Colorado : Westview Press, 1997), pp.149,
\$ 24.00, ISBN 0-8133-3328-8

The enigma of bottling the nuclear genie has challenged all right thinking defence analysts the World over for over five decades. Yet nuclear proliferation continues unabated as statesmen are being incrementally drawn into the vortex of a possible nuclear conflict and follow individual agendas driven by power politics rather than rationality of reason. Perhaps Stansfield Turner's scenario of a terrorist nuclear strike would come true, for the former CIA head would have deeper insights into proliferation of the international nuclear terrorist network than most of us. The *raison d'etre* of the book is the need for acceleration of the process of nuclear arms reduction by Western powers. The author's concerns arise from nuclear overkill capability built by nations, Russian instability and the threat from rogue nuclear weapon states. Thus, as summated in Part One of the book, the threat of a nuclear exchange has far from receded. Part Two covers the entire gamut of nuclear warfare from effects of a nuclear explosion to deterrence theories which have led to accumulation of nuclear stocks and is peppered with insights from the author's days with the CIA. The "Turner Plan" for a strategic escrow of nuclear weapons in the final part is the main contribution of the author to disarmament theory. The concept of "strategic escrow" envisages placing warheads in designated storage areas some distance from their launchers thereby reducing readiness time and providing opportunity for peace to work. Other aspects of the Turner Plan include traditional disarmament strategies as no first use, sharing of intelligence, sanctions against nuclear proliferates, anti ballistic missile defence and promoting nuclear restraints through confidence building measures (CBMs). Having a life long exposure to bureaucratic propensities for maintaining the status quo, he suggests revolutionary rather than evolutionary changes in established bureaucratic processes before traditional self defensive mechanisms of bureaucrats come

into play. Citizen support is an essential prerequisite for achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. Greater transparency, improved public awareness and reducing historic antagonistic positions between traditional belligerents as India and Pakistan are some of the proposed measures. The author has supported his narrative with detailed appendices and copious notes. Turner has presented a cogent argument in favour of nuclear disarmament. However, like the proverbial genie, the problem of nuclear restraint is not why and how it should be achieved but lack of political and public will to slow down the race to nuclear Armageddon.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

The Balance of Power : History and Theory. By Michael Sheehan
(London : Routledge, 1996), pp.226, £ 12.99 (Pb), ISBN 0-415-11931-6.

Michael Sheehan explains the complexity of the balance of power principle which is one of the fundamental concepts of international politics. He traces the evolution of the theory of balance of power and examines its practice in international politics for the last three centuries.

Notwithstanding the views of some theorists, the balance of power has not been a natural form of international relations throughout most of human history - barring the case of ancient Greek city-states, Renaissance Italy and European state system which arose in 1648 and lasted more than a century. The leaders of Europe restored it in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, but it broke down again by the end of the Century.

Michael Sheehan gives arguments against the inevitability of clashes between nation-states as they seek to increase their wealth and power. For him this is not an instinctive approach to international politics. The last chapter shifts the focus to the future of the balance of power concept and the idea of collective security as a refinement of balance of power theory. Sheehan hopes that an equilibrium of sorts will be reached on the basis of ideas of collective security. He is in good company. Kissinger has predicted that in the new world order, balance of power would re-emerge in a traditional multi-polar form because it will be a world comprising several power centres of comparable strength pursuing foreign policies based on their national interests and seeking reconciliation and balance of their competing interests. A book for those having a hand on the pulse of international relations.

K K Mitra

War History of the Marathas : 1600-1818. By Brig K G Pitre, AVSM (Retd)
(Pune : Published by Brig K G Pitre, April 1998), pp. 408, Rs. 150.00,
ISBN not indicated.

This book is an interesting study of the art of war initiated by the Marathas in the Seventeenth Century to establish an independent kingdom under Chhatrapati Shivaji and then in the Eighteenth Century to expand it to an empire under the rule of the Peshwas. The Maratha power was first established in the Deccan and later expanded to the rest of India and the author rightly claims that the history of the Marathas during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries was in fact the history of India.

Maratha power was established through the sword, retained by the sword and it ended when the sword became blunt and the wielder incapable of using it. The hilly terrain of Maharashtra was ideally suited to guerrilla warfare and the Marathas specialised in this form of warfare, which was eminently successful against the slow moving Mughal armies. In tactics, the cavalry remained their main fighting arm. By speed in movement, they were able to compensate for their lack of fire-power. A major change in the organisation and tactics of the Maratha armies came in the middle of the Eighteenth Century when they were trained and organised on the European pattern. But even with these changes the artillery continued to be neglected and this deficiency was one of the causes of their defeat by the armies of the East India Company. But more than their weakness in artillery, it was their fissiparous tendencies and internecine quarrels that led to their downfall. The British, who were pastmasters at this game, were able to manipulate it to their benefit.

Another weakness, brought out in the study is the total lack of organised logistics in the Maratha armies throughout the period. Initially the countryside and the people had the resilience to sustain an army of a small size. Later these ever expanding Maratha forces descended like a swarm of locusts to devastate the whole countryside, burning and looting, leaving a trail of misery and hatred in their wake.

The book is interesting and worth a study as there are many relevant lessons to be learnt from it vis-a-vis our present day politics. Unfortunately readers will have to cope with a multitude of printer's errors which is the result of poor proof reading and correction.

Major General Samir C Sinha (Retd)

The Military System of India : 1900-1939. By Dr KML Saxena (New Delhi : Reliance Publishing House, 1999), pp. 539, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7510-039-7.

Introspection is a healthy exercise in which Indians as a rule do not indulge. We have been under foreign rule for some 1000 years. During the last 200 years we were exploited by the British in a blatant manner.

The book under review is a sequel to an earlier study and is a continuation

of that thesis. It could appropriately have been titled 'British India's Military System 1900-1939'. The author has brought out that inspite of the talk of *izzat* the British never trusted Indians. The composition of the main fighting arm—the infantry—ensured checks and counter-checks and a play of one community against another. Every brigade had to have a British battalion and all the arms kept under the British control. All the battalions were composed of different communities except the Sikhs who were in a special category. The other part was the Gorkhas to put down any disaffection with an iron hand.

The British ensured the security of their rich possessions with a circle of states and buffers all round. While the north and east had been secured, and the sea lanes were under British domination, the Russian threat in the north west was kept alive with the development of Punjab and the north west, and concentration of forces in the area. The Durand Line was activated and the frontier tribes kept at war with each other along the unmarked border. Internal security was ensured with a strict control and detailed plans laid for each town and city. Trouble spots were all marked and closely monitored. While the British learnt lessons from World War I, implementation and improvement in the higher direction of war was always on the cards. This thought provoking study is a must for planners as a guide on what the British did for the Indian security. A welcome addition to military literature.

Lieutenant Colonel Gautam Sharma (Retd)

The Proudest Day : India's Long Road the Independence. By Anthony Read and David Fisher (London : Pimlico, 1998), pp. 565, £12.50, ISBN 0-7126-6142-5.

"Come what may, self knowledge will lead to self rule, and that would be the Proudest Day in British history." So reads Macaulay's minute on Indian education. The 'Proudest Day' of self rule in Indian sub-continent was only a part of Macaulay's prophesy that exposure to western ideas and ethics would lead Hindus to embrace Christianity in thirty year's time. However the proudest day also left India as a fragmented nation of two separate countries and 562 princely states. The lead-up to it stretched across nearly a century of colonial subjugation, preceded by two centuries of economic exploitation and political manipulation under the company Raj. The authors have narrated and explained the gradual expansion and transformation of status of the East India Company till the War of Independence (1857) as the essential prologue to the awakening, consolidation and the fragmentation of Indian nationalism under British Raj. The authors highlight the vacillations of British political strategy and their attitude to this country and its people as well as the role of both the British colonial authorities and a galaxy of Indian nationalist leaders during company Raj and British Rule.

Comprehensively researched and well presented, this review of India's experience of the British era will stand out as a work of great literary and historical value.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

When Generals Failed : The Chinese Invasion. By Brig Darshan Khullar (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 1999), pp. 267, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-098-7.

A number of accounts on the NEFA debacle are available. However, the author of this book has done a commendable job of consolidating the various events. The book follows two trends of narration – one is the author's personal experience as a subaltern of 22 Mountain Regiment and the other is that of a historian, with the benefit of extensive research from the records available and interviews with surviving personalities involved in the fall of Bumla, Tawang, Jung, Nuranong, Sela, Senge, Darang and Bomdila, the nine pins that fell one after another.

The selected excerpts from *The Snows of the Himalyas* makes for a more interesting reading. It helps to balance the story. The book gains in interest by the clever interspersing of the personal adventures of the author, sometimes amusing at others sad, giving an insight of the state of mind of the junior officers during the period of invasion. He has been more than candid of his own acts of omission and commission. Chapter one of the book analyses the state of the Army in 1962, the Nehru-Thimayya episode and the consequent rise of Kaul, Krishna Menon's antagonistic approach to the Service Chiefs and more importantly the total absence of preparation to counter the Chinese threat. Chapter Two traces the events leading to the fixation of the McMahon Line and subsequent problems. The author has taken pains to detail the deployment of troops for the various actions as also to mark them on maps. The actions of the commanders, troops and junior officers where relevant have been analysed critically and commented upon. As one goes through the narrative many questions keep striking the reader as to : why certain decisions were taken?; why positions were developed with men and material and then abandoned without much fighting?; why certain obvious positions were not held? There are many 'ifs' in this painful saga of the fate of Indian Army against the Chinese aggression. If Sela had another brigade, if Bomdila defences were given priority, if only Pathiana and Hoshiar had stuck to their positions, if Kaul was not flying around away from his Headquarters when Thapar and Sen were waiting for him there, if either the Chief or the Army Commander had given firm orders to Pathania to stick on to Sela...

More importantly, had the Thorat Plan been taken out and implemented at an appropriate junction, what could have been the outcome! This hypothetisation is of only academic value now. In the Postscript the author points out certain lessons learnt : ● Violation of the principal of maintenance of aim: changed six times in case of 7 Brigade; ● Disregarding the chain of command; ● Change of Commanders (two Lt Gens, one Maj Gen, three Brigadiers); ● Breaking old orbats and affiliations; ● Faulty concept of defence at high altitude.

The chapter on topography of NEFA, the Glossary and the Bibliography are useful additions.

There is a minor factual error on Page 97. The Chinese had not reached Lumla at 9 AM on 23 October. The BM, DQ, myself and other elements of 7 Brigade were in Lumla till late afternoon. The Chinese had reached Shakti by then. This is just to set the record straight. A word about the maps in the book. Though interesting these are too small in scale and need more than extra effort to follow. Same is true of the photographs. The size could have been larger, the quality of printing better and it would have been more interesting if the directions were mentioned with clarity. Hopefully the second edition of the book would take care of this.

Where Generals Failed informs the serious student of military history, educates the young officers involved in operations about the Whys and Hows of the events that happened as they did, and would also interest the casual reader. It will remind the readers of how history can matter - if only we care to learn.

Brigadier Lakshman Singh (Retd)

Sustainable Defence : Harmonising Long and Short Term Goals. By Air Marshal Vir Narain, USI Paper 2/97 (New Delhi : United Service Institution of India, 1999), pp.112, Rs. 200.

Air Marshall Narain's slim monograph in the USI series carries much sophisticated analysis and wise judgements. The Paper is a timely addition to the number of books, monographs and articles that have been published since India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear test in May 1998. Avoiding the narrow nuclear-centric approach to defense analysis, Narain is concerned with the totality of national security—strategic, military, political, economic, and philosophical.

The monograph covers a broad spectrum of Indian security issues from general, regional and domestic perspectives. It first attempts to define the parameters of national security, the question of how much security is enough and affordable, the relationships among defence policy-making, economic resources, and the needs of the military services.

He notes that the global problem today is one of unequal relationship, more so at the economic level than the military. While weapons of mass destruction remain a powerful instrument of deterrence, "the most pervasive, subtle (sometimes not so subtle) and widely used instrument of coercion at present is economic pressure. A handful of highly industrialized and economically powerful nations use aid, trade and economic sanctions to make sure that they retain their hegemonic position in international affairs." (p.3)

India's ability to sustain a defence capability in the age of high tech conventional weapons is constrained by its technological and economic base. Finding the right balance between what is technologically feasible at home under conditions of rapid technological advances abroad, and the ability to buy the most advanced weapons from abroad without adverse economic consequences at home, will always prove difficult. Adequate defence and affordable defence have often proved to be incompatible.

His chapter on "The State, the Economy and the Military" tends to be philosophical, ambiguous and somewhat truistic in its analysis. It tries to cover too much ground in very little space. He notes that in the triangular relationship among the state, the economy and the military, there exist problems of national will, deficiencies in the infrastructure, and the perennial problem of inadequate input of the military services into the civilian controlled defence decision-making process.

The last point is then taken up with considerable vigor and depth in the next chapter entitled, "Decision-Making: Structures and Processes." Here he discusses some of the key problems afflicting the elected political functionaries, the civilian bureaucracies, and the armed forces. Narain endorses the two major changes that have been periodically proposed by the armed forces to correct the weakness. The first is to merge the Service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence so that they act in tandem, if not in unison. The second would be to establish a Chief of Defence Staff as with the CDS in the United Kingdom and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US.

On the National Security Advisory Board, which was instituted in 1990, but rarely met until recently, Narain rightly points out that the problem with such organisations, whether in India or abroad, is that they tend to focus on the nuclear question to the detriment of conventional security issues, and to confine themselves to intellectual exercises rather than to pragmatic problems on the ground. He cites a leading critic abroad who alleged that such security think-tanks had a tendency to indulge in hypothetical exercises that are never tested.

The chapter on "Strategic Perspectives" examines defence allocations, distribution of weapons and the military balance at the regional and global levels. Subsequently, Narain addresses the problem of differing strategic culture among India, Pakistan and China, and then more broadly with those of Marxist, Islamic and Catholic countries, and the context of policy-making of the United States and Russia in a unipolar world. Strategic transformation at the end of Cold War has changed several military equations and it was important for India to note that Russia "has neither the ability nor the inclination to safeguard India's interests." (p. 71)

The diverse components of India's national security problem are then integrated in a concluding chapter where Air Marshal Narain examines India's options. He points out that "there has been a tendency to forget that deterrence owes its existence to actual warfighting capability" (p.99), and that the involvement of the military in conceptual policy-making and defence decision-making in both the conventional and nuclear arenas, was crucial for national security.

Although some of the chapters seem unfocussed, the monograph provides very useful and often penetrating discussions and insights that go beyond guns, bombs and rockets, to the underlying nature of national security issues faced by India.

Raju G C Thomas

Asian Economies in Transition : Reforming Centrally Planned Economies.
By Richard Pomfret (UK : Edward Elgar, 1996), 155, £39. 95, ISBN 1-85898-291-X

The book examines the transition of eleven centrally planned economies, viz, those of China, Indo-China, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and seven Central Asian Republics, to liberalised ones and draws attention to the trials and tribulations and failures and successes.

Though the book is somewhat dated it covers developments upto 1994 and provides statistics upto 1992. It affords a very valuable insight into the strengths and weaknesses affecting change in the concerned countries. It also attempts to suggest how experience of each of these countries can meaningfully be applied amongst themselves. The chapter on Tumen River Project should be of special interest to the Indian readers since most of us are unfamiliar with the geography of an area of vast potential and of special significance for countries like Russia, China, Japan, the Koreas and Mongolia.

Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

An American Quarter Century - U.S. Politics from Vietnam to Clinton. *Edited by Philip John Davies (New York : Manchester University Press, 1995) pp. 279, 14.99 ISBN 0-7190-4515-0.*

The contributors to this thought-provoking collection of essays on American politics are, without exception, leading scholars who take a hard look at twenty-five years of social and political change as America prepares to enter the Twenty-First Century. The editor, Philip John Davies, in his introductory piece, summarised the closing quarter of what he terms as "The American Century" in broad, brush strokes setting the tone of the essays that follow. In part-I of the book, the contributors examine the changes in social policy, the environmental agenda, the phenomenon of rising national debt and foreign policy. In part-II, the focus is on the impact of feminism and women in politics, race and ethnicity, the rise of the media and subjects such as campaign spending, reform and relationship between the US Congress and the President. A brief reference to two sample essays - one dealing with definition of poverty and social policy and the other with the environmental issue - may be in order, letting the readers find out for themselves the depth of scholarship which has gone into these two and other essays in the volume. In his essay on the change in American social policy, John E. Schwarz highlights a largely unnoticed phenomenon, namely, the official acknowledgement of the reality that traditional social policy has failed both the nation and the poor despite many successes over the past three decades. Waldstein's essay on Environmental protection traces the origin of the movement to Rachel Carson's 1962 book *Silent Spring* and covers the formation of various environmental interest groups, and finally, the creation of The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in September 1970.

The publisher deserves congratulations for bringing out an excellent collection of essays analysing a quarter century of dramatic change in American policy agenda and domestic issues.

K K Mitra

"Empire" by Integration : The United States and European Integration 1945-1997. By Geir Lundestad (Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 200, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-878211-X.

Historically great empires have been established through use of military might and thereafter exploited the subjugated. The author has examined the US version of a modern day empire through integration of Western Europe under its dominance. The book details with clarity the post World War II scenario and the reasons for the US promoting European integration from 1945 to 1997. The author has thrown useful light on the system and style of the US influence whereby it ensured that Western Europe could not act as an independent 'third force' but operate as a member of the Atlantic framework under the predominant overall influence of the US.

A useful book for those interested in the goings on in international affairs, foreign trade and military affairs.

Major General L S Lehl (Retd)

The Reluctant Superpower : United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95. By Wayne Best (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp.296, \$ 35.00, ISBN 0-312-17252-4.

In the absence of a strong and popular central leader in Yugoslavia, the virulent nationalism of its constituent republics has plunged the Federation into a civil war since 1991. Wayne Bert has analysed the role imposed on the USA as a uni-polar super power in a post Cold War international system, and contends that President Clinton, and his predecessor Mr. Bush avoided the use of military force against the resurgent Serbs in Bosnia as an essential back-up of their foreign policy. In a protracted discussion, the author projects diverse factors of foreign policy, national interests, regional (European) security and humanitarian considerations to an extent that these demand or justify military involvement abroad. The author has explained the genesis of the historic internal conflicts in the Balkan states and the politico-military course of the war during 1991-95 as a consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

In a thought provoking study, the book focusses on global management of regional conflicts-whether by the USA, the European Union as a future power, or the United Nations, now faced with the challenge of attempting to resolve the war in neighbouring Kosovo.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

Partnership in Crisis : The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO. By Paul Cornish (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 130, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-85567-467-X.

With the end of the Cold War, the rationale of NATO and in fact the concept of military alliances itself, is being questioned by many in the Western world.

The issue being raised is that, without an unambiguous threat, can planners contend with nations of challenge and risk, and scale the capability of military structures. The debate revolves round the new paradigm of US - European partnership.

According to the author, "theoretical approaches to international affairs have little to offer to real world situations". Further the international system is anarchic and not hierarchic where no political authority beyond the state really matters. Multilateral security policy to be effective politically, financially and militarily, demands genuine co-operation, coordination and preparation. The rub in the NATO today is the conflict between Europeanists and Atlanticists. While a new NATO force posture has been advanced through combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), problems and doubts arise on the question whether the European Union, or NATO should be the arbiters of this task force, and its strategy and employment, what with France and Germany wanting a discrete European identity and the British supporting a US-led alliance in the new foundations being laid for NATO. US-European relationships are certainly set on a new course.

A well researched book highlighting the inherent suspicions, doubts and rivalries besetting NATO despite their outward presentation of a facade of solidarity.

Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

Clashes : Air Combat Over Northern Vietnam 1965-1972. By Marshal L Michel III (Annapolis Md : Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 340, \$ 32.95, ISBN : 1-55750-585-3.

Recently declassified, US documents have enabled the author, himself an air force man with 321 combat missions to his credit in this war, to study in depth the air combat over North Vietnam, which was unique in certain respects. For instance, this war saw the use of machine guns make way for air to air missiles. The War in Vietnam was a learning process for a likely war in Europe, for both the Cold War adversaries. The US Navy had a limited role to play. As far as the Army was concerned, the terrain was vastly different to that of Europe. But there was commonality as far as air warfare was concerned. Lessons learnt could usefully be applied to any future air combat in Europe with regard to training, intelligence, early warning system, tactics, weapons and aircraft.

The book also clarifies certain misconceptions. For instance it is mentioned that at no stage whatsoever did any Russian pilot undertake a combat mission. The author also describes and analyses, with great expertise, the actual dog fights, the tactics, pilot skills and high level decision making. It will come as a surprise to some that 57 per cent of US air to air missiles malfunctioned and less than 13 per cent of functional ones scored a kill.

For planners and those interested in air combat, this book is highly recommended.

Major General Ram Nath (Retd)

Russia's Politics of Uncertainty. By Mary McAuley (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 351, £16.95 (Pb), ISBN 0-521-47976-2.

The author has aptly analysed the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Russia's present mindset of uncertainty. One could ask how the people, rulers and the ruled, react when long established rules of the game governing political behaviour are radically altered? To answer such and other related questions, the author assesses the political reactions of the society. Just as the theory of war and international relations had to adjust to the two World Wars, regional conflicts and to nuclear weapons, so major an event as the end of the communist party rule in the Soviet Union and its very crumbling has surely led to a massive change in the way we think about states, political order and society. In his keenness to get at the root of Russian politics, the author has addressed three issues of vital interest - the reassertion of the executive; the failure of the representative assemblies to hold their ground, and the inability of the political movements or parties to sustain themselves or to attract a following.

The book is an amalgam of critical and sympathetic analyses of Russia's search for new identities, institutions, and rules of political behaviour and is a must for those who take an active interest in international relations.

Major General S K Datt

Class and Client in Beirut : the Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State : 1840-1985. By Michael Johnson (London : Ithaca Press, 1986), pp. 243, £13.99, ISBN 0-86732-0652-5.

The author, who is a Lecturer in Politics in the School of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex, has described in depth the decline and fall of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon.

Once a financial and commercial centre of the Middle East as well as the most popular tourist resort of the oil-rich Arabs, Beirut is a changed capital now. Lebanon has lost its independent status : its southern part is under control of the South Lebanese Army of 2,500 troops which is supported by Israel; and the rest of the country is under Syrian dominance with 35,000 Syrian troops of the Arab Deterrence Force deployed in Lebanon to prevent fratricidal bloodshed. The author ascribes the fragmentation of Lebanese society and state to the Christian and Muslim divide and further sub-divisions within each religion; class conflict between the common people and the bourgeoisie; Lebanese nationalism versus the Arab nationalism of Nasser; and the conflict between the PLO and the Lebanese "right". One major cause leading to the Civil War was the patron-client relationship with strong and popular middle-level leadership having narrow factional loyalties. The book provides a critical analysis of social, economic, and political history of Lebanon, and covers the events leading to the inevitable fragmentation of a soft state.

Air Commodore N B Singh (Retd)

Jordan and the Palestine Question : The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy Making. By Sami-Al Khazendar (UK : Ithaca, 1997), pp. 229, £30.00, ISBN 0-86372-221-0.

"He who has taught me one letter of the alphabet, I am his slave".

– An old Arabic proverb

So begins Dr Sami Al-Khazendar, humbly thanking his mentors, interlocutors and benefactors who made this book a reality. The process took quite a while for the worthy doctor, who is the founder of the Academic Centre for Political Studies in Jordan and also doubles as the senior lecturer at the Institute of Higher Political Studies at Al-al-Bayt University of Jordan. He interviewed three ex-PMs of the Kingdom amongst other VIPs and diplomats. His sources are mostly primary, hence this study, an authentic piece of rare insightful observations.

With not many natural resources, the tiny Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan heavily relies on good foreign relations, free flowing foreign aid and goodwill of its belligerent neighbours. This precarious position has to be meshed with the internal domestic politics. This is easier said than done because of the large component of Palestinians in its populace, the PLO and the intifada. The author explores the complex interaction between the late King Hussein's Government and opposing ideological forces like the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and the leftist bloc and Jordan's foreign policy towards the Palestine question. He attempts to explain why and how the domestic opposition influenced Jordan's foreign policy towards the Palestinian imbroglio, impact of foreign policy on internal politics and discusses their interrelationship. All this is essayed in the backdrop of the Camp David accord, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Reagan Plan, the Fez Arab Peace Initiative, the PLO-Jordan Agreement, the Jordanian decision to disengage from the West Bank, the PLO's recognition of Israel and UN Resolution 242.

A rare read, and a must for serious scholars who need an Arab's view point.

Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma

The Next Generating Attack Fighter : Affordability and Mission Needs. By Donald Stevens, B. Davis, W Stanley, D Norton, et. al. (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1997), pp. 71, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2497-3.

This report examines the replacement of F-16 from the point of affordability and mission needs for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as part of Defence Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) programme. The new fighter aircraft will not only replace F-16 but also other Air Force ground attack and air-to-ground fighters currently in use in the US Air Force. The Air Force is basing its plan for acquiring 2600 attack aircraft which could cover targets as far as Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

An informative book for the uniformed fraternity

Lieutenant Colonel Daljit Singh

The International Who's Who - 1997-1998, Sixty First Edition (*Published by Europa Publications, 1997*), pp. 1685, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-85743-0 220.

The International Who's Who was first published in 1935 and thereafter updated every year. The 61st edition (1997-1998) provides in an alphabetical order information on leading personalities from all walks of life. Much research and hard work has gone into the compilation of this voluminous book and the publishers are to be complemented for giving detailed and accurate information about 20,000 people and thereafter keeping the same updated and adding more names.

The full form of abbreviations given from pages viii to xiv is very informative. Apart from the details of British and Canadian decorations, the authors may consider including abbreviations of other countries like India, e.g., PVSM (Param Vishisht Seva Medal), Param Vir Chakra (P.Vr.C), NM (Nao Sena Medal), etc. Another three or four pages will enhance the usefulness of the book.

An excellent book for anybody looking for quick and authentic reference about the leading personalities of the World.

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

At a Century's Ending - Reflections 1982-1995. By George F Kennan (*New York : WW Norton, 1996*), pp. 351, £19.95, ISBN 0-393-31609-2.

Kennan has had the satisfaction denied to most prophets - that of being vindicated by history in his incarnation as 'Mr X'. He had predicted and charted the Cold War. His prescription was however neglected - at immense cost to democracy and freedom. He reflects on the end of the Cold War and discerns a possible repetition of the mistaken comprehension that began it as recurring.

To him, the militarisation of the Cold War spawned the military-industrial complex, that is now in search of a fresh foe to replace the Soviet bear. He deems this detrimental to the spread of American ideals. The offering in the book are the culmination of the practitioner in the philosopher. The nonagenarian comes out as both prescient and prolific, making the book valuable more for wisdom than information.; A recommended dose of Realists.

Major Ali Ahmed

The Blue Book : Fiction and Beyond. By Mally Douglas (*New Delhi : Ebouz Classics, 1998*), pp. 235, Rs. 250.00, ISBN 81-7369-007-3.

This is an autobiography of Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, AVSM (Retd) whose father was once informed by the Air Force Academy in Begumpet that

his son Cadet Malhotra's standard of flying was not satisfactory and the progress very slow. The same cadet rose to great heights both as a flyer and as an administrator clocking 10,000 hours of flying involving about 20,000 accident free sorties.

In the memoirs, the author describes his experiences, the stresses and strains and the challenges faced by him, with interesting episodes. The book clearly brings out the comradeship which exists in the Air Force by way of officers and airmen and their families mixing freely particularly at festive occasions.

Apart from discussing professional aspects, Air Marshal Malhotra dwells in great detail on the problem of corruption at all levels resulting in inefficiency and suffering by common people. He also describes the unethical behaviour of the politicians such as resorting to taking unauthorised people in the aircraft and asking the concerned authorities to destroy the passenger list.

The Air Marshal also dwells on the civilian supremacy over the defence forces the problem of civil-military adjustments, unless professionals master the art of adjustment, accommodation and "Yes Manship". The comparison between the Boss and himself at the end of the book makes interesting reading and adds to the humorous aspect in the book replete with such anecdotes. Behind the veneer of humour hides a thought provoking book of interest to all Air Force officers and people in all walks of life. As a professional man the author could have highlighted more of his experiences particularly as a VIP pilot.

A good addition to all libraries.

Commodore R. P. Khanna (Retd)

Dropping Names. By Manohar Malgonkar (New Delhi : Lotus Collection, Roli Books Pvt Ltd, 1996), pp. 168, Rs. 95.00, ISBN 81-7436-008-5.

This sleek paperback is a collection of 36 vignettes on colourful personalities ranging from JRD Tata to Mario Miranda who have made an impact on the author. It includes fleeting glimpses of Field Marshal KM Cariappa, John Masters, Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi and several other Indians and foreigners. Their personae is depicted in Malgonkar's racy and often incisive style which makes the book ideal for quick Sunday reading. If you are a biography buff, enjoy reading it from cover to cover on an airline flight from Delhi to Mumbai.

Lieutenant General Ptakash Gokarn

John Foster Dulles : Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy. By Richard H Immerman (Wilmington, USA : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), pp. 221, \$17.95, ISBN 0-8420-2600-2.

Many of us have recollections of the 1950s US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as a rabid anti-communist for whom the world was divided into two : friendly countries aligned with the US, and those not aligned as the enemy of the US. Even the Europeans saw Dulles "as a fire-and-brimstone anti-communist fanatic who would risk the nuclear annihilation of Iron Curtain."

Dulles held the very important office of Secretary of State during the formative years of the Cold War and was largely responsible for shaping American foreign policy, initiatives and responses, during the 50s, although Eisenhower was very much his own master and would not hesitate to take Dulles to task if he thought it necessary. Dulles did exaggerate the communist threat but finally his commitment and dedication were never in doubt and his relationship with the President was a "model" one.

For students of American foreign policy, this book is a must-read. It is a very well-researched biography of an architect of post World War II American foreign policy. The book includes a biographical essay which is an invaluable reference to those wishing to engage in further research on Eisenhower, Dulles, American foreign policy, American presidential election campaigns and politics of the 1950s.

Commodore R N Sharma (Retd)

The Good Guys Wear Black : The True-Life Heroes of Britain's Armed Police.
By Steve Collins (London : Arrow Books, 1998), pp. 296, £5.99, ISBN 0-09-918682-9

Steve Collins has spun out true - life stories of high risk deeds of his "Black Team", special armed police, operating against individual hoodlums as well as organised gangsters. The motivation, valour and other spur-of-the-moment actions of his team-mates are artfully mentioned. More significant is the curbs inherently faced by the security forces in counter - terrorism operations, made worse by modern weaponry and the overzealous visual media.

The book makes an enjoyable reading.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

Zero Option. *By Chris Ryan (UK : Century Random, 1998) pp. 374, £5.99 ISBN 0 09 924 7623.*

This is the third novel by the author who has vast experience in counter terrorist operations and has seen active service with elite 'Special Air Service' SAS. As is the case with his earlier novels, this one is also based on the exploits of a 'Sergeant Geordie Sharp'. Fast and racy, it can be a good read if one can accept highly dramatised and some definitely improbable exploits of the hero. The story portrays the travails of Sergeant Sharp when Provisional Irish Republic Army kidnaps his girl friend and four year old son. They demand the release of PIRA leader captured in Colombia in exchange for the hostages. Meanwhile, the indispensable sergeant is required by the higher authorities to lead a hit team to eliminate an Iraqi General who had taken refuge in Libya and was busy mustering support to mount an attack on Israel. The PIRA later raise their ante. They want Geordie Sharp to shoot the British Prime Minister. A plan to hoodwink the terrorists and get Sharp's family released is formulated. But this requires

cooperation of the Prime Minister, in that, he should offer himself for a 'long distance rifle shot' to be missed deliberately but for all intent and purpose will look as if Sharp had met the demand and killed the PM. Does Sharp succeed in this mission and get back his family?

The storyline is incredible. But the book can be read if you are a 'checked in' passenger suffering a long wait, not knowing when your flight will take off.

Brigadier P Sarin (Retd)

Marching to Valhalla. By Michael Blake (UK : Arrow Books, 1996), pp. 288, £ 6.99, ISBN 0 09 923572 2.

This is a 'historical novel' based on the life and exploits of General Armstrong Custer, who commanded a cavalry brigade at the age of twenty three in 1863. The book takes the format of a 'personal diary' covering the period 18 May 1876 to 24 June 1876. General Custer was killed in battle on 25 June 1876. In addition to giving insight into the psyche of the young and extremely successful General, the author also highlights the usual professional rivalries that exist between highly competent commanders everywhere in the world. With the background of the American Civil War the book gives an interesting account of those times when America was taking shape as a Nation.

Not in the same league as his *Dances with Wolves*, which was also a very successful movie, this novel will be particularly interesting to those readers who are keen on military study. The book is a good mix of facts and fiction. It gives the reader a very good idea about the functioning of American Army of that period.

Brigadier P Sarin (Retd)

Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914-1918. By Roger Chickering (UK : Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 227, £12.95, ISBN 0-521-56754-8.

This book examines the military aspects of the war in great detail and depth. Particularly well covered are the Hindenburg Program, the Schlieffen Plan, the German advance of August and September 1914, the battle of Tannenberg, the occupation of Europe, the stalemate on the Western Front in 1914/15, the Battle of Verdun, the Brusilov Offensive of 1916, the Kerensky Offensive of 1917, the Ludendorff Offensive of 1918 and the Allied Counter Offensive during the period July to November 1918. Personalities like Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Erich von Falkenhayn, The Kaiser, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff are well presented, dissected, analysed and stored on the hard disk of history. Diplomatic manoeuvres and wranglings, the putout and actual policies and strategies of governments are dealt with masterly aplomb. The industrial mobilisation of Imperial Germany is covered under the heads of bureaucratic foundations, mobilisation of industrial resources, feeding the soldiers and the populace at large, mobilisation and maintenance of morale. Apart from this outstanding macro-level encompassing of events, personalities and results, what this book

will also be sought for, is the human angle coverage of day to day existence of the people; in the all pervasive fallout of the results on the fronts on all strata of society. The increasing burdens of the war effort are highlighted and brought out quite remarkably as to how these translate into political opposition.

Strongly recommended as compulsory study by all students of European history as well as those interested in the history of warfare as affects society.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma

The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization. By Francis Fukuyama and Abram N Shulsky (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1997), pp. 81, Price not indicated, ISBN 08330-2532-5.

The dynamics of the information age is gradually affecting the entire range of human activity, fostering myriad concepts of social, economic, commercial and political engagement. Commerce is generally the first to innovate as accrual of efficiency contributes to profit. It is thus appropriate that this Rand study sponsored by the US Army seeks to transfer lessons from information technology driven structural adaptations by commercial corporations to army organisation. Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky, two highly respected social scientists, have clinically analysed the change enabling factors in this slim volume.

Greater premium on human capital, short product cycles, complex markets, globalisation and dominance of the service sector are the emerging phenomenon in the corporate World. To survive without affecting the bottom line, organisations have transformed from traditional hierarchies to, "Virtual Corporations" wherein generalised functions are pushed out by outsourcing. This has come about through greater trust building, information flows directed at points of decision and egalitarianism of knowledge and competencies. While some military functions as strategic planning, fire support and logistics are best left centralised, the CNN effect wherein due to media proliferation the price of tactical failures could lead to major political upheavals and the RMA with information dominating the decision space is also likely to perpetuate centralisation. "Informatting" or applying automation to information processes to avoid information overload and provide only required information at each command level, demystifying access of information to all those who need it, encouraging experimentation by promoting an adaptive/innovative culture, greater distribution of skills through training, are the principal adaptations recommended by the authors as precursors to structural transformation. The average reader's expectations of an organisational model being provided as a summation of theorising are however unfulfilled. Exponential developments in information age technologies has rendered prognostications in this sphere hazardous. Thus the authors work undertaken merely two years ago would seem dated in the emerging commerce and business environment. Notwithstanding the same, it clearly enunciates the socio-political transformational adjustments required in organisations to adapt to the information age such as trust, egalitarian power models, breakdown of hierarchies, sharing of information and a bottom up decision loop.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending September 1999

(The books reviewed in April - June 1999 issue has been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

S. No.	Author's Name	Title	Year
Army - India			
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